



Cooperating to Disarm

**Regional Centre on Small Arms
in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa
and Bordering States**

**BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
ON PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT
FOR THE RECSA REGION**

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBP	Community Based Policing
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MS	Member States
Nairobi Protocol	Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
NAP	National Action Plan
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PD	Practical Disarmament
PSCs	Private Security Companies
RECS	Regional Economic Committees
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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Introduction to Practical Disarmament

The concept of Practical Disarmament was first used in 1995 in the UN's "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", reinforcing arms reduction efforts in response to the new phenomena of small arms possession by non-state actors. It reflected the need to target this new group with practical measures different from the regulations and sanctions for nation-states.ⁱ The concept was endorsed by UN member countries that experienced negative effects of proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) particularly after civil wars and other forms of armed conflicts. Practical Disarmament measures were envisioned as a concept and framework that would not only comprehensively address the issue of illicit (SALWs) in post-conflict settings, but also create conditions for achievement of sustainable peace and development.

Basically, the concept of Practical Disarmament acknowledges the extensive and complex channels of SALWs proliferation as well as the additional reality that SALWs are not only confined to conflict situations, but also afflict communities in peaceful times. In addition to the physical removal of SALWs, it deals with other issues relevant to achieve sustainable peace such as socio-economic transformation; improving not only political governance but also public security as well as the promotion of political reconciliation, social tolerance and cohesion necessary for restoration of complete justice and peace during and/or in the aftermath of armed confrontations. This comprehensive approach ideally diminishes the need for possession of SALWs in the society as the population is adequately catered for in all aspects particularly aspects of human security, the absence of which usually propels the need to acquire SALWs. A central objective of Practical Disarmament is to prevent the onset, distribution and continuation of armed violence through a combination of approaches for building peace, not only through peacefully resolving armed conflicts but also preventing their future occurrence.

In its most basic form, Practical Disarmament consists of a combination of legal reforms intended to regulate not only the illegal access to, but also ownership and use of SALWs by civilians and other unauthorised non-state entities, as well as the technical interventions undertaken to collect, manage and de-commission (through various methods) the surplus SALWs from the national army and its auxiliaries, and those collected from belligerents (such as guerrilla/rebel forces and irregular militias) and civilians that are considered by the legitimate government to be in the excess of defence stockpiles.ⁱⁱ

As envisioned, Practical Disarmament is a collaborative, pragmatic and contextualized approach. The approach acknowledges that security is influenced by a range of social, cultural, economic, ecological and psychological as well as political factors. The value of Practical Disarmament is in promoting a demilitarized culture in society. It calls for the development of, and the creation of awareness and sensitization on, the relevant national policies and legislation (principal and subsidiary) necessary to increase the viability of public involvement in national security issues in a transparent manner to the extent possible.ⁱⁱⁱ This people-centred collaborative approach to the control of SALWs requires the participation of all stakeholders who seek to establish a society free from violence and illicit firearms.

Practical Disarmament therefore, is not just about the collection and management of weapons stockpiles but has to do with ending as well as preventing conflicts, strengthening the rule of law and promoting public security. It is aimed at reducing armed violence and demands for SALW and improving the management of the State in dispensing its security functions. Practical Disarmament is often combined with, but distinct from, Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programme amongst others. It can also be taken as a component of 'disarmament' during DDR programmes. The concept has expanded in recent years beyond simply a technical intervention and now takes into consideration demand factors as well as the accountability and reform of state security entities.^{iv}

While appreciating that DDR is geared towards situations where conflict is just ending, it is evident that there are other categories of armed conflicts that cannot be addressed by conventional DDR approaches especially those associated with armed civilians such as: organised criminal gangs/groups; militias; pastoralists; among others. Acknowledging the stabilizing role of DDR in conflict situations, there are also explicit limitations to the extent of its interventions. The need to deal with armed groups outside conflict situations calls for a different approach. The concept of Practical Disarmament opens an opportunity to address the traditional and new dimensions of conflicts within RECSA region. This implies that existing initiatives for peace-building such as DDR need to be complemented by intervention for long-term socio-economic development through undertaking Practical Disarmament.

These guidelines are intended to provide Governments and practitioners with a clear road map in the design and development of disarmament interventions that will harmonize approaches, better facilitate the implementation of more comprehensive and integrated programmes, improve the efficiency and ensure effectiveness in the use of resources and involvement of a wider cross-section of stakeholders in the implementation processes. The guidelines are intended to offer minimum generic standards for undertaking Practical Disarmament. The individual countries in the RECSA region depending on the context, framework and resources available will develop the details of the actual disarmament initiatives.

Regional status

Over the last two decades, RECSA Member States have experienced various types of armed conflicts, largely due to the prevalence of SALWs, weak state institutions and structures and asymmetries in the exercise of political power, manifested by political repression, exclusion and patrimonialism. These conflicts range from inter-state conflicts; internal civil strife and armed rebellions; to piracy and terrorism associated with religious fundamentalism, as well as the insecurity created by armed civilians, including, not only organised crime but also individual criminals and pastoralists.

The extent of possession of SALWs by non-state actors in RECSA Member States, which is, among others, largely caused by the prevalence of inter-state conflicts and internal civil strife, varies from country to country. There are some RECSA member states where the entire armed forces of a country have been disbanded following a military defeat (e.g. Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and Somalia, among others), or where there has been a military stalemate as a result of which parties to the conflicts have been forced to seek a negotiated settlement (e.g. the Sudan). Even in countries where internal civil conflicts ended, or where none has ever been experienced at all, being neighbours with other countries afflicted with conflicts has exposed them to high risks of illegal civilian armament and organised criminal gangs. Illegal armament of civilians perpetuates organised crimes, manifested variously in form of: armed robberies; carjacking; kidnappings; extortions and protection payments; human trafficking, drug trafficking, among others. In many countries in the region, national and sub-national elections are increasingly associated with armed violence, which in some countries has been linked to organised crime.

In many Member States, armed conflicts involving civilians are also characterised by intra- as well as inter-community conflicts. These conflicts may sometimes result from and manifest in form of the competition over the access, ownership and control of resources such as land and water. In all countries in and around the “Karamoja” and “Somali” clusters, armed pastoralist conflicts involving livestock rustling are prevalent; and most of the rustling occurs within and among component pastoralist ethnic groups, clans and sub-clans. There are also armed conflicts between pastoralist groups and their settled crop-cultivating neighbours.

In these countries, inter-community conflicts between the various pastoralist groups (especially involving livestock rustling) often espouse cross-border dimensions. Violent armed conflicts occur between pastoralist communities along common border areas between Sudan and Uganda; Sudan and Kenya; Sudan and Ethiopia; Ethiopia and Kenya, and; Uganda and Kenya. Some of these pastoralist groups astride the common international borders: the Nuer and Anyuak are present in both Sudan and

Ethiopia; the Pokot are in both Uganda and Kenya; the Oromo in Ethiopia are cousins with the Gebra and Borana in Kenya; there are Borana in both Kenya and Ethiopia.

In most of the Member States which have been afflicted by armed insurgencies (Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda), a diversity of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) interventions targeting either defeated armies and/or rebel groups have been undertaken, not only as part of peace building initiatives to end armed conflicts, but also to facilitate short-term stabilisation after the end of armed conflicts.

The DDR programmes implemented in Member States have varied largely due to the unique contexts of armed conflicts in which they have been implemented. These range from inter-state wars and internal insurgencies to situations of civilian armament and organised crime involving a diversity of irregular actors. Variations have been observed in size of the DDR operations (in terms of numbers of beneficiaries), duration (the period within which the DDR operations were carried out) and source of funding. Some have been very large (e.g. in Ethiopia), and others small (Uganda). The period the programmes were implemented ranged from 3 years to five years, and in most countries, a series of DDR programmes have been implemented over an extended period of time. In most Member States, DDR programmes have been funded by Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) administered by the World Bank and UNDP, apart from a few where much of the resources were internally generated (e.g. Ethiopia). In some Member States, such as the DRC, and to some extent Burundi, DDR operations were part of UN-mandated peacekeeping operation.

In all these Member States, following the abatement of internal insurgencies, DDR operations targeting ex-combatants in rebel forces or defeated armies, have been followed by demobilisation and reintegration interventions of national armies and their auxiliaries, associated in most of these countries with security sector reforms. Many Member States have at some point down-sized their military, some unwillingly, largely in response to pressure from donors. In a few countries, the dynamics of internal conflict situations have compounded the process of down-sizing, as the number of troops has surged in response to new security challenges, even after demobilisation has been effected (e.g. Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda).

In some member states where DDR interventions have been implemented, there have been DDR challenges associated with inadequately demobilised and poorly reintegrated ex-combatants, servicemen and women as well as poorly regulated private security service providers. In many of these countries, ex-combatants from defeated armies and demobilised rebel forces, servicemen, women and auxiliaries may have retained some small arms that have continued to fuel armed criminality in post conflict settings (e.g. in Uganda). There are also many countries where insurgents are still active in-

country (DRC, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Burundi). Some Member States suffer conflicts from insurgents of other countries or based in neighbouring countries (Uganda, Rwanda, and Sudan). In all these Member States, Practical Disarmament has come under scrutiny in peace building and conflict management endeavours that generate sustainable security, peace, and development. The concept of Practical Disarmament is an appropriate approach for members States to deal with their specific needs and related challenges.

Guidelines development process

In response to the challenges posed both by civilian armament and the different approaches and initiatives undertaken in the RECSA region, RECSA developed these “Best Practices Guidelines on Practical Disarmament” for the RECSA region. For the development of these Guidelines, RECSA and its collaborating partners carried out various activities, which included the following:

- Baseline studies were undertaken in four countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan) to provide a clear understanding of the experiences of the different disarmament interventions. These informed the design of the Practical Disarmament guidelines. Each of the studies mapped out and analysed the past government disarmament interventions and responses to the challenges posed by armament, such as: disarmament strategies used; the legal framework for disarmament interventions; the nature of development interventions undertaken, and their integration with security considerations; the challenges encountered in disarmament exercises and the way they were addressed. The studies also identified disarmament stakeholders and their roles, the competencies and synergies built and the capacity gaps. A methodology workshop was organised to ensure harmonization of the approach for the baseline studies
- A Regional Research Validation Workshop was held to share the findings of the studies with representatives from RECSA Member States, regional organisations, civil society, researchers and other disarmament experts. Lessons learnt from inputs of workshop participants were consolidated to inform the development of these guidelines.
- Joint Learning Missions were undertaken to Liberia and Sierra Leone. These missions offered an opportunity to learn from out-of-the-region experiences in carrying out post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of armed groups and civilians. The two missions, comprised representatives from RECSA Member States, members of the Project Steering Committee, RECSA staff, civil society and research organisations.

- A team was constituted to draft the Best Practices Guidelines on Practical Disarmament. The team benefited from the baseline studies on Practical Disarmament and the reports of the learning missions to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Available literature on disarmament, peace building, conflict resolution and prevention from governmental and other agencies, as well as resource materials from the United Nations (including the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) informed the design of these guidelines on Practical Disarmament. The draft was shared widely with partner organisations for input/review.
- Finally, a draft of the Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament was presented for discussion and review, and was adopted in October 2010 during a regional validation meeting attended by representatives from RECSA Member States, regional inter-governmental organisations, civil society, researchers and experts in disarmament.

Background

As the dynamics of conflicts have become more complex, multiple and regionally interconnected, conflicts are no longer dominated by struggles between belligerent armies over state powers. In addition to post-conflict settings, armed violence is also occurring in other nationally specific inter-related contexts, such as election violence, urban violence, resources competition, ethnic identity differences, inter-group competition, and organized crime, among others.

The violence engendered in these conflicts is increasingly being characterised by the use of SALW. Armed actors have varied from combatants in national armies and rebels to bandits, terrorists and civilians – the latter comprising vigilantes, youth, militias, gangs, and criminals. The emergence of these new actors has challenged national and regional security and the framework used to understand and address conflicts.

In most of the countries of the RECSA region, affected by armed conflicts associated with the prevalence of SALWs, policy and legal frameworks for controlling SALW and addressing the negative impacts of armed conflicts are inadequate. Difficulties are encountered in maintaining law and order thus inhibiting the provision of community security and undermining efforts to sustain peace and security. The conventional approach to security provision has focused on reducing the prevalence of illicit SALWs. This approach focusing primarily on armed groups has not adequately addressed the root causes of the widespread armament of societies as a whole.

Armament is driven by such varied factors/aspects as political and economic marginalization, inequity and inequality, high levels of poverty, absence of effective State authorities, porous borders, inability to institutionalize political power, globalization, retrogressive cultural practices, inability to effectively respond to changes in physical and climate conditions. As a result, any disarmament initiative must be multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary and inclusive so as to contribute to sustainable peace. The latter challenges are some of the aspects that inform Practical Disarmament.

Conventional DDR interventions entail processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants of armed groups and national armies into civilian life. In the RECSA region, DDR interventions have been undertaken in Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. DDR interventions have usually been integrated in peace agreements between the government and warring factions and implemented as an element of stabilisation and recovery at the end of a conflict. DDR is an immediate intervention aimed at stabilising volatile conflict situations. By their nature, DDR

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initiatives usually tend to focus on the immediate peace dividends from the interventions undertaken in post conflict settings but pay limited attention to long-term recovery and development. Thus, DDR interventions are, most of the time, incapable of addressing underlying pertinent issues that undermine security and stability of the conflict affected communities. There are apparent inherent limitations of DDR as a post-conflict intervention; and include, among others, the following: the exclusive focus of DDR on combatants; the tendency to create inequities and inequalities; inadequate support for sustainable livelihood initiatives; the failure to adequately address community security; the limited national ownership, as in most cases it is donor-driven.

One of the immediate measures to implement at the end of a conflict or in situation of widespread-armed violence is the restoration of a climate of peace and security. This calls for Security Sector Reform (SSR), which is an important measure undertaken to achieve sustainable peace in post-conflict settings. Even though, this and other DDR measures have primarily been undertaken in order to enhance public and community security, they have not sufficiently reduced demand for illicit SALW and/or addressed the motivations behind civilian armament.

The intensity, diversity, scope and magnitude of conflict situations in the RECSA region necessitate approaches that recognize the complexity of various conflict scenarios in the respective states. Apart from the on-going intra-state and inter-state conflicts, the RECSA region has experienced conflicts ranging from organized crime; urban violence; electoral violence; vigilantes; both State supported and non-State militias; violence associated with armed pastoralist groups amongst others. The multiplicity of interventions that have been undertaken in the States of the RECSA region have faced many challenges. The focus on security-centred interventions, as well as lack of cross-border, holistic, multi-faceted and multi-level interventions have limited their impact on peace, security and stability in the short, medium and long terms.

It is instructive that some countries in the RECSA region have not experienced outright internal insurgencies that would require DDR interventions. Yet, these countries have and continue to grapple with the problem of small arms possession by civilians. As pointed out, the armament of the civilians is informed not so much by socio-political imperatives but more by socio-economic and cultural considerations. The proliferation and misuse of firearms by these civilians occasionally results in violent contestations that, even though, do not necessarily graduate into civil wars, cause political unrest and exacerbate criminal activities. It is therefore paramount that illicit small arms are collected from the civilians in order to build public security and confidence in the governments.

Practical Disarmament offers an opportunity to sustain disarmament interventions by addressing most of the gaps emerging from conventional disarmament initiatives. Practical Disarmament endeavours to

create conditions where not only disarmament succeeds and peace is restored and maintained but in so doing ensures that there are no losers amongst all the participating stakeholders. Thus, it mitigates against the need to acquire weapons.

General Best Practices Guidelines on Practical Disarmament

Situation Analysis

The process of designing Practical Disarmament strategies should be preceded by a clear, comprehensive and systematic situation analysis for each of the identified categories to be targeted.

The situation analysis is important for three main reasons namely;

- (1) It provides the relevant basic information for instance on what went wrong in the community, necessary to inform the development of appropriate interventions;
- (2) It highlights the challenges and the lessons learned from previous efforts to conduct disarmament exercises;
- (3) It helps decision makers to compare current and past situations, and the best ways to address emerging challenges.

Situation analysis is a precondition in any process that aims to guide the implementation of Practical Disarmament. The situation analysis should clearly highlight the following:

Categories targeted for Practical Disarmament

There are a number of categories of armed groups that Practical Disarmament should target. These categories are determined by the identities, composition, and the levels of organization, goals, and the nature of armament. In the case of the RECSA Region, the main categories for Practical Disarmament are: rebel groups/ex-combatants, armed criminal gangs/ militias, armed civilians, and national armies, especially if it is in the context of security sector reforms intended to improve the quality and effectiveness of the armed forces. Practical Disarmament strategies proposed for each of these categories will vary.

Drivers of armament

What drives target groups to arm themselves illegally? Are there historical issues that led the people to resort to arms or violence? What are the different events that have affected the social, economic, political and other safety networks especially among the various age groups to push them to arms and violence? Understanding of the underlying causes in light of the new dimensions such as emerging technologies and influences, and the root causes of conflicts is therefore key to unearthing the reasons that drive individuals and communities to illegally acquire arms, and hence, to addressing the problem of illicit SALWs. For instance are there structural inequalities, electoral disputes, insecurity, historical grievances, and governance issues?

Understanding the causes for armament allows for devising effective Practical Disarmament strategies.

Levels of armament

A survey of SALWs should be undertaken to provide information needed for planning appropriate Practical Disarmament strategies. In negotiated peace agreements, the inventory of weapons owned by forces subjected to disarmament is usually part of the peace agreement; although it may not give full extent of the armament (especially if there is a likelihood that armed could flare up again). It is essential to establish the level of armament as well as to anticipate the nature of weapons that should be expected to be collected from whom, and where. This information will inform appropriate planning for the management of collected weapons [See *BPG on Destruction of SALWs*]. It will be essential to establish the following: What percentage of the population is armed? What is the estimated number of weapons in circulation among the population? What types of weapons do they possess and what are the sources? Are arms easily available and accessible? These questions, amongst others, will allow the designers of Practical Disarmament programmes to design interventions that are effective based on the realities on the ground.

Actors in the armament/conflict

To develop effective Practical Disarmament strategies, it is crucial to undertake an actor analysis in order to profile the various actors involved in armament. Who is armed? Are men, women, girls and boys armed? Are they ordinary civilians or organised criminals? What are their objectives and relationships? Who is supplying illegal arms? Are there any institutions involved in intervening to resolve the problem? Actor analysis allows for channelling interventions to the most appropriate beneficiaries of Practical Disarmament.

Stakeholders and their interests

Who are the stakeholders in Practical Disarmament at the local, national, regional and international levels? What are their interests? How can they be brought on board to support Practical Disarmament initiatives? The situation analysis should answer these questions. In the context of the RECSA region, governments, regional organizations, Regional Economic Communities, Civil Society organizations, private companies, bilateral and multilateral partners, and community organizations are some of the key stakeholders.

Available capacities

A Practical Disarmament intervention strategy should benefit from the existing local capacities. The situational analysis should therefore highlight the existing capacities, traditional leadership

structures, faith-based organizations, NGOs and civil society organizations working in the area, relevant national and local government supported programmes being implemented within the geographical scope targeted, and alternative livelihood opportunities such as livestock markets, irrigation, among others.

Gender dimensions of the problem of armament

The integration of gender issues in any Practical Disarmament intervention should be mandatory. The various roles of men, women, girls and boys in relation to the proliferation and use of illegal firearms needs to be carefully investigated and documented prior to executing Practical Disarmament. Questions such as are women armed? What are the men, women, girls and boys specific issues related to Practical Disarmament? What are the specific men vs. women roles in SALW use? Are women, girls and boys affected in the same way by SALW as are men? What gender integrative strategies can be employed in Practical Disarmament intervention strategies?

Cultural dimensions

Within the RECSA region, culture is a significant component that influences the ways in which communities interact with one another, their physical environment, and their access to the resources in their localities. Cultural practices such as age and generational set systems, initiation to adulthood and marriage, play a significant role in processes of arms acquisition and use. What role does culture play in the armament of civilian population? What are the cultural dynamics of SALW proliferation? In what ways does culture influence perception of communities towards arms? The answers to these questions would help to determine the entry levels for civic education programmes and alternative livelihood and other strategies to disarm the mind.

Legal and policy regimes

Understanding existing legal and policy regimes helps to guard the intervention process against legal setbacks. The parameters of operation and where there are policy and legal gaps, addressing them is a priority that should precede any Practical Disarmament intervention. It also helps planners to negotiate the various positions assumed by key stakeholders especially governments in relation to Practical Disarmament interventions.

Regional context

Understanding the regional context of armament and disarmament processes helps to situate Practical Disarmament interventions within the existing regional realities. What regional factors have a bearing on the disarmament process? Who are the regional actors that may aid or derail the process? What is the prevailing regional political and economic environment? Is there an ongoing regional conflict fuelling the arms acquisition? Are there regional actors whose partnership can

move the process forward? Is there an ongoing DDR programme, or a cross border development programme that can benefit a Practical Disarmament intervention? More crucially, understanding the regional political and economic context is even more urgent in situations that demand for disarmament to be undertaken concurrently at a regional level.

Impact of armament

Profiling the impact of arms proliferation and use allows intervention strategies to target the most urgent and vulnerable beneficiaries. Women, children, physically challenged persons and social economic systems are often the worst affected by violence and conflict in which illegal arms play a central role. What is the psychological, physical and emotional impact of the armed conflicts and/or armament on combatants, children, and physically challenged people, among others? Understanding the magnitude of the impact not only influences the direction and scale of intervention, but may also influence the pace at which interventions are implemented.

Plan of Action

Once the prevailing situation of armament is established, the development of an action plan to systematize interventions should be undertaken. The role of an action plan is to ensure that both quick-wins and long-term goals are well articulated and factored for in the process. The plan of action should clearly stipulate the short-, medium- and long-term goals of a Practical Disarmament intervention. For instance, in on-going conflicts situation, the short-term objective will be to stabilize the situation and end the conflict; in post-conflict situations the objective will be to restore ex-combatants and address the needs of those affected by the conflict; in the case of armed civilians, the short-term objective is to ensure peace and security through restoration of law and order.

The objectives will determine the alternatives that are available for the disarmament implementers. In the identification of objectives, clarity is needed on the type of engagement, that is, whether short, medium or long term; whether a security operation or a socio-economic transformation intervention. The former is sometimes necessary as a short-term measure to reinstall security where law and order has broken down. However, the aim should be the latter as a long-term measure for sustainable solutions. The action plan should at a minimum entail the following;

1. Determination of appropriate interventions/activities
2. Sequencing/prioritization of activities
3. Determination of timelines

4. Allocation of responsibilities (these will be allocated based on the actors involved as per the situation analysis)
5. Determination of milestones/indicators of success
6. Resourcing

Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Monitoring and evaluation are essential management functions that are interactive and mutually supportive. Monitoring is a continuing function that aims primarily to provide intervention implementers and stakeholders with early indications of progress, or lack thereof, in the achievement of the intervention objectives. It enables the identification and assessment of potential problems and success of an intervention. It provides the basis for corrective actions, both substantive and operational, to improve the delivery or intervention design, manner of implementation and quality of results. In addition, it enables the reinforcement of initial positive results. Monitoring and evaluation should be integrated in implementation process to enable implementers to respond to demands for:

- (a) Greater accountability in the use of resources,
- (b) Representation and participation,
- (c) A clearer basis for decision-making and
- (d) More practical lessons from experience to guide future disarmament interventions.

Monitoring and evaluation should be results-oriented and provide assessments of the relevance, performance and success or challenges of disarmament interventions.

Resource Mobilisation

Regardless of the target of the Practical Disarmament exercise, resource mobilization is critical to the achievement of the overall objectives of the plan. Resources may be in the form of finances, equipment, technical, and human, among others. Whatever the target, several approaches may be used to mobilize the required resources to implement Practical Disarmament intervention plans. The first step is to develop a resource mobilisation strategy after identifying possible sources of funding and capacity support. This may include the following:

1. **Budgetary allocation by Government.** This is necessary to demonstrate Government ownership and commitment to the process for long-term sustainability. The government should be seen to own the process and the best way to demonstrate this is to allocate funds to support the process.
2. **Mobilisation of technical and financial assistance from development partners and civil society.** The strategy should provide for a mechanism to secure buy-in from development partners, civil society and other actors working in the area. This may be through full or partial financing of Practical Disarmament programmes, joint fundraising ventures, etc.
3. **Local/private financiers.** The strategy should provide for ways and means of acquiring the financial, technical and material support from private companies, under their corporate social responsibility or through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), individuals, community initiatives.
4. **Local, national and international expertise.** This will ensure the process gains from past experiences and strengthen partnerships. The bottom line is however to ensure national ownership and determination.

Execution

To effectively execute the Practical Disarmament interventions, an appropriate institutional framework is necessary to plan and implement the DDR interventions. Consultation for buy-in of the process with the following key actors is a prerequisite for success:

1. Leaders (traditional and Government)
2. Communities
3. Civil society
4. Development partners
5. Inter-governmental regional mechanisms

It is worth noting that consultations may highlight issues that require refining the activities and prioritizing them accordingly.

A sensitisation programme should be rolled out to pass the right messages to the targeted categories regarding a Practical Disarmament exercise. A number of issues must be addressed in the sensitization process including:

Who should undertake the sensitization campaign?

The sensitization activities may be undertaken by the government departments at the local government level, civil society organizations, community-based organizations, faith-based groups, opinion leaders such as teachers, political and business leaders, media, amongst others stakeholders. Sensitization should be shielded against “spoilers” who may take advantage of the process to pass conflicting messages to the communities that run counter to the intended purpose.

How should the sensitization be done?

Depending on the target, it may be undertaken through public forums, workshops, print and electronic media particularly through radio in vernacular languages especially in the rural areas, door to door campaigns, posters in public places, drama, music and dance activities with the relevant messages, essay competitions in schools and colleges among others.

What should be contained in the sensitization messages?

Sensitization campaigns should contain messages about the dangers and negative impact of illegal arms. It should also endear itself to the targeted population by being positive, non-threatening and friendly and restoring and/or maintaining the dignity and identity of people. It should seek to build a partnership between the targeted group and the government, and to consistently highlight the overall benefits to the welfare of the group and the society at large.

Policy/legal framework

A policy and legal framework should be developed to provide an enabling environment for practical disarmament to be undertaken. This policy and legal framework should be clear on the following issues:

Policy

1. Peaceful resolution of all forms of conflicts. The policy must be clear on the circumstances where the use of force is permissible (for example, in instances where the necessity of restoration of law and order dictates so). Whenever the use of force becomes necessary in resolving conflicts, the policy framework should specify the necessary rules of engagement.
2. The Policy framework should specify the need for all inclusive consultations involving an inter-ministerial/department committee in achievement of sustainable peace and development.
3. The Policy framework should emphasise processes that involve all relevant stakeholders, including communities, civil society, and development partners.
4. The Policy framework should seek to transform the social and economic life of the people through long-term and sustainable interventions.

Legislation

1. A Legal framework that seeks to enhance control of civilian acquisition, ownership and use of SALWs has to be put in place, and it should imposing tough sanctions on those who contravene the principal and subsidiary laws regarding acquisition, ownership and use of SALWs.
2. The Legal framework should provide for disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, recovery, reconstruction and development of not only ex-combatants but also communities affected by armed conflicts in a holistic manner that makes sustainable peace and development possible.

Institutions and structures

For the effective implementation of the Practical Disarmament interventions, a Multi-stakeholders Committee involving all the relevant stakeholders should be established with the primary responsibility to coordinate the process. The structure of the committee should comprise an Inter-Ministerial Commission made up of representatives of the line ministries in charge of the Judiciary, Youth, Internal Security, Foreign Affairs, Tourism, Transport and Communications, Natural Resources/Environment, Defence, Finance, and Agriculture, as the situation in the country may demand; Civil Society Organizations, Regional Inter-Governmental Organisations, national and regional NGOs, private sector, research think tanks, development partners, community leaders, community based organisations.

Each of these stakeholders should have a clearly defined role, relative to their capacities and mandate. The institutional framework created under this Multi-Stakeholders Committee should have the overall responsibility for coordinating and ensuring effective implementation of the Practical Disarmament interventions.

Political goodwill

For Practical Disarmament to be successful, it must enjoy political goodwill from leaders (local and national as well as institutions). Even in situations of on-going conflicts both sides of the protagonists should genuinely accept to end conflict and implement the outcomes of peace negotiations as part of Practical Disarmament. Political will means that the Government has to provide all the necessary resources and facilitate a conducive environment for the implementation of the process. This is expressed through government ownership through commitment of the leadership to the process and allocation of funds plus support to the implementers. The shielding of the process from politicisation is crucial and may be achievable through consultation during the intervention design.

Best Practices Guidelines for Practical Disarmament for Selected Categories of Armed Groups

These Best Practice Guidelines herein are intended to guide the process of undertaking Practical Disarmament in order to achieve sustainable, effective and long-term peace and development. The practical aspect of the Practical Disarmament will see Government go beyond reactive, short-term disarmament processes to a more sustained approach. Across all the intervention options, prevailing insecurity concerns must be adequately addressed as a way of instilling confidence in the whole process. Appropriate legal regimes must be also in place to guide the processes.

Disarmament interventions options

The following intervention measures are recommended either singly or as a combination of two or more approaches for optimised realisation of a sustainable and lasting solution to security-related conflict.

1. **Voluntary surrender:** It entails the physical return of SALWs to the legal government or mandated organization, by individuals or community on their own accord, and attracts no further penalty. This is a non-aggressive approach which allows illegal gun owners to surrender their arms without any conditions within a specified time frame (amnesty period). In addition to the applicable timelines, the amnesty details should indicate, collection centres and conditions of surrender, if any. Under the circumstances, those who surrender their weapons voluntarily may be considered for immunity from prosecution as provided for under article 12 of the Nairobi Protocol. For the success of this approach, adequate measures should be taken to address the previously prevailing security fears and renewed confidence in the Government's ability to provide security. This is recommended as a best practice.
2. **Amnesty:** A specified period during which illegal weapons can be handed in without prosecution. In accordance with domestic laws of the respective member states, general amnesty may be granted for those in possession of illegal arms to surrender them. Clear time lines to include collection centres and other conditions applicable should be clearly specified. In situations where disarmament may be complicated by re-armament leading to a protracted process, member states may also consider establishing a standing amnesty commission to continuously pursue this option. This is recommended as a best practice.

3. **Forceful disarmament:** It refers to the use of institutionalized force to disarm armed groups and individuals. This approach is dictated by the prevailing situation but mostly where there is large-scale escalation of violence and a need to initially stabilise the situation is deemed necessary. This can also follow where voluntary surrender is estimated to have fallen short of expectations depending on the initial estimates of illegally-held arms as well as continued manifestation of armed conflicts which is suggestive of continued retention of illicit firearms. The initial survey on armament level within the target group should be objective to project a fair account devoid of any conflicts. Careful planning and coordination, backed by legal and adequate policy provisions, awareness creation and sound accountability measures should be in place to ensure successful forceful disarmament operations. Strategic planning to include localised, national and regional coordination should be considered for an effective process. In these best practice guidelines, the use of force should be discouraged, unless where it is unavoidable. The operation should guard against violations of basic human rights at all times. This option is recommended as a best practice but only with very clear justifications, and proper procedures for execution.

4. **Weapons in exchange for development (WfD):** It entails the direct linkage between voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by a community as a whole in exchange for the provision of infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO. Determining the corresponding level of development project vis-à-vis the appropriate number and type of weapons surrendered should be carefully designed to avoid antagonism between the Government/development partner and the target group. There should be strong community leadership structure at the grass roots to support the initiative. Security fears must also be adequately addressed for the intervention to succeed. When well articulated and implemented, the approach can achieve better results. The challenges created to this approach include (i) an argument that provision of social amenities and varied development activities is their right and the Government has an obligation to provide such developments without conditions; (ii) an indication that the Government has failed to disarm the group and is therefore resorting to persuasion since it cannot be enforced; (iii) the Government may appear as the weaker stakeholder in the process risk losing the confidence of the target group. This option is perceived to be punitive and retrogressive as it targets the whole community for collective punishment and leaves the area more marginalised and dilapidated as happened in North Eastern province of Kenya. This option is not recommended as a best practice.

5. **Weapons in exchange for incentives (WED):** The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of appropriate materials by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO. This approach is directed to individual's benefits as opposed to communal ones. Before this concept is adopted, detailed estimates on arming levels should be known to avoid triggering more weapons trafficking and proliferation in pursuit of monetary gains. The incentive applicable to a specific type of arm should be carefully decided to avoid situations where the surrender of obsolete and unserviceable weapons can enable individuals to acquire a serviceable and modern weapon. As a baseline guideline, the value of incentives on offer should not exceed the market value of the same weapon. The incentives should be materials or equipments of value if they have to attract the individuals to surrender arms. The challenges associated with this approach include:

- Rewarding of criminality if in the first place the national laws prohibit civilians from acquiring arms;
- Difficulties of determining the appropriate pricing and value of arms for fair exchange;
- Lack of means to ensure or determine that all arms have been collected;
- The trigger of a new flow of arms if the exchange value is attractive.

This option has worked well in Burundi and Karamoja region of Uganda and it is recommended as a best practice.

6. **Weapons linked to development (WLD):** The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an international organization or a NGO. Under this category, the Government or development partners initiate some development projects within the area without pre-conditions. Under the circumstances, further development initiatives will be linked to cooperation from the community by surrendering more weapons. As opposed to the weapons in exchange of development concept, high degree of popular support by the target group is guaranteed after having witnessed the gains so far realised with the introduction of the ongoing development projects where no initial conditions had been set. Asking for surrender of arms for sustaining further development and a lasting security solution is a better strategy to bring the community to cooperate fully without coercion since good and clear intentions by the Government will be visible. This concept is recommended but should be augmented with law and order enhancement. This option is also recommended as a best practice.

7. **Buy-Back:** The direct link between the surrender of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives in return for cash. This approach acts as an alternative legal market for those who wish to surrender their weapons in exchange for cash. It has a direct individual benefits as opposed to communal benefits. The concept is hinged on cash for arms surrendered. Like in the case of weapons in exchange of incentives, this approach should be carefully planned and controlled to forestall possible abuse. The concept should be designed such that the cash offered is not higher than the market value of the gun surrendered otherwise a new cycle of proliferation of arms will be triggered into action. Due to the challenges associated with value and price fluctuation, this approach can only apply as a short-term measure for the legally owned guns but with very elaborate government controls to ensure that government stocks are not targeted through corruption deals. Recording and quick destruction of collected arms will ensure that they are not available for re-surrender. This intervention should be applied only to individuals who acquired arms legally. It is recommended as a best practice subject to the legality of weapon ownership.

Before an incentive programme is implemented, there should be a sensitisation campaign to clarify the intentions of the programme, and to harmonise expectations. Incentive programmes should be followed by a strict enforcement of legislation pertaining to the possession of SALWs to prevent abuse [See BPG on SALWs in DDR processes].

Categories of armed groups targeted for Practical Disarmament

Rebels Groups/ex-combatants:

The process of undertaking Practical Disarmament for rebel forces and their combatants is intended to ensure that after they renounce rebellion or sign a peace agreement they do not revert to war, and are supported to reintegrate into civilian life in a sustainable manner. Across all the categories considered, sensitivity to gender and generation dynamics along with responsible media coverage should be considered. The following Best Practice Guidelines are proposed:

1. **Develop a comprehensive intervention plan of action detailing how to deal with the rebellion early before Practical Disarmament commences.** The objectives of the plan should be clearly highlighted, in terms of how the planned interventions will contribute to the achievement of sustainable peace. The objectives should clearly state the type of engagement to be undertaken with rebel forces. The following three options can be considered:
 - a. **Military action:** This entails undertaking operations to militarily subdue or defeat those who are opposed to the legitimate government. It involves the following:

- i. A detailed analysis of the prevailing situation to inform the strategies to be used in undertaking military action
 - ii. An analyze of the advantages and disadvantages of the available options and a recommendation of the best options
 - iii. Developing a detailed plan of action to include coordination, roles of stakeholders and timelines, among others
 - iv. Provision of requisite logistics and administrative support for successful military action
 - v. A consideration of the most appropriate security arrangements in the event of military action.
- b. **Negotiated Settlement:** Negotiations marks the commencement of the process of demobilization. Negotiations between government and rebel forces continue throughout the demobilization and reintegration period. Negotiations between government and military leadership of a belligerent organization can be undertaken even where there is no conflict, as long as demobilization occurs. During negotiations in periods of conflict, an agreement has to be reached on security arrangements for the post-conflict period in order for demobilization to take place, including determining the following: (i) the number of combatants from rebel forces that will be integrated into national army; (ii) how combatants will be disarmed and assembled; (iii) how combatants will be cantoned for disarmament and demobilization; (iv) the goals that will be pursued in undertaking a reintegration of ex-combatants. Continuous negotiations keep the parties to the conflict engaged, which ensures that they remain focused on keeping the peace process on track. A negotiated settlement entails the following:
- Detailed peace agreement which specifies what will happen to former combatants, how they will be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated;
 - Guidelines on the control and management of combatants/ex-combatants and the weapons in their possession in the period preceding their disarmament and demobilisation;
 - An agreement on how monitoring of the implementation of the peace agreement will be undertaken, and the membership of monitoring teams.
- c. **A combination of military action and peace negotiation.** Determining which comes first, or at what point in time to pursue one and not the other, or when to pursue both concurrently will be depend on prevailing conditions.

Note: Whichever option(s) is/are considered, the intervention plan should detail why the particular option is preferred and not another, as well as the respective strategies that are to be pursued to achieve the objectives.

2. **Once a negotiated peace deal has been agreed upon and realised or a military solution has been achieved, conventional DDR intervention commences.** In case of a negotiated end of an armed conflict, the broad objective of undertaking a DDR programme should be included in the peace agreement, and a clear commitment to supporting achievement of sustainable peace should be made by the principles to the peace agreement. The peace agreement should specify the following:
- a. A clear delineation of those who are considered as combatants to determine eligibility for demobilization and reintegration benefits.
 - b. Delineating clearly the geographical locations of areas for cantonment and the specific routes that combatants are supposed to take in moving to the areas of cantonment
 - c. Clearly stating the conditions of the cantonment taking into consideration gender and generation dynamics.
 - d. Stating clearly the expectation from the combatants in the areas of cantonment
 - e. An indication of the approximate time the cantonment is likely to last. The period between cantoning and re-insertion of ex-combatants should be kept as brief as possible. Ensure security of the combatants during cantonment (general rules for management of cantonment sites should apply).

The process of implementing disarmament and demobilisation of rebel groups/ex-combatants will entail the following:

- f. **Civic education:** Civic education will be undertaken to enlighten ex-combatants on the process they are undertaking; how it will be done; and the benefits (peace dividends) they should expect to achieve from it. Civic education should be undertaken at all stages, commencing at the start of cantonment, during cantonment and the end of cantonment. It should also target ‘disarming the minds’ of the ex-combatants for attitude change.
- g. **Identification, screening and documentation of rebel forces and ex-combatants:** Rebel forces and ex-combatants will be identified, screened and documented not only to determine the potential beneficiaries of Practical Disarmament, but also to determine who they are; how many they are; the rebel groups or factions within rebel organisations to which they belonged; who their commanders were; where they operated; how they were organised.
- h. **Documentation of collected weapons:** A systematic documentation of weapons collected from rebel forces and ex-combatants should be undertaken to establish their numbers, nature and conditions of weapons collected from combatants. The following procedures will be adopted: (i) registration of information regarding the collected weapon (such as

serial number, type of weapon, and condition in which it is); (ii) the identification of the ex-combatant from whom the weapon was collected (including name, military unit, and site where weapon was handed in). In addition, these records should be properly written and a safe storage of the data on collected weapons and their component parts maintained for future reference [See BPG on Marking, Record-Keeping and Tracing; BPG on SALWs in DDR processes].

- i. **Management of collected weapons:** A system of management of collected weapons should be put in place, including: (i) Proper storage facilities, in a secure location, for weapons and their major components (to prevent unauthorized access), as well as ensure secure transportation (movement) from collection points to designated military storage site (central depository), before they are forwarded for redistribution to the security forces; conversion and/or destruction [See BPG on Stockpile Management and Security]; (ii) marking of usable stocks that will be retained by the military (government armed forces) [See BPG on Marking, Record-Keeping and Tracing], and putting in place a mechanism to monitor redistribution of retained weapons [BPG on SALWs in DDR processes]; (iii) guidelines for decommissioning and/or destruction of surplus stocks (the point at which weapons stocks exceed the threshold of necessity as determined by a legitimate government) [BPG on definition and indicators of surplus SALWs] or unusable weapons, through either recycling by steel mills to remove ferrous materials (if SALWs are in large quantities), use of cutting torches and carbide saws (for small quantities of SALWs), using light presses or even sledgehammers (for small arms), or public burning (to create a bonfire of weapons), taking into consideration, safety^v, cost and effectiveness [BPG on National Procedures for the Destruction of SALWs]; (iv) appropriate qualifications and training for carefully and systematically selected (including security cleared) personnel involved in tasks regarding stockpile management and security of SALWs; (v) appropriate civil, administrative or criminal penalties should be established for violations of established procedures for management of collected weapon stockpiles.
- j. **Counselling:** After being screened, ex-combatants should be counselled not only for post-traumatic stress disorders, but also what to expect from the DDR process, on return into communities, as well as counselling them on civilian life.
- k. **Medical Examination:** All ex-combatants should undergo a medical examination to ensure they do not introduce any new diseases acquired during rebellion/struggle. Those who need treatment are referred to established hospitals.
- l. **Integration of ex-combatants in the national army:** In the process of demobilisation, the following guidelines are proposed:
 - i. Clear procedures should be put in place for determining how ex-combatants get re-integrated into the national security forces.

- ii. The process of integration of former combatants into the national armed forces should be as transparent as possible. For former guerrilla/rebel groups who have benefitted from a negotiated settlement, there should be no hassles in reduction in force.
 - iii. Those who wish to join the security forces should be further screened and re-trained.
- m. **Discharge certificates:** Some ex-combatants will chose to return to civilian life on their own volition. Those who do should be given discharge certificates as a sign to show that they have been successfully demobilised. The following guidelines are proposed for demobilisation:
- i. Ex-combatants who choose to return to civilian life should be helped to identify where they wish to resettle.
 - ii. In the rural areas, local leaders in the community of preference for return must be identified, verified, and consulted for their consent, and counselling to prepare them to receive the ex-combatant(s).
 - iii. For child soldiers or children born in the bush, family tracing should be done, followed by family re-unification. The general principles fostering to children should apply.
 - iv. Issuance of discharge certificates. Once reinsertion packages are ready, transport should be provided to those who are ready to proceed to their preferred areas of reinsertion/resettlement.

3. **The process of undertaking reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants already disarmed and demobilised will entail the following:**

- a. **Incentives for recipient communities:** The affected communities should also be equitably considered for packages/incentives prior to insertion of ex-combatants as a way of attracting the community support the process. On the basis of available resources, communities are consulted on their preferred form of packages. The packages should be procured in a transparent manner to prevent over-pricing and ensure quality items are obtained.
- b. **Skills training:** Undertake a programme for skills training targeting both the ex-combatants and non-combatants in the communities affected by armed conflicts and should suit the specific needs of the beneficiaries.
 - i. Short-term training is usually residential, and should be undertaken during the period when discharge certificates are being arranged.

- ii. Long-term training is usually non-residential, and should be planned after the ex-combatants have been discharged and reinserted. This process may start once the beneficiaries have been identified.
 - iii. The skills training should be relevant to the realities in the respective communities where the beneficiaries live. The skills training offered should generally lead to a profession or occupation that will enable the ex-combatants to adapt to the society.
 - c. **‘Start-up kits’ and ‘start-up funds’:** In addition to the reinsertion packages provided to ex-combatants, all those who participate in skills training should be given start up kit and ‘start-up funds’ to support the income generating enterprises they initiate.
 - d. **Data Bank:** A data bank for all reinserted combatants should be maintained for future follow up where necessary, but also monitoring and evaluation, as well as for security. Proper storage and archiving of the data generated from the process is essential.
 - e. **Community Civic Education:** Civic education for the communities to enlighten them on the process and in order to manage fears and expectations
4. **After ex-combatants are reinserted into the community, efforts geared at addressing their long-term socio-economic needs need to be put in place.** This will entail the following:
- a. Integration of the recovery needs of the ex-combatants in the broader over-arching national economic development frameworks.
 - b. Identifying and developing requisite community infrastructure that spurs opportunities for income generation
 - c. Take into consideration affirmative action for special interest groups
5. **The process of reintegration should be accompanied by national level efforts to address the political governance issues associated with the armed rebellion,** especially enabling political participation and ensuring inclusion; and democratic governance reforms.
6. **A regional approach** should be adopted to deal with armed rebellion that has a cross-border dimension. In case of bi-lateral arrangements where a sovereign country agrees with another to deal with rebel forces holed up in the territory of another country, there should be transparency in the international transfer of SALWs involved in across-the-border military operations to deal with the rebels [*see BPG on Export Controls on SALWs*]. The policy and legal frameworks in the countries involved have to be harmonised with respect to dealing with across-the-border rebel groups.

7. **Individuals would be encouraged to join or form associations comprising both ex-combatants and community members according to their trained skills areas.** Associations will assist ex-combatants in tackling the challenges associated with their varied business ventures, without creating inequities between ex-combatants and the others members of the community. Ex-combatants should not form or be in associations which may lead them to replicate leadership structures as was the case during the struggle.

Organised Criminal Gangs/Groups and Militias:

Most of RECSA Member States are grappling with an increase in organised crime characterised by armed criminal gangs or groups, youth brigades and vigilantes referred to in these guidelines as militias. The process of undertaking Practical Disarmament for armed criminal gangs/groups and militias should entail the following:

1. **Recognise the existence of organised criminal gangs/groups and illegal militias** as a start point to activate action.
2. **Conduct a detailed situation analysis** to establish the underlying causes of their dissent; structure of militias/criminal gangs, composition, levels and source of armament, available capacities (leadership structures, institutions and types; the nature of support systems and links) to inform appropriate response.
3. **Ensure the appropriate legal and policy regimes are in place** to guide government response and to address any genuine concerns.
4. **Undertake a profiling** of the members of the organised criminal gangs/groups and militias for proper tracking and capacity assessment and appropriate response.
5. **Engage the leadership of the identified criminal gangs/groups and militias** with a view to arriving at a peaceful disarmament process.
6. In the event that a peaceful settlement is not realized, **a security operation should be carried out as short-term engagement** to arrest and dismantle existing structures of the criminal gangs/groups and militias.

7. **Government to demonstrate real commitment to addressing the emergence and existence of such groups by addressing any root causes that give rise to them.**
8. **Government and community leaders, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), development partners, inter-governmental and regional organisations should partner to rehabilitate reformed members of the organised criminal gangs, as well as provide for counselling for their victims.**
9. **As a long-term plan, Governments should work towards disarming minds through formative education and socialisation.**
10. **Government to enhance regional cross-border cooperation and collaboration in dismantling militias/criminal gangs.**

Armed Civilians

The RECSA region is affected by the presence of illegally armed civilians who fuel violence and insecurity within communities. They include the following: (a) armed pastoralists, and; (b) armed criminals. The following should guide Practical Disarmament for these categories:

Armed pastoralists:

1. **Acknowledgement of the problem:** All stakeholders should acknowledge the insecurity associated with armed pastoralists and challenges they pose to sustainable security and development.
2. **Conduct a detailed situation analysis:** The analysis should, among others: determine the underlying factors that explain why pastoralists choose to be armed (such as claims regarding the need to provide security of their persons and property; using SALWs as a status symbol; prevalent culture of weapons; or factors such as the urge to accumulate wealth ‘primitively’; or widespread community perceptions of insecurity); the manifestation of the insecurity and its impact, on the basis of which the most appropriate long-term practical disarmament strategies for achieving sustainable peace are identified.
3. **Undertake wide stakeholder consultations, sensitisation as well as civic education:** Stakeholder consultations, sensitisation and civic education should target not only the local communities in the affected areas, but also the local leaders (elected and appointed); religious

leaders and civil society organisations, through public fora, workshops, publications and the media. The latter actors have a key role to play in persuading armed individuals to surrender their weapons. Other key actors include the traditional authority structures (especially the councils of elders); kraal leaders; the youth (referred to as *Karachunas* among Karamojong; *morans* in the communities in the North Rift of Kenya and the Kuria in northern Tanzania), who are the most likely purveyors of armed conflicts, either directly or indirectly. These consultations and sensitisation activities serve the following purposes:

- a. Confidence-building measures to win support of the people so as to persuade those with SALWs to surrender them peacefully;
 - b. Harmonisation of expectations in undertaking practical disarmament;
 - c. Ensuring the process of disarmament is voluntary and peaceful;
 - d. 'Disarming the minds' of formerly armed pastoralists in order to change their attitudes.
4. **Provide security, and restore and maintain law and order:** As a precondition for sustainable removal of illegal SALWs available in pastoralist communities, measures should be undertaken to improve the security situation in the country in general and the affected communities in particular by undertaking the following measures, among others:
- a. Increase presence, support functioning and improve effectiveness of justice, law and order institutions
 - b. Integrate the use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions (where they exist and are still relevant) in resolving conflicts and maintaining security
 - c. In conflict afflicted pastoralists' communities along the international borders, interventions should strengthen local level and cross-border peace and security structures/institutions (e.g. the cross-border peace and security committees) and mechanisms.
5. **Develop appropriate policy/legal framework:** The legal/policy framework should clarify the strategies of not only disarmament (to emphasise the need for voluntary disarmament, and where forceful measures become absolutely necessary, establish clear guidelines that must be followed); but also resource mobilisation and allocation; inclusion and participation of all affected stakeholders in design and implementation of interventions strategies; socio-economic transformation; and, national reconciliation and integration.
6. **Establishment of multi-sectoral, multi-level, multi-disciplinary, bilateral cross border institutions and/or structures for coordinating disarmament and development.** In order to

effectively coordinate practical disarmament interventions, the proposed structure should comprise the following:

- a. An Inter-ministerial committee comprised of relevant ministries and departments;
 - b. Community leaders and community-based organizations;
 - c. National and local CSOs;
 - d. Private sector;
 - e. Regional inter-governmental organisations;
 - f. Research/think-tanks;
 - g. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral development partners and international NGOs.
7. **Appropriate security management of weapons collected from pastoralists:** Undertake a systematic documentation of weapons collected from armed pastoralists, following already established guidelines [*see BPG on Marking, Record-Keeping and Tracing*], as well as a system of management of collected weapons [*See BPG on Stockpile Management and Security*], including the marking of usable stocks [*See BPG on Marking, Record-Keeping and Tracing*], and monitoring the redistribution of retained weapons [*BPG on SALWs in DDR processes*]. In case of decommissioning and/or destruction of surplus stocks or unusable weapons, appropriate methods should be used taking into consideration, safety, cost and effectiveness [*BPG on National Procedures for the Destruction of SALWs*].
8. **Use new and on-going development projects as incentives for surrender of arms.** As an incentive for armed pastoralists to voluntarily surrender illegally-held SALWs, interventions undertaken under the long term comprehensive development strategies in place (or planned) should also integrate the provisions of incentives for voluntarily surrender of illegally-held weapons by armed pastoralists.
9. **Undertake Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for deliberate investment in infrastructure to open up conflict-afflicted pastoral areas to development opportunities.**

Armed individual criminals:

Practical Disarmament interventions targeting armed individual criminals should entail the following:

1. **Proper urban physical planning** (street lighting, street identification, estate and block marking, door numbering).
2. **Community policing** for enhanced collaboration in the fight against criminal activities

3. **Increase intelligence policing and police deployment** for appropriate response.
4. **Enhance collaboration between service providers and government security agencies** for purposes of generating biometric data
5. **Capacitate the border points adequately** (e.g. gun detection machines, scanners, etc.) to better control and monitor cross-border criminal activities
6. **Enhance cross-border collaboration between the different agencies**, including Interpol.
7. **Ensure enforcement of existing laws and application of appropriate penalties and sanctions.**
8. **Create job opportunities for youth.**

Related support programs

Practical Disarmament cannot be undertaken in isolation, it has to be linked to the broader frameworks of security sector reform (SSR) as well as the over-arching national economic development and poverty reduction frameworks and strategies.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The objective of SSR is to improve State capacities in addressing/answering security needs, in accordance with democratic standards and transparency principles. This is combined with good management of public affairs and respect for the rule of law. SSR aims at re-establishing “right-sized” competent security forces that the Government can afford to sustain and that operates in accordance to the rule of law.

The Security Sector Reforms (SSR) denotes a revamping of the security sector to enable it meet the needs of the society. In post-conflict situation and volatile societies, if peace is to be lasting, the security needs of both the state and its population must be addressed equally and in parallel with political and socio-economic aspects of reconstruction.

Equally important, in its security dimension; just as in the political and socio-economic aspects, post-conflict peace-building requires due attention to governance, particularly good governance in the security sector. The population has to be protected from any threats to their personal security. These threats are likely to emerge from unaccountable and poorly managed police, armed forces or intelligence units. The security of citizens is also threatened when the state monopoly of legitimate power is undermined by armed non-state actors or if former combatants, including child soldiers, are not disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated. To enhance community security, the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) should be curbed. Mine action programs including demining activities to clear mines, UXOs and other explosive remnants of war should, where applicable, be undertaken and to include also victim assistance. There has to be legal regime which safeguards the rights of the citizens to security. The various legislations should be enforced, and those who violate the laws prosecuted. If there are any victims of past crimes, they should be provided with reparations. The above provide a basis for building sustainable peace which also eliminates any opportunity for rearmament.

The following interventions are crucial in ensuring disarmament processes are successful and that disarmed communities and groups do not relapse to armament:

1. Capacitated, professional and efficient security forces are key to restoring law and order for enhanced security while ensuring long-term sustainability of disarmament interventions.
2. The end of a conflict calls for the reorganization and restructuring of military and other security structures (Police, militias, customs, etc.) in accordance with the new security needs. Any reserve forces that do not operate under established forces (government militias) should be integrated under SSR sector.
3. Areas of reform in the justice include the strengthening of traditional law and justice systems especially for rural communities. law and order sector that deserve attention include the following: responses to crime need to be improved to ensure an efficiently, well functioning criminal justice systems as well as long-term developmental crime prevention programmes are in place; the root causes of crime such as gender and income inequality, poor parenting and squalid urban environments amongst others, should also be addressed.
4. The exit packages for those leaving security services under SSR or regular retirement should enable the beneficiaries to earn an alternative livelihood that is sustainable to prevent them from reverting to crime in order to survive. Dismissals from the security services must be fair and based on clear established procedures without any discrimination whatsoever.
5. SALW issues should be integrated in SSR, especially the continuous sensitisation of security forces on the control of SALWs, building of capacities of detection at the borders, and the importance of proper management of SALW stockpiles. Continuous arms marking should be integrated as a key component of SALW management.
6. There is urgent need to address the increasing privatisation of security service provision given the central role that security services play in the configuration of the security sphere and its impact over state capacity to control the instruments of violence. Privatisation of security needs to be understood as entailing the provision of security services through the market, but also as comprising reaction by those actors without access to private security options; who, in the absence of protection by the state, are likely to organise themselves into vigilantes and neighbourhood watches, among others. Oftentimes, it is these self-defence arrangements that give rise to militias which are associated with extra-judicial execution or misuse of licensed arms. The need for clear regulatory framework of the PSC (establishment, registration, licensing, recruitment criteria, responsibilities, armament, monitoring, training etc) should be considered as part of SSR.

7. Security Sector Reform is one of the measures to be implemented to prevent, control and reduce the proliferation of light weapons. SALW-related programmes integrate measures that fall under the SSR – ensuring the safety and security of stockpiles, strengthening of capacities of customs and border controls or the enhancing control of civilian-owned weapons, for example. The issue of safety and security of stockpiles, management of surplus stocks, and definition of needs in regard to security are closely linked to arms collection and surrender programmes to ensure that arms collected will not fall back into the hands of civilians. Record-keeping, safe and secure storage and destruction are key to preventing SALW proliferation. This should go hand in hand with marking, record-keeping, tracing, stockpile management, etc.
8. Intelligence is central to the agenda of SSR because reform of national intelligence services is necessary with a view to making them more relevant to the development needs of societies. In addition the integration of the intelligence services into the overall national security systems will enable it to contribute better to the efforts to combat international terrorism, transnational crimes, money laundering, drug trafficking and arms smuggling.
9. Community policing should be introduced/enhanced at the grass roots in order to build the capacity of the local community in the fight against crime in partnership with the security sector. This initiative also places the community at a vantage point to take control of the security management at their level and act as a check against misuse of state powers by the security sector. The approach is very effective in controlling the excesses associated with security sector personnel.

National recovery and reconstruction, poverty reduction and development frameworks

1. Linking socio-economic measures to disarmament initiatives.

The reintegration component of DDR programmes is intended to support the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life through the increase of professional skills, support to micro-projects, provision of start-up capital and tools, amongst others. The effectiveness of the reintegration dimension, especially the ability to secure the means of subsistence on a sustainable basis, in general, both presuppose the existence of economic opportunities and the adjustment of training programme with the existing economic needs in communities. As such, there must be development interventions undertaken alongside DDR programmes that ensure and support the restoration of productive livelihood and re-start of economic activities in communities themselves.

The socio-economic measures entailed in disarmament interventions (supporting income generating activities; micro-enterprise development; provision of reinsertion packages; rehabilitation and reconstruction activities) are to start the process of recovery and reconstruction in communities and give a first response to the socio-economic motivations to armament. As an example, rehabilitation of damaged infrastructures (such as roads, bridge, and lighting) contributes both to short-term work opportunities and restart of productive activities (viable infrastructures). However, they are preliminary, transitory and temporary measures. Significant reduction of SALW is a medium to long-term process that relies on the interdependence between improvement of security and generation of sustainable means of livelihood. It is for this reason that disarmament must be interfaced with the efforts deployed for post-conflict recovery and/or strategies for national and local development, which is what practical disarmament brings on board.

2. Interface SALW reduction programmes with national poverty reduction and development programmes.

Disarmament, when targeting the socio-economic factors of armament, is directly connected to poverty reduction but without engaging a comprehensive development strategy (target, short-term and local level). It is important to ensure that positive synergies are created, and the resulting dynamics from these programmes in the framework of comprehensive development programme and strategies are appropriately addressed.

Efforts undertaken at the national level have to translate into increased opportunities for securing employment to generate income to sustain the livelihoods of those DDR reforms are intended to benefit. Apart from providing for functional literacy, disarmament programmes also need to support vocational training that takes into account the short, medium and long term opportunities at the local, regional and national level. Reforms to support socio-economic transformation need to be undertaken, including, among others, land reforms; the provision of social amenities and sustainable means of livelihoods are some of the basic components of development programmes and strategies, which are of utmost importance when designing disarmament interventions.

3. Natural Resources management

The resources which are subject to fierce inter community rivalry and competition should be identified and initiatives developed as a way of de-conflicting the long standing traditional inter-community contests for resources among the pastoralist groups. The policy guidelines should strive to achieve a

fair and balanced access to all the shared resources. The associated animosity, rivalry and motivation for armament can be partially addressed by this initiative alongside other options. Water and pastures resource control account for most of the conflicts involving pastoralists groups. Sound policies strengthening the equitable distribution of resources should also be targeted for improvement in order to achieve an equal access to facilities by all communities. This way, potential agitation attributed to marginalisation and neglect will have been subsequently eliminated.

4. Education for Social transformation. In undertaking education for social transformation, the following should be considered:

- a. Make education available and affordable to change cultural values that support armament like cattle rustling and drug trafficking among others.
- b. Maintenance of law and order should be enhanced in order to provide an enabling environment for sustainable pursuit of education opportunities.
- c. Affirmative action to make education available to all the affected communities
- d. Relevant training programs (institutions) in the affected areas in order to enhance community productivity at community level like livestock production for the pastoralist communities.

5. Public Awareness and Sensitisation. In undertaking public awareness and sensitisation, the following should be considered:

- a. Civic education (social responsibility). This entails programs to educate and create awareness to the community on their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Their participation and solid contributions are considered vital in augmenting government effort in realising greater impact on the initiated policies.
- b. Local mechanisms for conflict resolutions should be established and/or reinforced in order to achieve home-grown solutions to conflicts.
- c. The role of responsible media should be considered for enhanced awareness, wider target coverage and effective and timely dissemination of the intended message. Binding guidelines to the media should be issued so that the intended message is communicated and clearly understood without distortion or contradiction.

Definitions

Armed forces: The military organization of a State with a legal basis, and supporting institutional infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.). *[UN IDDRS]*

Armed groups: A group that has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; is not within the formal military structures of a State, State-alliance or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the State(s) in which it operates. *[UN IDDRS]*

Arms control: The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions. *[UN IDDRS]*

Buy-back: The direct link between the surrender of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives in return for cash. *[UN IDDRS]*

Civil Society: Voluntary sector made up of freely and formally associating individuals pursuing non-profit purposes in social movements, religious bodies, women and youth groups, indigenous peoples' organizations, professional associations, unions, etc. *[UN IDDRS]*

Combatants: A combatant is a person who is a member of a national army or an irregular military organization; or who is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or who is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or who holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization; or who arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or who having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes. *[UN IDDRS]*

Community-based policing (CBP): CBP involves the police participating in the community and responding to the needs of that community, and the community participating in its own policing and supporting the police. It can further be explained as: the police working in partnership with the community; the community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two working together, mobilizing resources to solve problems affecting public safety over the longer term rather than the police, alone, reacting short term to incidents as they occur. *[UN IDDRS]*

Criminal: A person who indulges himself in illegal activities

Development: Condition in which the quality of life of a people, community, or state is progressively improved due to corresponding improvement in the quality of a variety of social, economic, political and cultural indicators such as education, health, infrastructure, livelihood, water, housing, governance institutions and systems.

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR): A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. [UN IDDRS]

Disarmament: The collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. Simply put, disarmament is a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants and unauthorised civilians. [UN IDDRS]

Demobilization: The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). Simply put, demobilisation is the process of taking the combatants out of military organisational and command structures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of combatants reverting to rebellion. [UN IDDRS]

Reinsertion: Reinsertion starts after demobilization but before reintegration commences. It encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year. [UN IDDRS]

Reintegration: The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. Simply put, reintegration is the process of helping former combatants from whom weapons

have been collected and have been removed from military structure to integrate socially and economically into civilian life in a community of their choice. Reintegration concerns reinsertion into the community of combatants from life in military camp, and resettling them into civilian life. [UN IDDRS]

Ex-combatant: A person who has lain down or surrendered his/her arms with a view to entering a DDR process. [UN IDDRS]

Illicit trafficking: The import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of small arms and light weapons from or across the territory of one State to that of another State if any one of the State concerned does not authorise it. [Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, art.1]

Militia: A military group that is raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army in an emergency or a rebel group acting in opposition to a regular army. [UN IDDRS]

Pastoralist: A person who indulges in a subsistence system of livestock production that is based primarily on domesticated animals, including cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, donkeys and camels and to a small extent poultry, usually, but not always, relying directly or indirectly on the communal or free range grazing of the livestock on natural pastures. The livestock husbandry is both culturally and economically dominant, much of the time involving mobility to track seasonally available pastoral resources.

Possession: The owner or a person, to whom the owner has transferred possession of a firearm, has possession of the firearm, while it is in his/her physical possession or under his/her control. [Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons]

Rebel group: An illegal military group that acts as an army to capture State power.

Security:

State-centred security: The military capability of the state to protect itself from external threats.

Human security: The wholesome safety and well being of individuals and communities, it is the absence of threats to the basic needs and welfare of individuals; Citizen participation in processes of decision making in matters that directly or indirectly affects their lives.

Human Security approach focus on the individual and contends that there can be no security if the individual is not free of threats to his/her wellbeing. It stresses the protection of human rights and individual freedoms, and entrenches the right to good, responsive and accountable governance. Human Development is an integral element of human security.

Security Sector Reform (SSR): A dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of a strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private–military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society. [UN IDDRS]

Small arms and light weapons (SALW): [Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, art.1]

Small arms: Weapons designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles. “Small arms” shall also include: “firearms”, meaning:

(a) Any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899;

(b) Any other weapon or destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine

Light weapons: include the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100 mm calibre, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder-fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defence weapons

UXO: Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded, either through malfunction or design or for any other reason.

Voluntary surrender: The physical return of SALW on their own accord by an individual(s) or community of SALW to the legal government or an international organization with no further penalty. [UN IDDRS]

Weapons management: Weapons management refers to a national government's administration of its own legal weapons stock. Such administration includes registration, according to national legislation, of the type, number, location and condition of weapons. In addition, a national government's implementation of its transfer controls of weapons, to decrease illicit weapons' flow, and regulations for weapons' export and import authorizations (within existing State responsibilities), also fall under this definition. [*UN IDDRS*]

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- i. A/50/60/S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the Secretary General on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN. par. 60
- ii. Defense stockpile is defined as the sum of all SALW assessed as needed for all defense and security needs of the State's military and security forces following a national risk assessment and planning process. It comprises the total number of SALW required by a national army, which includes: (i) quantities of SALWs belonging to active units; (ii) quantities of SALWs belonging to reserve units; (iii) the quantity of stockpiled SALW used to cover additional replacement or repair needs of active units or reserve units (reserve stocks) [*See BPG on definition and indicators of surplus SALWs*].
- iii. A/50/60/S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the Secretary General on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN.
- iv. See <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/disarmament/disarm.html>
- v. SALW destruction and disposal methods associated with negative environmental and ecological consequences (such as burning) are not permitted in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) participating States, in preference for environmentally friendly techniques [*BPG on National Procedures for the Destruction of SALWs*]. See also UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, "A Destruction Handbook: Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives", based on Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council on "Methods of Destruction of Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives" (S/2000/1092), 15 November 2000.