



Cooperating to Disarm

DISARMAMENT EXPERIENCES IN RECSA REGION WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ETHIOPIA, KENYA, SUDAN AND UGANDA



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The synthesis report benefitted from the individual country studies undertaken in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. This report offers a comparative approach to the experiences in the four countries, with general regional observations based on the country experiences to identify challenges encountered in disarmament processes, derive best practices and offer recommendations on gaps to be addressed.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AIAI	Al Itihad Al Islamia
ASTU	Anti-Stock Theft Unit
CAMP	Citizens Army for Multi-Party Politics
CAR	Central African Republic
CDF	Chief of Defence Forces
CES	Central Equatorial State
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
D&D	Disarmament and Demobilisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Derg	Amharic reference to the former Military Regime of Ethiopia
EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
EFP	Ethiopia Federal Police
EFPC	Ethiopia Federal Police Commission
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces
EPLF	Eritrean People's Revolution Front
EPRDF	Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FEM	February Eighteen Movement
FERA	February Eighteen Resistance Army
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral Services
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KIDDP	Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
KPF	Kenya Pastoralist Forum
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NAP	National Action Plan
NBGS	North Bar-el-Ghazal State
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance/Army
NFP	National Focal Point
NOM/A)	The Ninth October Movement/Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement

OAGs	Other Armed Groups
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plans
PMAC	Provisional Military Authority Committee
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
PSC	Private Security Companies
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
RRR	Reinsertion, Resettlement and Reintegration
RRU	Rapid Response Unit
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SIRAA	Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defense Force
SNGs	Special Needs Groups
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSBCSAC	Southern Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSPS	South Sudan Police Services
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIRO	Uganda National Independence Revolutionary Organisation
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNRFII	Uganda National Rescue Front II
UPA	Uganda People's Army (UPA)
UPDF	Uganda Peoples Defense Forces
UPDM/A	Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army
UVAB	Uganda Veterans Assistance Board
UXOs	Un-exploded Ordinances
VCCU	Violent Crime Crack Unit
WAAF	Women Associated with Armed Forces
WBGs	Western Bar-el-Ghazal State
WES	West Equatorial State
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Synthesis Report covers experiences of implementing disarmament initiatives conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. The choice of these countries was informed by the fact that the countries had diverse experiences with disarmament; Ethiopia and Uganda had undertaken huge DDR programmes after internal instabilities. Sudan had on-going DDR and civilian disarmament programmes. Kenya on the other hand, though with no experience of any significant internal insurgencies, had undertaken disarmament among pastoral communities and other armed civilians.

The Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) commissioned the case studies, with funding from the Government of Japan through the Kenyan office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP-Kenya Office). The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) office in Nairobi coordinated the research.

The prevailing circumstances under which the various DDR interventions were undertaken varied from one country to another; and included contexts where active conflicts such as armed rebellions were experienced (Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia) as well as contexts where armed non-states actors such as criminal gangs, militias and armed civilians such as pastoralists were active (Kenya and Sudan). Some of the Member States were grappling with internal civil strife/unrest associated with either pre- or post-election violence (Kenya), or with natural resources conflicts (Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda). Livestock raiding was also rampant in all States (Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia). The States were also grappling with lawlessness involving armed crime/thuggery.

In countries where governments have changed following internal civil strife, DDR interventions have occurred within a context of stabilization, or been accompanied by Security Sector Reforms (SSR) aimed not only at reducing the number of illicit weapons in the hands of non-state actors, but also reducing the size of the military to a small manageable force which is easy to professionalize. In the latter case, this has involved the establishing of appropriate policy/legal environment to enable the professionalization of the military.

All the RECSA Member States have, without exception, been afflicted by the proliferation of SALW in the hands of non-state actors, which has been a cause of different forms of internal insecurity. The extent of the proliferation of SALW and the resulting impact on security has varied from countries that have been affected by internal civil strife to those where there has not been any major internal civil strife.

In the studied States, different disarmament strategies have been employed to address the issues of proliferation of SALW. These have ranged from the mundane gun collection security operations (disarmament) to the more drawn out conventional Disarmament, and Demobilisation (D&D), and Reinsertion, Resettlement and Reintegration (RRR) operations especially in the countries that have been characterized by internal civil wars and violent change of governments.

In some of the Member States that have had such armed conflicts aimed at regime change, the process of implementing the DDR programmes occurred within a context of cutting down on the expenditure on defence and improving efficiency in the use of defence resources. It also involved reducing the numbers of the armed forces, as well as increasing the numbers of weapons confiscated and destroyed, and putting in place national policies and legislation to curb not only the inflow of illegal firearms and weapons, but also guiding DDR programmes.

While in each State, the implementation of disarmament took into consideration the specificities in local post-conflict contexts, these interventions invariably encountered multifaceted challenges which included weak economic, financial and administrative/management and political institutions. Other setbacks pertained to political transition, governance, national and community security, including the cross-border dynamics of most of the armed conflicts experienced, as well as inability to ensure security of those subjected to disarmament and the larger communities involved. Lack of political goodwill, management of collected firearms and arms stockpiles as well as management of expectations of DDR beneficiaries were challenging. Policy and legal loopholes, as well as challenges related to reinsertion, resettlement and reintegration were other hurdles in the process.

Most States were grappling with the disarmament of different categories of armed civilians including armed criminal groups, militias and vigilantes, as well as armed individuals and pastoralists. In the four States, there were pastoralists communities that have a culture that glorifies the gun, and also believe that all the cows in the world belong to them. This leads to the desire to acquire livestock from others to accumulate their own numbers, and includes raiding from them. The disarmament efforts have largely remained ineffective, hence leading to the continued existence of illicit firearms in the hands of non-state actors.

The disarmament programmes in the various States also entailed joint disarmaments as well as simultaneous disarmament campaigns along the international common borders targeting armed pastoralist groups along the Ethiopia-Sudan

border (mainly Murle); Kenya-Uganda border (Turkana and Matheniko; and Pokot Uganda and Pokot Kenya). In all these instances, joint disarmament committees were usually set up to address this issue; and security forces deployed on either side of the borders. There have been exchanges (extradition) of criminals, as well as return of raided property (especially livestock) as well as kidnapped people where this occurred.

It is inadvisable for States to adopt individual initiatives given the fact that SALW trafficking cannot be fully controlled by individual countries. This is largely because illicit trade and trafficking of SALW can/is nourished by discrepancies between legal regimes and porous borders. Inadequate regional co-operation specifically in the area of disarmament interventions aided by legal and operational divergences, lack of agreed regional standards on armed groups disarmament and inappropriate methods and approaches of disarmament further hinder effective disarmament processes.

While a lot has been achieved, the traditional approaches have not brought desirable results of complete disarmament and control of small arms, as well as reintegration. One of the main challenges has been the inability to address the rising phenomena of small arms possession by non-state actors, including militias, criminal gangs, vigilantes and civilians such as pastoralists. There is thus a need to target this phenomenon with practical measures different from or complementary to the regulations and sanctions that are applicable to nation States undertaking the conventional disarmament initiatives; hence the need for adopting Practical Disarmament.

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 *Country Case-Studies*

The Country case studies on disarmament experiences were conducted in 2009/2010, in selected RECSA Member States that had a history of armed conflicts involving internal civil strife and/or external belligerents, as well as armed criminality perpetuated by non-state actors, such as criminal gangs, militias, vigilantes and armed civilians.

Of the four countries selected, Ethiopia and Uganda had undertaken huge DDR programmes after internal instabilities. Sudan, on the other hand, had on-going DDR and civilian disarmament programmes while Kenya, though with no experience of any significant internal insurgencies, had undertaken disarmament among pastoral communities and other armed civilians. These case studies focussed on exploring the various disarmament initiatives that were undertaken, not only in order to confine access of firearms to the legitimate national army and security forces, but also to lay a foundation for long-term peace building.

The choice of the four countries was based on the fact that the diversity in these four countries provided a regional picture of disarmament experiences in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa to inform the development of best practice guidelines on Practical Disarmament.

The studies were commissioned by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA), with funding from the Government of Japan, made available through the Kenyan office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP-Kenya Office). The Institute of Security Studies (ISS) office in Nairobi coordinated the research.

RECSA is an inter-governmental agency mandated to coordinate the implementation and mainstreaming of joint efforts to achieve a secure sub-region, free from proliferation of illicit small arms and firearms misuse, in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and Bordering States which subscribe to the principles, aims and objectives of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol, through collaboration and liaison among interested parties.

Member States to the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol committed themselves to addressing the proliferation of illicit SALWs through the establishment of adequate legislations and controls, efficient stockpile management, the building of capacities of responsible parties, strengthening of coordination and cooperation among them and awareness raising on the dangers of illegal possession of SALW. RECSA has already developed Best Practice Guidelines on the following: 'Stockpile Management'; 'Import, Export and Transfer Control'; and 'Marking, Tracing, Brokering, Public Awareness and Destruction'. These guidelines have been useful in harmonising the approaches adopted by the Member States in addressing the respective aspects of SALW. However, there are no guidelines yet on the crucial aspect of 'Practical Disarmament' for the RECSA region, a task which the Country Case Studies were intended to respond to, first by documenting the disarmament experiences in selected Member States, and thereafter identifying lessons as well as Best Practices for informing the development of Best Practice Guidelines for Practical Disarmament.

1.2 Practical Disarmament

The concept of Practical Disarmament was first used in 1995 in the UN's "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", reinforcing arms reduction efforts in response to the new phenomena of small arms possession by non-state actors. It reflected the need to target this new group with practical measures different from the regulations and sanctions for countries.¹ UN member countries that experienced negative effects of proliferation of weapons particularly after civil war and others endorsed the concept. Practical Disarmament measures were envisioned as a concept and framework that would comprehensively address the issue of illicit weapons.

Basically the concept acknowledges the extensive and complex channels of small arms proliferation as well as the additional reality that small arms are not only confined to conflict situations. In addition to the physical removal of the weapons, it deals with other socio-economic and political aspects such as good governance, improved public security and reforms to promote development, political development, social tolerance and cohesion necessary for restoration of complete justice and peace. This comprehensive approach ideally diminishes the need for arms possession in the society as the population is adequately catered for in all aspects particularly aspects that would propel the need to acquire weapons. A central objective of Practical Disarmament is to prevent the onset and distribution of armed violence through a combination of approaches.

1 A/50/60/S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the Secretary General on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN. par. 60

In its most basic form, Practical Disarmament consists of a combination of legal reforms to regulate civilian firearms and ownership and technical interventions to collect and destroy retrieved or surplus weapons.

As envisioned, Practical Disarmament is a collaborative, pragmatic and contextualized approach. The approach acknowledges that a range of social, economic, ecological and psychological as well as political factors influences security. The value of Practical Disarmament is in promoting a demilitarized culture in society. It calls for the development of respective national policy and legislation to increase the viability of involving the public through creating awareness and sensitization and transparency in national security issues.² This cooperative arms control requires the participation of all stakeholders who seek to establish a society free from violence and illicit firearms.

Practical Disarmament, therefore, is not just about the collection and management of weapons stockpiles but has to do with preventing conflicts, strengthening the rule of law and promoting public security. It is aimed at reducing armed violence and demands for SALW and improving the management of the State in dispensing its security function. Practical Disarmament is often combined with, but distinct from, Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes amongst others. It can also be taken as a component of 'disarmament' during DDR programmes. The concept has expanded in recent years beyond simply a technical intervention and now takes into consideration demand factors as well as the accountability and reform of state security entities.³

While appreciating that DDR is geared towards situations where conflict is just ending, it is evident that there are other categories of armed conflicts that cannot be addressed by conventional DDR approaches such as armed civilians: gangs, militias and pastoralists, among others. Acknowledging the stabilizing role of DDR in conflict situations, there are also explicit limitations to the extent of its interventions. The need to deal with armed groups outside conflict situations calls for a different approach. The concept of Practical Disarmament opens an opportunity to address the traditional and new dimensions of conflicts within the RECSA region. This implies that existing initiatives for peace-building such as DDR need to be complemented by intervention for long-term socio-economic development under Practical Disarmament processes.

2 Ibid. 3.

3 <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/disarmament/disarm.html> (Accessed 30th June 2010)

1.3 The Report

This report is a synthesis of the four Country Case Studies on the experiences of implementing disarmament and especially around the aspects of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)⁴.

The report is divided into five chapters. The introduction of the report and the understanding of the context of Practical Disarmament are contained in Chapter One. The experiences of armed conflicts and disarmament undertaking in the selected States are examined in Chapter Two. The disarmament challenges encountered in the selected States are analysed in Chapter Three. Lessons learnt from past disarmament undertakings in the selected States are analysed in Chapter Four. The Best Practices from the disarmament experiences that constitute a case for Practical Disarmament are drawn from the lessons learnt in Chapter Four. Chapter Five identifies some gaps and new areas of research that would contribute to better and sustainable Practical Disarmament initiatives.

4 For detailed definitions of the terms Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, see United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre available at: <http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php>

CHAPTER 2

2. EXPERIENCES OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND DISARMAMENT UNDERTAKINGS

The experiences of armed conflicts and disarmament in the selected States varied from one to another.

2.1 ETHIOPIA

2.1.1 The Nature of Armed Conflicts in Ethiopia

The diversity of the armed conflicts experienced in Ethiopia:

Armed conflict in Ethiopia ranged from armed struggles for capture of state power to inter-state wars, as well as internal civil strife and armed criminality perpetuated by armed civilians (especially criminal gangs and pastoralist communities). Emperors ruled Ethiopia until September 1974 when the last Emperor, Haile Selassie, was overthrown. This coup d'état was executed by middle ranking army officers who formed the Provisional Military Committee (PMAC), known as the '*Derg*' in Amharic. Shortly thereafter, infighting ensued among the members of the *Derg*. After Mengistu Haile Marriam assumed the leadership of the *Derg*, he declared Marxism Leninism as a state ideology. The *Derg* nationalized all private companies and abolished private property including urban land, rentable houses, apartments and land possessed by feudal lords in the rural areas on a tenancy system. The revolution led feudal lords, students and various ethnic based movements to raise arms against the *Derg*.

By 1976, the *Derg* was already facing armed opposition by Eritrean separatist groups in the north of Ethiopia. They pursued a campaign of secession, and by mid-1976, controlled most of the territory. By the end of 1977, the *Derg* controlled only 5 per cent of the present-day Eritrea, then a territory under Ethiopia. In Tigray, Tigrean political movements also declared war against the *Derg*. Other armed rebellions against the *Derg* were carried out by supporters of the deposed emperor (royalist parties) as well as the Afar Liberation Front from Afar region. In the south, the Oromo Liberation Front was born and the Western Somalia Liberation Front revived with support from Somalia.⁵

In Addis Ababa, the *Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP)* composed of young leftist students employing urban terror haunted the *Derg*. After Mengistu

5 Meredith, M., *The State of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence*, (2006), London: Free Press

survived an assassination attempt in 1977, he began to purge the Government of any opposition and consolidated his power as the undisputed leader. When Mengistu was firmly in control, he unleashed what was termed as 'red terror', which began in May 1977. On the eve of May Day 1977, the soldiers that had been deployed in Addis Ababa machine-gunned demonstrating students, including children, and killed hundreds of them.⁶ The reign of Mengistu was thereafter characterised by an array of assassinations of those opposed to his rule, whether armed or not, under custody or not, young or old.

In July 1977, the Somali leader, General Siad Barre, invaded Ethiopia (Ogaden) and took Jijiga in September 1977. This provoked the international actors of the Cold War. The US backed Barre and the Soviet bloc armed the *Derg* along with 17,000 Cuban soldiers. In February 1978, the Somalia invasion was quelled. The euphoria from the victory and the huge Soviet support led the *Derg* to Eritrea to fight the EPLF that controlled all major towns except the two ports of Massawa and Assab, and the capital, Asmara. The EPLF, with support from TPLF fighters from Tigray, defeated the *Derg*. In retaliation, the *Derg* launched a genocidal attack on the Tigray by bombarding market places, arresting, torturing and killing scores of civilians.⁷

The TPLF enjoyed popular support in the North and forged an alliance with other anti-*Derg* fighting groups in Eritrea and other parts of Ethiopia, leading to the formation of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Using guerrilla tactics, EPRDF slowly dislodged the *Derg* from the countryside until 1991, when they captured state power in Addis Ababa. A transitional government was put in place. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was in power for four years (1991-1995). The Ethiopian Parliament enacted a new republican constitution in 1995. The constitution proclaimed Ethiopia as a Federal Democratic Republic based on the various ethnic-based federal states that constituted the republic. The first democratic elections held in 1996 were won by the EPRDF and its head, Meles Zenawi, assumed power as Executive Prime Minister and Head of Government.

Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. In 1995, Ethiopia adopted a constitution that allowed, among others, multi-party democracy, periodic elections, religious autonomy, and uncurbed right to self-determination by ethnic-based regions. On 6 May 1998, a boundary dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia ignited a two-year war that ended in May 2000, claiming the lives of more than

6 Kaplan, R. D., *Surrender or Starve: travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea*, (1988), New York: Vintage books

7 Meredith, 2006, op cit.

100,000 soldiers on both sides, with hundreds of civilians displaced.⁸ Ever since the Ethio-Eritrea war, the Ethiopian Government has been battling two armed political factions operating in Ogaden, namely the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), both of which have carried out several attacks against civilians and foreigners deemed to support the government. The WSLF constitutes fundamental Islamist forces formerly known as Al Itihad Al Islamia (AIAI). Ethiopia militarily pursued these fundamentalists into Somalia in 2006.

Ethiopia, like other states within the Horn of Africa, has pastoralists who have a culture of firearms ownership. While the Ethiopian pastoralists are a minority constituting 12 to 15 per cent of the total population⁹, most are armed and are said to possess up to 74 per cent of civilian-held firearms estimated at 320,000.¹⁰ They live near or along border areas and share close kinship, genealogical and linguistic relations with other pastoral groups in neighbouring countries.

Ethiopia has grappled with a diversity of conflicts within and between pastoralist communities in the lowlands and those in the highlands over access to resources. In Gambela, for example, there are internal conflicts between the various ethnic groups in the region (e.g. the sedentary Annuak crop farmers and the pastoralist Nuer) over power and resources, mainly water and pasture. There have also been clashes between indigenous ethnic groups in Gambela and the settlers from Northern Ethiopia over land ownership. In addition, there has also been livestock raiding involving pastoral groups from South Sudan.

Factors that led to the proliferation of SALW in Ethiopia:

It is estimated that there are 320, 000 firearms possessed by civilians in Ethiopia which is 0.4 firearms per 100 people. This ranks Ethiopia at 174 out of 179 countries worldwide in terms of the number of firearms per capita. The number of SALW possessed by the civilian population is higher than that owned by the

8 Around 600,000 people were displaced, of which 250,000 in Eritrea included not only those internally displaced, but also others deported from Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, more than 300,000 were displaced, excluding those deportees from Eritrea (See Gilkes, P. & Plaut, M. 2000. *The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Foreign Policy in Focus. Volume 5, Number 25 August*).

9 See Beruk, Y. Representation of Pastoralists' at Federal level: Agenda Item 3(a), Paper presented to the United Nations on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Minorities, 11th Session of the Working Group of Minorities, May 30th - June 3rd, 2005, Geneva, Switzerland

10 Karp, Aaron, 'Trickle and Torrent: State stockpiles', *Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business*, (2006), p. 61. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 July.

police.¹¹ Culture has been the most potent force behind civilian arms possession in the northern highlands of Ethiopia. Until 2000, firearms were still being licensed to individuals in Tigray. These were often used for individual as well as community protection.

Tigray Region has the highest concentration of illicit firearms because it has a longer history of civil strife, dating to the colonial period (anti-colonial struggles of the 18th, 19th and 20th century); anti-Haile Selassie I rebellion of the 1940's as well as the 17 years of civil war in Ethiopia (1975-1991), and the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war. In addition, the 2006 military expedition into Somalia against the Islamic Courts added to the arms caches in circulation, some of which landed in civilian hands. There is also a thriving black market in firearms, some of which are stolen from local militias and the Police. The four neighbouring countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan are the most affected. Illicit firearms in Ethiopia also proliferated after the overthrow of the Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Marriam in 1991, and subsequent rebellions in Ogaden.

While firearms are the preserve of the state, the law allows civilians to possess them with a licence or upon registration with the authorities. Pastoralist communities also bear arms for their protection. The settled communities rely on collective security provided through community policing. Ethiopia Federal Police (EFP) is responsible for registering and issuance of licenses. At the regional level, the EFP has delegated its power to regional and city administration police commissions responsible for managing collected arm stockpiles. However, many of the firearms among civilians are not registered.

Illicit firearms collected from civilians are supposed to be transferred to the national defence forces, and those that are non-functional disposed via burning. There has been a challenge in the implementation of these procedures, which sometimes has occasioned illicit trade, trafficking and theft as well as the misuse of weapons.

There are challenges in many parts of Ethiopia in maintaining community security. In the countryside, local militias provide security. Community policing is prevalent in the cities, while the wealthier individuals hire private security companies. By the end of 2010, there were about 70,000 militias in rural Tigray. Law regulates the activities of militias. However, many times there have been breaches leading to criminality and proliferation of illicit firearms. The mushrooming of Private Security Companies (PSCs) has the potential to trigger the

11 Karp, Aaron, 'Completing the Count: Civilian firearms', *Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City*, (2007) p. 67, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27 August. See also, Ethiopia — Gun Facts, Figures and the Law [Online], Available at: <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/ethiopia> [Accessed on August 17, 2011]

proliferation and misuse of arms. In addition, Government weapons stockpiles are sometimes not well managed, as some of the state weapons find their way either into civilian hands or into the black market.

2.1.2 The Dynamics of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, three forms of disarmament and demobilisation interventions have been undertaken. The first form was intended for ex-combatants from defeated armies, as well as armies of other liberation movements, militias and auxiliaries. This was done in three phases: the first phase started in 1991 and targeted the *ex-Derg* regime army. The EPRDF forces sensitised the communities who welcomed fleeing defeated soldiers to give up their arms voluntarily. Between 1991 and 1992, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) successfully disarmed and demobilised 455,000 *ex-Derg* soldiers. The soldiers were assured that there would be no victimization or retaliation for the crimes they may have committed while still in service.

The second phase targeted ex- Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) combatants where 23,000 ex-OLF soldiers were disarmed and demobilised between 1992 and 1994.

The third phase targeted ex-fighters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). In June 2010, the Ethiopian government signed a peace accord with the leadership of the WSLF and a faction of the ONLF. By the end of 2010, disarmament interventions were continuing along the Ethio-Somalian border areas.

The second form of disarmament and demobilisation entailed the ‘right-sizing’ of the national army, the Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF), which was undertaken in two phases. After the defeat of the *Derg* regime, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) established the ENDF as the national army of Ethiopia. The TGE integrated combatants of EPRDF into the ENDF, creating a need to disarm and demobilise 130,000 EPRDF ex-combatants. The first phase was in 1991, where a total of 130,000 former EPDRF combatants comprising mainly Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters were demobilised. The second phase was undertaken after May 2000, following the end of the two-year Ethio-Eritrean war. The war eroded the gains from the disarmament and demobilisation operations of the early 1990’s, because Ethiopia tripled its army from 100,000 in May 1998. Between 2000 and 2003, Ethiopia implemented disarmament and demobilisation interventions targeting about 131,000 veterans and 17,000 disabled former combatants.

The third form of disarmament and demobilisation targeted armed individuals (such as the feudal landlords in North Ethiopia) and communities such as pastoralists, and entailed a diversity of strategies. First, immediately after the overthrow of the *Derg* regime, the TGE carried out house-to-house gun mop-up operations in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country to remove illicit firearms. One such operation was undertaken in Gambela in 2010. Disarmament operations were also carried out in pastoralist communities to remove illegal guns from armed cattle keepers and herdsmen. Such operations were carried out in Moyale along the Ethiopia-Kenya border.

In Ethiopia, the signing of the 'Maikona Declaration' in November 2009 between the Gabra and Borana tribes that inhabit the two adjacent Moyales of Ethiopia and Kenya contributed significantly to the disarmament and development initiatives in the region around Moyale. After the declaration was adopted, cattle rustling decreased substantially in the area. Secondly, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) fighters based in Moyale, Kenya were persuaded by the community to disarm and subsequently return to civilian life. Thirdly, illicit proliferation of small arms in the area also declined. Fourthly, the different tribes agreed to use each other's grazing land and water intermittently whenever the situation dictated. And, lastly, a joint peace and security committee to monitor and oversee the peace and stability of the neighbourhood by meeting on a weekly basis was set up.

2.2 KENYA

2.2.1 The Nature of Armed Conflicts in Kenya

Kenya has not experienced nation-wide armed insurgencies. However, the country has had to contend with a diversity of armed conflicts, such as the *shifita* war, the 1982 attempted coup d'état, armed robberies, livestock raiding and conflicts over ownership, control and access to natural resources such as water, land and pasture.

In the 1980's and 1990's, Kenya dealt with low-key insurgents that had regime change as one of their main objectives such as the February Eighteen Resistance Army (FERA) – a 1990's military wing of the February Eighteen Movement (FEM), which was perhaps one of the first insurgency groups in Western Kenya. The Kenya Pastoralist Forum (KPF) was a civil society advocacy initiative whose activities were thought, by the government of the day, to have had political undertones. *Mwakenya* was another group fighting for regime change and was labelled a dissident organisation.

Since 1992 with the reintroduction of multi-party politics, the country has witnessed political violence characterised by electoral violence¹² and attacks on migrant communities in certain parts of the Rift Valley and Coast provinces.¹³ Contests over the fair distribution of natural resources often manifest as ethnic conflicts but sometimes they manifest as politically motivated and/or perpetuated conflicts. More recent analysis of the 2008 pre and post-election violence points to the possibility of heightened eagerness of sedentary communities in parts of central Rift Valley (extending from Uasin Gishu to Molo and Kuresoi areas) to possess guns¹⁴. The use of equally deadly weapons such as machetes, clubs, spears, bows and arrows has also been widespread. These armed conflicts have affected both urban and rural areas.

The Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) in the Mt Elgon area was formed in 2005 to advance a local agenda which was both political (to determine Mt. Elgon's elected leaders) and economic (to ensure a fair land distribution in the Chepyuk settlement scheme). However, it soon became lethal and acquired a more national political agenda.

In other parts of Kenya, armed criminal gangs, armed militias, vigilantes, and neighbourhood watch groups have mainly perpetuated insecurity. Some of the neighbourhood watch groups which emerged as a response to insecurity within communities also transformed into local vigilante groups/militias and became a source of insecurity. Some of these gangs and militia groups include *Mungiki* in Nairobi, Rift Valley and Central provinces; *Chinkororo* and *Amachuma* in Kisii; the *Baghdad Boys* in Luo Nyanza; and *Sungu Sungu* in Kuria. There are also *Jeshi la Mzee* (Kamjesh), *Kosovo Boys*, *Taliban*, *Jeshi la Embakasi*, *Jeshi la King'ole*, *Geri ya Urush*, *Brotherhood* and *Ghetto Boys* in Nairobi; *Angola-Msumbiji* in Western Province; and *Kaya Bombo Youth*, Republican Council (*Mulungunipa Forest Group*) in the Coast Province. During elections, these vigilante and militia groups are used to influence outcomes of local and national electoral processes.¹⁵

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- 12 There is recorded use of small arms in electoral violence as early as January 1998, when pastoralist groups attacked a perceived migrant community in Ol Moran, Laikipia. Over 50 people died and another 1000 others fled the area after the initial attacks (see Edge Kanyon-golo & Jon Lunn, *Kenya Post-Election Political Violence*, (Nairobi: Article 19, 1998), p.5)
- 13 Kenya has since done away with Provinces under the new constitution's administrative arrangements.
- 14 Ekuam, David, *An Overview of the Status of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Areas Affected by Post-Election Violence in Rift Valley Province*, (Nairobi: UNDP Kenya, 2008)
- 15 See Wepundi, Manasseh and Frank Muhereza, *An Analysis of Disarmament Experiences in Kenya*, (Nairobi: RECSA Report, July 2011, Unpublished)

Since the pre-colonial era, pastoral communities have been the most highly armed groups in the country. Pastoralist communities in the arid and semi-arid Northern and North-eastern parts of Kenya begun to acquire firearms in 1855 by exchanging ivory for guns with Ethiopian gun runners and Arab and Swahili slavers from the Coast.¹⁶ Pastoral communities are predisposed to conflicts because of a history of government neglect, in terms of a deliberate marginalisation characterised by inability to put in place requisite state structures for addressing resource use contestations. For long, the pastoralists have used the illegal SALW not only for their (and their property's) protection, but also for livestock raiding. Violent conflicts involving pastoralists have become widespread and increasingly severe in the North Rift, Eastern and North Eastern regions of Kenya, and the whole of the region including Sudan-Kenya-Uganda, Ethiopia-Kenya-Sudan and Kenya-Uganda border communities. In Mount Elgon region, land alienation and economic inequities have seen the emergence of armed militia and vigilante groups. Religious fundamentalists e.g. the *Al Shabaab* and piracy are latter forms of conflict that have affected areas bordering Somalia.

Factors leading to the proliferation of SALW in Kenya:

The Mau Mau insurgency accounts for the initial circulation of illicit small arms in Central Kenya. Remnant illicit firearms continued to circulate for 50 years after the uprising ended.¹⁷ Illicit firearms also proliferated in Kenya due to civil strife in neighbouring countries that led to collapse of governments. In 1979, after the fall of Idi Amin, some of the arms looted from Moroto barracks by the Karamojong in Uganda ended up with Kenyan pastoral groups. The fall of Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia in 1991 also led to the inflow of arms into North Rift, Upper Eastern and North Eastern provinces. The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia also led to inflow of arms into Kenya.¹⁸

Most illicit arms circulating in Kenya today continue to come from Somalia, and the long porous Kenya-Somalia border that is difficult to effectively monitor especially complicates this. Arms traffickers take advantage of the lawlessness in Somalia to proliferate illicit firearms. SALW from Somalia come primarily from Bakara market, through the Bay/Bakol and Gedo regions, across the Somali-Kenyan border into the North Eastern Province.¹⁹

16 See Nene Mburu, *The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkana Districts: The Case for Appropriate Disarmament Strategies*, p.4-5, Online: www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/Guns.pdf (Accessed 30th June 2010)

17 Katumanga Musambayi & Cliffe Lionel, *Nairobi – a City Besieged: The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development, A Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative*, (Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2005), p.5

18 Adan, M and Pkalya, R, *Closed to Progress*, (Nairobi: Practical Action, 2005), p.47-48

19 Farah, Ibrahim, Ahmad Aisha & Omar Daud, *Small Arms and Border Controls in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Malkasufta, Ethiopia; Mandera, Kenya; and Bula Hawa Somalia*, (APFO & Project Ploughshares, 2005), p.9

SALW trafficking through the Ethiopia-Kenya border is more difficult due to the comparatively tighter monitoring mechanisms. But SALW sourced from Ethiopia are trafficked through various routes to Kenya. First, clans move arms from the Ethiopia border to Burhaje, Somalia and then to Mandera, Kenya. Second, arms from Malkasufta, Ethiopia are smuggled through Bula Hawa, Somalia into Kenya. Arms are transported from Ethiopia's Moyale over to Kenya's Moyale and Elwak.²⁰ These arms supply Nairobi's illicit weapons users through Garissa to Eastleigh, and/or Wajir-Isiolo-Eastleigh.

It is estimated that there are between 50,000 to 170,000 illicit arms concentrated in Northern Kenya, where they perpetuate various forms of crime.²¹ The proliferation of small arms intensified in the North Rift and North Eastern regions due to recurrent cattle rustling and armed violence. In addition, proliferation of illicit firearms may be attributed to the influx of refugees from the neighbouring warring countries.

Inadequate policing manifested by poor facilitation, low deployment and rogue elements among law enforcement agencies have led to complacency in the control of weapons proliferation. Many times there has been pilferage of ammunition, which finds its way into civilian hands and is used for criminal activities²². The discovery in Narok in 2009 of a large cache of 10,000 bullets manufactured at the Eldoret Bullet Factory and several guns in the hands of a suspected arms trafficker²³ pointed to the possibility of the existence of a large network of a lucrative arms trafficking business in the region, which could be fanning not only internal insecurity in Kenya, but also civil wars and other forms of instability in neighbouring countries.

Illicit SALW also originate from Uganda, first through Mt. Elgon (through Lwakhakha and Chepkube) into Eldoret (in greater Uasin Gishu), and secondly, through the borderline North Rift areas, which end up in West Pokot. Arms are also trafficked through the Suam border point (in Trans Nzoia West) to Eldoret through Kitale.²⁴

20 Ibid., p.8

21 In Adan, Mohamoud & Pkalya, Ruto, *Op. Cit.*, p.51, the authors approximate arms in Turkana, West Pokot, Wajir, Samburu, Marsabit, East Baringo, Tana River, Moyale, Trans Nzoia, and Marakwet alone to be 172,995. Further, the then Internal Security Minister, John Michuki, was quoted as estimating the number of small arms in the North Rift to be 50,000. See Patrick Beja and Cyrus Ombati, *State Still Has Long Way to Go in Disarmament*, East African Standard, 29th August 2005

22 Bevan, J. 2008. Blowback: Kenya's illicit ammunition problem in Turkana North District. Geneva: Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 22 (<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-occasional-papers/SAS-OP22-Kenya.pdf>) (Accessed 15th July 2010)

23 See Daily Nation, 9th December 2009, pp.1

24 Ekuam, David, *An Overview of the Status of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Areas Affected by Post-Election Violence in Rift Valley Province*, (Nairobi: UNDP Kenya, 2008), p.16

2.2.2 The Dynamics of Disarmament in Kenya

Since the colonial period, successive governments in Kenya have made several attempts to disarm communities and armed groups, although not much success has been achieved. Most of the unsuccessful efforts in the past can be attributed to poor methodologies and approaches while more successful disarmament efforts in the recent past for instance, *'Dumisha Amani II'* can be attributed to improved approaches. The most protracted disarmament in Kenya has been among the pastoral communities. Other categories that have been targeted include armed criminal gangs/militias that were responsible for urban violence, and Police Reservists who have variously been accused of collusion with cattle rustlers where they either hire out their guns and/or simply abet cattle rustling.

In Kenya, the first disarmament attempt was in 1926, code-named 'Operation Tennis', and targeted the Turkana and Karamojong. It was followed by 'Operation Jock Stock' in 1952, targeting the *Mau Mau* rebellion. In 1954, the colonial government passed the Firearms Act as a way of curtailing the anti-colonial struggles in Central Kenya following the theft or capture of 660 arms from British Troops by *Mau Mau* fighters.²⁵ The colonial government also deployed the Kings African Rifles in 1961 to disarm the Turkana. The first disarmament by the post-independent government was undertaken between 1963 and 1968 targeting Somali Irredentists (also referred to as the *'Shifta'* bandits). The *shifta* wars led the Government to close the Northern Frontier District during which the disarmament of the insurgents was undertaken.

Further disarmament operations were carried out in 1980 in Bulla Karatasi, Garissa and in Mandera's Malka Mari in 1981. In February 1984, disarmament operations were carried out in Wajir. In 1984, Kenya and Uganda carried out a joint disarmament operation called 'Operation *Nyundo*' ('hammer') targeting borderland communities (specifically the Pokot). Between July and October 2001, the Kenya Government carried out various disarmament operations in the North Eastern province.

In order to disarm the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), a military-led security operation called 'Operation *Okoa Maisha*' (Save Lives) was carried out in March 2008. An earlier Police-led operation involving the administration police and General Service Unit (GSU) in October 2007 failed to contain the SLDF. The high-

25 See Kamenju, J., "Combating Illicit Arms and Landmines: A Historical Perspective", in Kamenju, J. & Okoth, G. Pontian, *Power Play and Policy in Kenya: An Interdisciplinary Discourse*, (Nairobi: Oakland Books, 2006), p.240

handed²⁶ nature of the military-led operation of March 2008 led to the crushing of the militia. Two of its top commanders were killed and over 1,735 suspected members arrested. Out of these 1,324 were interrogated and released, 374 were arraigned in court and charged with various crimes, while 37 remained in police custody. Further, 41 AK47 assault rifles and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition were recovered.²⁷ Surviving members were either arrested or scattered.²⁸

Most of the armed groups, movements and organisations that were challenging the power of the state in Kenya were either outlawed/banned, or were defeated militarily and thereafter disbanded. Many ceased to exist after their leaders (political and military) were arrested, eliminated or forced into exile. Police either arrested or killed the top commanders in the mid-1990s February Eighteen Resistance Army (FERA) and February Eighteen Movement (FEM) to quash them. Some of its commanders are believed to be hiding in Uganda. Kenya Pastoralist Forum (KPF) was deregistered as a civil society initiative and *Mwakenya* was outlawed.

Subsequent disarmament operations targeting mainly pastoral areas of Kenya included Operation *Dumisha Amani I* (Maintain Peace) in 2005, which was followed by Operation *Okota* ('collect') until February 2006. Operation *Dumisha Amani II* was launched in 2010.

While the disarmament operations entailed gun collection undertakings mainly by the Police, different strategies were used during the various disarmament undertakings ranging from arrest, detention and prosecution of suspects, to 'shoot-on-site' of armed criminals, especially in the urban areas. There were also allegations of extra-judicial killings (mainly of Mungiki, but also of other armed gangs).²⁹

The Kenya Government often issues amnesty to criminals and other illegally armed civilians to enable them to surrender their firearms voluntarily. Kenya has also put in place cross-border collaboration mechanisms for controlling cross-border trafficking of illicit firearms. A technical cross-border committee

26 See Kenya National Commission of Human Rights, *The Mountain of Terror – A Report of Investigations of Torture by the Military at Mt. Elgon*, (Nairobi: KNCHR, 2008)

27 See Robert Romborah Simiyu, *Militianisation of Resource Conflicts: The Case of Land-based Conflict in the Mount Elgon Region of Western Kenya*, ISS: Pretoria, Monograph 152, 2008, p.41

28 See Wachira Kiragu, Muluka, Barrack, Wepundi, Manasseh, *Mt. Elgon Conflict: A Rapid Assessment of the Underpinning Socio-economic, Governance and Security Factors*, (Nairobi: UNDP, 2008), p.40

29 The 'shoot-to-kill' order was given by Internal Security Minister, John Michuki in January 2007 (see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200701/28/eng20080128_345416.html (Accessed 12th August 2011))

with Uganda is already in place. The two countries have undertaken joint cross-border disarmament initiatives. Kenya has also signed agreements on joint security with Ethiopia. In Kenya, the civil society has also been actively involved in supporting disarmament undertakings.

The main challenges, which have been associated with these disarmament operations, have been their reactive nature (Operation Tennis; *Okota*; and *Dumisha Amani I*). It is only under *Dumisha Amani II* where efforts were made to implement integrated disarmament and development programmes.

2.3 SUDAN

2.3.1 The Nature of Armed Conflicts in Sudan

The armed conflicts and disarmament experiences made reference to in this analysis are for the periods mainly between 2005 and 2010. This corresponds to the period within which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was under implementation; and thus treats the two countries, the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan as one.

The armed conflict experienced in North Sudan:

The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum had to contend with widespread domestic political pressure in the North over the manner in which it handled the CPA negotiating process. There was a general feeling that the North was giving away too much which would have the consequent implication of other groups demanding similar treatment. Armed confrontations between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and armed groups in South Kordofan³⁰ as well as in Blue Nile State³¹ might be pointers to this notion. Under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Blue Nile state were required to downsize to the pre-war level of two battalions (a battalion is, in theory, approximately 800 men including four infantry companies of 105 men each).

Almost six years later, on the eve of Southern Sudan's self-determination referendum, state Governor Malik Agar claimed SAF still had 20,000 troops in Blue Nile. Another 3,000 SAF troops served, with an equal number of Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) fighters, in the Joint Integrated Units (which

30 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Armed Entities in South Kordofan (February 2011)" <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/three-areas/HSBA-Armed-Groups-South-Kordofan.pdf>

31 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, "The Buildup of Forces and Arms in Blue Nile (December 2010)" <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/three-areas/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Blue-Nile-note.pdf>

many observers deemed as neither jointed nor integrated). During the war, SAF distributed un-verifiably large numbers of firearms to loyal communities as well as Popular Defence Forces to create a buffer zone between them and the SPLA. In response, the SPLA also amassed its troops in the transition area thus exacerbating intra- and inter-community conflicts. As a result of the fact that the SAF and the SPLA drew their support from the communities in which they were operating, civilians who offered different services to the fighting forces gained access to firearms even though they might not have been necessarily involved in direct combat. The outcome of this was the militarization of the communities³².

The Khartoum government continues to contend with armed conflict in Darfur. The actors in the Darfurian armed conflict include the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)³³, Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi³⁴ and the Liberation and Justice Movement³⁵.

The tension between Chad and Sudan catalyses the Darfur conflict with its leaders Presidents Idriss Déby and Omar al-Bashir fighting proxy wars.³⁶ Reports indicate that Chadian armed opposition groups, although reduced, have been active in North Darfur, where some have turned to banditry for survival and others joining the SAF. These, alongside militias from Darfur are said to be active in the contested areas of Abyei and southern Blue Nile. Indeed, some 300–400 Chadian rebels from the Missiriya Arab tribe have reportedly joined their Sudanese kin in Abyei, while another 400 (Arabs, as well as Ouaddaïan and Tama) have been trained, together with several thousand recruits from Darfur, near Damazin in southern Blue Nile, possibly to support locally recruited pro-Khartoum Missiriya militias.³⁷

32 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report (Unpublished report)

33 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Justice and Equality Movement (January 2011)”. Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/darfur/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf>

34 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi”, Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/darfur/HSBA-Armed-Groups-SLA-MM.pdf>

35 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Liberation and Justice Movement (January 2011)”, Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/darfur/HSBA-Armed-Groups-LJM.pdf>

36 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Sudan-Chad Proxy War (January 2011)” Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-armed-groups-darfur-chad-proxy-war.php>

37 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Sudan-Chad Proxy War (January 2011)” Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-armed-groups-darfur-chad-proxy-war.php>

The nature of armed conflict between the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A:

Although the SAF and SPLA signed a permanent ceasefire under the January 2005 CPA, armed confrontations continued through proxies. The CPA failed to address the role of proxy militia groups in exacerbating the conflict between the SAF and SPLA. Most of the militia groups were aligned to, funded and supported by SAF and posed serious security threats in southern Sudan, which negatively impacted on the CPA stabilization implementation processes. The CPA provided for the establishment of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) with approximately 32,900³⁸ soldiers drawn from both SAF and SPLA. The JIUs were deployed in specifically defined areas over which there were disagreements over borderlines such as Abyei. The inability to integrate the JIUs made it difficult to deter outbreak of conflicts.

The nature of the armed conflicts experienced within South Sudan:

The CPA required all Other Armed Groups (OAGs) to re-align themselves with the two CPA principals i.e. SAF in the North and SPLA in the South. There were challenges in the South, with many of the OAGs failing to integrate properly. Conflicts flared up in many states in South Sudan following controversies related to the April 2010 General elections in Sudan. The run-up to the 9 January 2011 referendum on the self-determination of South Sudan was characterized by widespread conflicts between the SPLA and rebel fighting groups.³⁹ These included: George Athor in Jonglei state; Gatluak Gai in Unity state; David Yauyau in Jonglei state; Gabriel Tang-Ginye in Jonglei state; and Peter Gadet in Unity state.

In Upper Nile state, the SPLA also aggressively suppressed armed Shilluk.⁴⁰ The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda led by Joseph Kony continued to attack civilians in the Western parts of Sudan neighbouring CAR and DR Congo, particularly Western Equatorial State, Western Bar-el-ghazel State and South-

38 See Report of the UN Secretary General on Sudan, 14 October 2010 (S/2010/528)

39 South Sudan became the 53rd Independent African Country and 154th UN member on 19 July 2011, following a 19 January referendum in which Southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted to secede from the North

40 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Small Arms Survey updates on post-election insurrections and the LRA, (see 13 December 2010 e-mail from SAS) available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/>; See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, "SPLM/A-Shilluk Conflict in Upper Nile (updated December 2010)", <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/southern-sudan/emerging/HSBA-Armed-Groups-Yauyau-Shilluk.pdf>

ern Darfur.⁴¹ These attacks have spread violence in the communities as well as the displacement of thousands.⁴²

The prevalence of firearms in majority of the communities in South Sudan continues to fuel inter-communal violence.⁴³ Several open or suppressed community conflicts threaten security in southern Sudan. The most virulent of these conflicts were experienced in Jonglei in 2009, and involved retaliatory attacks between Murle militias and the Nuer. Similarly, armed conflicts were reported in Malakal in 2009. Although Eastern Equatorial State experienced widespread clan and community-based conflicts over cattle, marriage disputes, borders and natural resources, these conflicts are common throughout South Sudan. Cattle rustling, armed robbery, and banditry are also endemic.⁴⁴ The return to ancestral villages or pre-displacement homes by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees exacerbated tensions over land and other resources in many parts of Southern Sudan.

Factors leading to the proliferation of SALW in the Sudan:

Arms have proliferated due to prolonged exposure of communities to armed conflicts. The majority of able-bodied males and females were at some point in their lives involved with the fighting in one way or the other, whether directly or indirectly, which exposed them to firearms. In Sudan, thousands of civilians were in possession of SALW without necessarily being actively involved with the armed forces. It is estimated that the weapons held by civilians numbered 1,240,000, which is about four weapons per every 100 citizens in Sudan.⁴⁵ While this is almost more than double the number of weapons held by armed groups in Sudan, the dearth of statistics on actual numbers suggests that the actual number of firearms in civilian hands could actually be higher, especially in southern Sudan.

Sudan has several pastoral communities in the North and South that are armed. The state does not have the monopoly of violence in southern Sudan. Along the border between the North and the South, insecurity is rife and many people

41 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Lord's Resistance Army update (updated November 2010)", <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-armed-groups-southern-sudan-LRA.php>

42 See Small Arms Survey, 2009: 50

43 See Small Arms Survey, 2009: 54

44 See UNDP/ South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control, *'Eastern Equatoria State Consultation Report, 1 March - 10 April 2010*

45 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report

are armed for their own protection. Institutions for ensuring the rule of law are lacking in most parts of southern Sudan.⁴⁶

The ambiguity of the CPA created anxieties about the political future of Sudan leading to fresh recruitment of fighters and arms proliferation by both SAF and SPLA. The failure to arrive at a peaceful end to rebellions among armed groups in the South also contributed to the proliferation of SALW. In addition, some of the armed groups were propelled into rebellion by claims ranging from political exclusion to electoral malpractices by what was considered as an ethnically dominated, Dinka-led SPLM government.

The stalling of progress on negotiations over the Abyei border demarcation cast doubt over peace in the disputed area, leading to further arms proliferation. This is despite the unequivocal commitment to peace and peaceful coexistence made by both Presidents Omar Bashir and Salva Kiir on several occasions. The uncertainty over the future military-cum-security relationship between North and South has also been a cause of arms stock-piling that has led to proliferation of SALW. There are allegations that the North has continued to support proxy militias in the border areas.⁴⁷

The sources of firearms in Sudan are mainly internal, although cross-border dimensions (especially the armed conflicts in neighbouring Chad, and supplies from Egypt, and to a small extent Kenya and Uganda) have also played a significant role. There have been reports that even after the CPA, a large number of small arms in the possession of non-state armed groups in the South have continued to originate largely from inventories of both the SAF and SPLA.⁴⁸ Small arms are readily available from a number of other sources within southern Sudan, including un-recovered civil war arms caches and poorly secured and managed SPLA and disarmed militia stockpiles.⁴⁹ Reports indicate that during the civilian disarmament, the best-functioning weapons collected in Jonglei, Warap, Unity and Lakes States between 2006 and 2009 were redistributed to local police and in some cases recycled into SPLA stocks.⁵⁰ This defeated the purpose

46 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report

47 See Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Emerging Armed Groups in Southern Sudan (updated December 2010)”, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-armed-groups-southern-sudan-emerging.php> (Accessed June 10, 2011)

48 See Lewis, Mike, ‘Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flow’. Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working paper No. 18, September 2009

49 Small Arms Survey, 2009: 51

50 Small Arms Survey, 2009: 36, quoted in Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report

of undertaking disarmament. Proper mechanisms for arms control, storage and eventual destruction have not yet been put in place.⁵¹

2.3.2 The Dynamics of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sudan

The disarmament exercise in Sudan started in 1989 with the Popular Defence Forces, followed by Community Police in 1993. In the same year, disarmament was also undertaken in Darfur. Thus, prior to the January 2005 CPA, there had been various adhoc disarmament interventions undertaken both in the North and South. The GoSS executed disarmament programs around the upper Nile and Jonglei states between December 2005 and May 2006. However, some people from the Murle group refused to surrender their weapons and crossed the border into Ethiopia.

The disarmament processes in Sudan entailed a combination of military action against armed groups (rebels, militias as well as auxiliaries) as well as negotiations for peaceful settlements, which sometimes resulted in demobilization and co-option into government and the military. The Khartoum government has been engaged in an active conflict with dissident rebel groups in Darfur. In the South, GoSS has on several occasions offered unconditional amnesty to various rebel fighting groups. Gun mop-up operations have on several occasions been undertaken in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. Sudan undertook DDR initiatives whose beneficiaries included members of the armed forces, ex-combatants from rebel armies and civilians in both the North and the South, militias and auxiliary armies.

The more systematic disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan commenced after the signing of the CPA in January 2005 until the 9 January 2011 referendum on self-determination in South Sudan, a period known as the CPA transition period.

The realignment of all Other Armed Groups (OAGs) under the provisions of the CPA was a form of disarmament and demobilization. In addition, both SAF and the SPLA were required to undertake a process of “proportional downsizing” as part of the DDR.⁵² The disarmament in Sudan was also intended to provide for a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the

51 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report

52 The need for implementing a DDR programme was anchored in Chapter Five of the January 2005 CPA (See Security Arrangements, Annexure 1: Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, Part III: Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and Reconciliation, pp. 118-121).

country, as part of the peace and confidence building measures, in order to contribute to creating an enabling environment for human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilization across the Sudan.

Although disarmament was mainly led by the armed forces (SAF and SPLA), demobilisation and reintegration was UN-led through United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in collaboration with stakeholders from the private sector and civil society. By December 2010, the UN-led DDR in South Sudan had been undertaken in Central Equatorial State, Lakes States, Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, Eastern Equatorial State and in Western Bahr El Ghazal State.⁵³ In the north, DDR was undertaken in the states of Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Khartoum.

The disarmament process was envisaged to be undertaken in two phases. Phase I, targeted 36,641 members of Special Needs Groups (SNGs), including Women Associated with Armed Forces (WAAF). Phase II targeted demobilization of about 53,400 active members of the SPLA.

It had been expected that the SPLA would use the DDR support to reduce the size of its forces. However, by December 2010, only 9,736 had undergone the DDR process in the South, and 23,367 in the North, with the majority being WAAF and elderly/disabled ex-combatants. None of the active SAF and SPLA had been subjected to demobilization by the end of the CPA transition period.⁵⁴

2.4 UGANDA

2.4.1 The Nature of Armed Conflicts in Uganda

The nature of the armed conflicts experienced in Uganda:

Armed conflicts in Uganda ranged from internal civil conflicts by organised rebel groups seeking regime change to criminality perpetuated by former army combatants (veterans), militias and auxiliaries, private security guards and organised criminal gangs, on one hand and armed civilians in rural and urban areas (but most especially in pastoral areas such as Karamoja) on the other.

Uganda has had a long experience with armed rebellion since the coming to power of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986, following a 5-year protracted armed struggle. The low presence of the state in most parts of the country, coupled with the deteriorating socio-economic infrastructure led to

53 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report

54 See Annex 7, in Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report, p.85

a conflagration of violent armed conflicts. The state battled one armed rebel group after another, starting in Teso (Uganda People's Army, between December 1986 and October 1992) and Acholi (Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army from January 1986; then Holy Spirit Movement that led to the formation of the Lord's Resistance Army), spreading to Lango (Citizens Army for Multi-Party Politics in 1999) and West Nile (West Nile Bank Front from 1992 to 1998 and Uganda National Rescue Front II from 1996 to 2002), and eventually to the Ruenzori sub-region (the Allied Democratic Forces between 1996 and 2001).

There were also several other smaller armed groups that the NRM government engaged over the years. It has been estimated that there were in total 45 such rebel groups.⁵⁵ A few engaged the state in large-scale armed conflicts, sometimes involving conventional warfare, with modern battle formations (e.g. the ADF; WNBF and LRA). Most were small armed groups that lasted for short periods. Their grievances ranged from bad governance or dictatorship/authoritarian rule, to political and economic marginalisation.

The conflicts in the various parts of the country left behind a legacy of indiscriminate proliferation of illicit SALWs, which contributed to the rise in organised crime in rural and urban areas; and also contributed to the armed conflict in the Karamoja region, where there was widespread conflict over resources required for livestock production. Although the Karamoja conflict did not pose a direct military threat to the survival of the state, it posed a serious security threat to peace and stability not only in Karamoja, but also in all the districts that neighbour Karamoja, which were afflicted by violent livestock raiding. The turning point in Karamoja followed the overthrow of the Idi Amin regime in 1979, when Karamojong warriors looted the armoury in Moroto barracks, leading to the intensification of livestock raiding.

Factors that led to the proliferation of SALW in Uganda:

Apart from civil strife, the proliferation of illicit firearms in Uganda can also be attributed to poorly implemented DDR programmes targeting former combatants and the national army. Some ex-combatants retained their weapons after they were demobilised. When militias and auxiliaries were disbanded, some absconded with their weapons because they were not properly disarmed and demobilised. These weapons were used in crimes, leading to insecurity in communities. The licensing of firearms for use by private security companies also contributes to the proliferation of firearms that are sometimes used for criminal purposes.

55 See Muhereza, F.E. "An analysis of experiences of undertaking disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Uganda", RECSA 2011

In most of the areas affected by armed conflicts, insecurity is attributed to the limited presence of state institutions responsible for law and order enforcement. Electoral politics are increasingly characterised by violence. Beginning 2010, the country has faced new challenges of terror networks, linked to *Al-Qaeda* and *Al-Shabab*, through which firearms and explosives could be proliferated. This appears to be a consequence of Uganda's involvement in regional peace keeping efforts in Somalia under African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The Karamojong in North-Eastern Uganda have a culture that glorifies the gun. Since they border a conflict-afflicted region including South-Eastern Sudan and North-Western Kenya, arms flow freely into these remote, large and poorly policed volatile areas.

2.4.2 The Dynamics of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Uganda

In Uganda, disarmament entailed military action to remove illegal guns from rebel groups and insurgents, and firearms mop-up operations targeting criminal gangs and armed individuals in different parts of the country. Many armed rebel/insurgent groups were forcefully disarmed (and thereafter demobilised) after being militarily defeated. They included, among others, the Uganda National Independence Revolutionary Organisation (UNIRO) in Acholi; The Ninth October Movement/Army (NOM/A); National Democratic Alliance/Army (NDA); Citizens Army for Multi-Party Politics (CAMP); Uganda People's Army (UPA) in Teso; The West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB) in West Nile; The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Ruenzori region; and also armed pastoralists in Karamoja. Peace agreements and terms of disarmament and demobilisation were negotiated and agreed with the Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A) in Acholi; and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII) in West Nile. As for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), government used a combination of military aggression and peace overtures to achieve disarmament between 1987 and 1999. In 2002, Operation Iron Fist I was launched against the LRA, and was followed by Operation Iron Fist II of 2004. The Juba Peace process commenced in 2006 and ended in April 2008, after the talks collapsed without the signing of a Final Peace Agreement.

In Uganda, apart from military action to forcefully disarm rebel groups, criminal groups and armed civilians, disarmament also involved persuasion and granting of amnesty to those who renounced rebellion or voluntarily returned illicit firearms.⁵⁶ It also entailed the 'right sizing' of the national armed forces, which

⁵⁶ Before the Amnesty Commission was established under the Amnesty Act of 2000, amnesty was provided through presidential prerogative. In Karamoja, amnesty from prosecution for possession of illicit firearms was usually granted by the military.

was implemented as part of security sector reforms.⁵⁷ The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) was set up to assist with the resettlement and reintegration of veterans from the national army.

In Karamoja, the first disarmament operation was undertaken in July 1961 when the 4th Battalion of Kings African Rifles were deployed and instructed to ‘pacify’ the Karamojong. The Obote I government used legislative and administrative control measures to effect disarmament, following the passing of the Administration (Karamoja) Act No. 17 of 1963. In 1964, the Administration (Karamoja) (Amendment) Act of 1964 was passed, and it re-introduced ‘collective punishment’ for involvement in raiding. Heavy fines were imposed including confiscation of livestock if found guilty. During the Idi Amin regime (1971-1979), limited disarmament was undertaken. The government was mainly concerned with forceful enforcement of dressing in clothes among the Karamojong.

The Obote II government established militias in all districts neighbouring Karamoja to contain Karamojong cattle raiding. It also undertook some limited disarmament between 1983 and 1984. Between 1986 and 1999, the NRM government carried out forceful disarmament, but this was short-lived and largely a failure. Between December 2001 and January 2002, voluntary disarmament was undertaken. It was followed by a short-lived forceful disarmament between February and March 2002. Following challenges, disarmament was re-launched by President Museveni on 21 September 2004. Between 2004 and 2005, government carried out low key disarmament operations in Karamoja.

The first ever sustained forceful disarmament campaign in the history of Karamoja was launched in May 2006, and continued through 2010. The various disarmament interventions in Karamoja entailed a diversity of approaches and interventions for achieving disarmament objectives. Apart from the ‘Cordon, Search and Disarm’ strategy, the UPDF used several strategies for undertaking disarmament in Karamoja such as: arrest of adult males who would be released after they surrendered their weapons; confiscation of livestock; establishment of Protected Kraals; deployment of Canine Squads; intensified foot patrols; interception of raiders to recover raided animals and intensified military intelligence.

In different parts of Uganda, efforts were made to integrate disarmament with development through comprehensive development frameworks such as the PRDP (for the North of Uganda) and the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and

57 Between 1992 and 1995, government attempted a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of almost 35,000 UPDF soldiers from the national army in response to pressures from donors, which was partly embraced by government that saw it as an opportunity for professionalizing the army.

Development Programme (KIDDP) specifically for Karamoja. While all ministries in Uganda responsible for service delivery have in one way or another been involved in supporting disarmament and demobilisation, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and especially the Ministries of State for Northern Uganda and for Karamoja Affairs (which have since May 2011 been upgraded to a full cabinet ministry) were key to disarmament interventions. The Ministry of State in the Office of the Prime Minister in charge of Luwero Triangle has been instrumental in post-conflict resettlement and reintegration of former combatants and communities affected by the 5-year NRA bush war in the Luwero Triangle.

In different parts of the country, the army has occasionally launched 'gun mop-up' operations not only to arrest, but also to disarm criminal minded individuals and gangs. Government has set up specialised units under the Police to deal with urban crime and terrorism such as the Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU), which became the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) and the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) specifically for Karamoja. The UPDF in collaboration with other security agencies occasionally carries out 'gun mop-up' operations in former conflict-affected areas. In April 2008, the army launched 'Operation Restore Hope' for forceful disarmament in the Teso sub-region.

In West Nile, government briefly introduced a 'Guns-for-Cash' programme to encourage former combatants and members of the public to surrender their weapons voluntarily. This scheme instead inadvertently increased the trafficking in arms and a proliferation of SALW. In Karamoja between 2001 and 2003, government used a 'Rewards-for-Guns' incentive system to reward individuals who handed in their guns.⁵⁸ The management of the incentives for the buy-back scheme generated enormous challenges that undermined the objective of disarmament.

58 Each would be given incentives ranging from ox-ploughs, maize flour and a certificate as a token of appreciation. Those who would agree to disarm would be given priority in accessing funds from poverty eradication schemes, such as *Entandikwa* (start-up funds). Each kraal leader who mobilised guns from the villages received 40 pieces of iron sheets. This scheme was mismanaged and abused, and abandoned.

CHAPTER 3

3. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN THE SELECTED COUNTRIES

The disarmament challenges encountered varied from country to country. In each of the studied Member States, the challenges encountered during the disarmament also varied from one category for disarmament to another. This chapter highlights some of the major challenges encountered.

3.1 *THE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERTAKING DDR PROGRAMMES*

The States focused on during the disarmament case studies presented different policy and legal frameworks for undertaking DDR programmes, which presented a diversity of related challenges.

3.1.1 **Appropriateness of the Policy/Legal framework on Control of Firearms**

The policy and legal framework for control of SALWS in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, there existed a legal and policy framework for the control of firearms, which dates back from the medieval document of '*Fitha Negest*' (Justice of Kings), to the country's Penal Code, which was adopted for the first time in 1938. This code levied punishment on arms misuse. Anyone who was arrested in connection with armed robbery was sentenced to flogging or to 5-20 years of imprisonment. The punishment was made more severe with time. Under Proclamation No. 3 of 1950, (Negarit Gazeta, 1950) anyone found guilty of banditry would be sentenced to death as punishment.

In 1960, the Ministry of Interior issued the Arms Regulation of 1960 (Legal Notice No. 229 of 1960), in which anyone who possessed and/or wished to get involved in arms trade was to get registered, be issued a certificate and declare the list of weapons' stock annually to the government (Negarit Gazeta, 1960). In 1961, the Ministry of Interior amended the Arms Regulation of 1960, with issuance of the Arms (Amendment) Regulation of 1961 (Legal Notice No. 240 of 1961), which required every person in possession of an arm to register them where they live with the relevant authorities.

In Ethiopia, as early as the 1950's and 60's, there were gun shops in various parts of Addis Ababa. When students begun striking against the State, it was suspected that these gun shops were the source of the firearms. As a result, the

government begun to clamp down on the gun shops. This resulted in repeal of the firearms ownership law in the 1970s. Gun shops are still outlawed in the country at the present. The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, which is the supreme law of the land provides for the basic human rights and freedoms in article 55(21). It authorises the Federal Legislative Assembly to enact laws regulating the possession and bearing of arms. The power to issue firearms was bestowed to the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority (SIRAA) under proclamation No. 6 of 1995.

Proclamation No. 6/1995 made SIRRA responsible for issuing licenses for the possession or use of firearms. Whenever necessary, these powers could be delegated to federal and regional executive organs including the Ethiopia Federal Police Commission (EFPC), as per Article 8 of the same proclamation. Under Article 7 of Proclamation No. 313/2003, the Federal Police was empowered with legal authority to prevent crimes from being committed within the federal court jurisdiction; to counteract activities which are in violation of the constitution; to safeguard the security of borders, airports, railway lines and terminals and mining areas and to conduct studies on crime prevention and investigation; among others. While the Federal Police Commission is based in Addis Ababa, Article 7(15) and (16) of the proclamation entitles it to delegate its powers to the regional police commissions where deemed necessary.

A number of limitations have already been noted in the laws governing the ownership, use and control of SALW. The Ethiopian Federal Police has drafted a new law on SALW. The draft law has been submitted to the Council of Ministers for review.

The policy and legal framework for control of SALWS in Kenya

The regulation on small arms matters in Kenya is provided for under the Kenya Firearms Act Cap 114 alongside administrative and operations procedures of the various armed forces. In pursuit of international and regional commitments to illicit firearms control and regulation, Kenya is signatory to the UN Program of Action, party to the Bamako Declaration and has ratified the Nairobi Protocol of 2004. Kenya has signed but is yet to ratify the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling. These international and regional frameworks are nationally contextualised through a National Action Plan on small arms control and a National Policy on SALW. The National SALW policy is in its final stages awaiting cabinet approval. In September 2010, the Kenya Parliament enacted the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 2010. This Act in effect amended the Firearms Act, and prescribes a life sentence for anyone found with an illegal firearm. The Act introduces tougher penalties for illicit small arms possession.

Kenya has developed a National Action Plan (NAP) to address SALW proliferation through institutional capacity building, stockpile management, public awareness and research of the prevailing and changing dynamics. The national framework is coordinated by a National Focal Point (NFP) that has established taskforces at Provincial and District levels to deal with SALW issues.

The government is, however, yet to formulate a stand-alone policy or legislation on disarmament, although disarmament has been undertaken since the colonial period. The armed conflicts in Kenya can therefore partly be attributed to the inability of the existing legal framework to address itself to the key demand and supply factors in the proliferation of illicit SALW. These range from marginalization of pastoral communities, underdevelopment and poor governance structures and systems to ethnic conflicts, retrogressive cultural practices, cattle rustling and porous borders among others.

The policy and legal framework for control of SALWS in Sudan

In Sudan, the guiding firearms control legislation is the Arms, Ammunitions and Explosives Act of 1986 and the Arms, Ammunition and Explosives regulations of 1993, incorporating amendment No. 1 of 1997.⁵⁹ The laws prohibit the possession of firearms without a valid licence from an authorised entity. In Sudan, state agencies are required to maintain records of the storage and movement of all firearms and ammunition under their control.⁶⁰

In an attempt to deal with the unique situation in South Sudan, UNDP supported the Southern Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control (SSBC-SAC) to develop policies for regulating ownership and use of small arms. A legal framework specific to South Sudan has not yet been finalized. The SSBCSAC provides the institutional framework for controlling small arms proliferation. This institutional framework should be decentralised to the states and other lower administrative structures of government to ensure effectiveness.

The policy and legal framework for control of SALWS in Uganda

The Uganda Penal Code Act (Cap. 120) contains various provisions that address issues of unlawful use of firearms. The Explosives Act (Cap. 298) regulates the

59 See Fleew, C, and A. Urquhart, 'Strengthening Small Arms Control: An Audit of Small Arms Control Legislation in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa' February 2004, SaferAfrica and SaferWorld.

60 Sudan 2003. Registration 'The National report of Sudan on its implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects (UNPoa). New York, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN of 8 July 2003; section 7, pp.4. Available at: <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/5293> (accessed 13 August 2011).

manufacture, storage and peaceful use of explosives. The Firearms Act (Cap. 299) makes it an offence for anyone to possess (and use) a firearm without a license. Those who do commit an offence, for which one is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years. The fines proposed under this law are under review, in a process, which is being spearheaded by the National Focal Point on SALW.

To complement the functioning of magistrates' courts to address possession of illicit firearms, a Military Court Martial was lawfully established to hear cases involving the possession and use of weapons. For being in unlawful possession of arms, ammunition, equipment and other prescribed materials ordinarily being the monopoly of the army, armed civilians make themselves subject to military law under section 15(1)(i) of the UPDF Act of 2005 (Cap. 307). By indulging in raiding activities using illegally owned arms and ammunition, Karamojong warriors commit an offence for which they are liable, upon conviction, to suffer death (Section 33[1][2]). Hundreds of armed civilians as well as armed Karamojong warriors who have been arrested in possession of illicit firearms have been charged, prosecuted and sentenced by the Court Martial.

Uganda's policy framework for the control of firearms is expounded by the National Action Plan for the Control of SALW, developed by the National Focal Point (NFP) on SALW in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A National Policy on Peaceful Conflict Resolution is also underway.

Uganda, in compliance to international and regional processes on SALW control, has signed and ratified several international and regional agreements, protocols and declarations. These include: (a) United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects; (b) the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (ratified in April 2005); (c) the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons; (d) the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Uganda has signed and ratified the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa.

3.1.2 Appropriateness of the Policy/Legal Framework on Disarmament and Demobilisation

In all the four countries where the disarmament case studies were undertaken, there were a variety of policy programmes that had been implemented on disar-

mament, although there was no coherent national policy framework to support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. While there was a diversity of policy pronouncements on disarmament, none of the countries has a stand-alone legislation on disarmament, yet this is a challenge these countries have grappled with since the colonial period.

Uganda has neither a national policy framework for disarmament and demobilisation, nor a National Policy for Conflict Resolution and Peace building, although there are efforts towards the latter since 2006. Several development policy programmes such as the NRM Ten-Point Programme of 1986 and the Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAP)⁶¹ also made reference to the need for disarmament. The disarmament that was undertaken was mainly based on policy pronouncements which have been made by the executive (the Presidency as well as members of cabinet responsible for security and for defence⁶²) on one hand, and the leadership of the military on the other. None of these were ever subjected to parliamentary debate for approval. Even for Karamoja, where the government has had the most extensive disarmament engagement, there was neither a specific policy nor legislation that was put in place. There were inadequate provisions in regard to resettlement and reintegration of disarmed Karamojong pastoralists.

Several policies were adopted in undertaking disarmament in Karamoja such as the establishment of protected kraals that resulted in undesired consequences, such as making livestock more vulnerable to raids; and ecological destruction where these kraals were established.

The need for disarmament in Karamoja was on different occasions the subject of parliamentary deliberations, both at select committee level as well as plenary debates; although no single law was ever promulgated on Karamojong disarma-

61 The Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAP) provided government's overarching policy framework for guiding public action for poverty eradication in the country. The PEAP of 2001 (under Pillar 2 on 'Creating Good Governance and Security') identified the launching of disarmament in Karamoja as a mechanism for not only conflict resolution but also providing support to communities affected by cattle rustling and accompanying gross human rights violation, which undermined government poverty eradication initiatives in districts neighbouring Karamoja. The 2004 PEAP under Pillar 3 on 'Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management', identified the need to end cattle rustling as one of the major impediments to the realisation of government development objectives in general and improvement of human welfare conditions in particular.

62 In November 2000, the Minister of State for Security issued a Ministerial statement that outlined government policy objectives in pursuing disarmament in Karamoja. In December 2001, State House issued a circular signed by H.E. President Museveni addressed to political leaders and the military in the region, outlining the guidelines for the Karamoja disarmament exercise.

ment in the 6th Parliament (1996-2000)⁶³; 7th Parliament (2001-2005)⁶⁴, and 8th Parliament (2006-2010)⁶⁵.

In Uganda, while there is no law enacted specifically to address disarmament and demobilisation issues, the 1995 Constitution broadly provides for the need to engage in peace building and conflict resolution. There were some attempts to put in place appropriate legislative processes to enable disarmament to take place, especially the enactment by Parliament in June 1987 of the one-year Amnesty Statute through which government granted amnesty to all rebel groups fighting the government. After the period of the amnesty expired, government granted Presidential Pardons starting in December 1988. An Amnesty Act was passed by parliament in November 2000, and assented to by the president on 17 January 2001. By January 2005, up to 14,695 individuals had benefited from amnesty. While the amnesty law was sufficient to handle disarmament and demobilisation, it was largely inadequate to address the issues of reintegration of former combatants who benefitted from the amnesty.

In Sudan, the policy framework for undertaking DDR was the Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan of 2007.⁶⁶ In this strategic plan, DDR was seen as a mechanism for creating an enabling environment for achieving human security and post-CPA social stabilization and peace building for sustainable development. The Sudan DDR policy framework however, encountered challenges, largely related to contradictions within the CPA itself. On one hand, the CPA provided for the primacy of achieving the national unity and sovereignty of Sudan, while on the other, it also recognised the inherent right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. The leadership in the North and South were founded on two differing political visions about the future of their country. The manner in which the DDR was eventually operationalised and managed did not conform to the principle of ‘One-Country Two-Systems’, which was the foundation of the CPA. The South viewed the post-CPA DDR in Sudan to have largely been Unitarian, in as far as ‘Khartoum’ seemed to control the management and funding of the processes, even when separate DDR Commissions were established for both

63 The 6th Parliament passed a motion for a resolution on disarmament in Karamoja on 15 March 2000 in which government was tasked to clearly undertake to disarm the Karamojong but also establish a foundation for the development of Karamoja.

64 While reports were often made in Parliament on Karamojong livestock raiding, the 7th Parliament did not debate or pass any motion or resolution on disarmament in Karamoja.

65 The most vicious forceful disarmament ever experienced in Karamoja was undertaken during the tenure of the 8th Parliament of Uganda. However, deliberations on disarmament in parliament mainly focussed on whether or not the UPDF used excessive force during disarmament, and in the process committed gross human rights violations; and on the consequences of the armed conflicts associated with Karamojong raiding.

66 See the National Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-Integration Coordination Council, “The National DDR Strategic Plan”, Sudan, Khartoum, August 2007.

the North (North Sudan DDR Commission) and the South (the South Sudan DDR Commission). As a result, the GoSS and especially SPLA leadership did not appropriately own the United Nations-led DDR process that was taking place in the South.⁶⁷

In Ethiopia there was also no clear policy and legal framework for undertaking Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) interventions. Kenya has not had internal insurgency that would require conventional DDR. However, disarmament has been undertaken through amnesties and security operations targeted at armed groups such as pastoralists and criminal gangs. There have however not been clearly spelt out legal provisions or institutional arrangements to guide such processes. Most of such operations have been of short-term nature to address occasional insecurity escalation.

3.1.3 Appropriateness of the Policy/Legal framework for Resettlement and Reintegration

In the three studied Member States where DDR programmes have been implemented, reintegration was not informed by appropriate policies or legal frameworks that should articulate related concerns such as resettlement, rehabilitation, reconciliation and peaceful co-existence. Their absence has undermined the achievement of sustainable peace and development in many occasions. Where programmes for reintegration have been implemented, they have not been accompanied by adequate attention to addressing the challenges facing the resettlement of former combatants.

In Uganda, a national policy framework for reconciliation to make reintegration of ex-combatants possible has not yet been put in place. While the existing policy and legal framework as well as institutional structures for undertaking reintegration, resettlement and rehabilitation are inadequate, there have been some initiatives. The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), was launched by government on 15 October 2007. It was a good undertaking for rebuilding the north and consolidating the peace achieved, and was in line with Agenda Item Number 2 of the Juba Peace Talks on 'Comprehensive Solutions', which deliberated on the following, among others: (a) participation in national politics and institutions; (b) economic development of northern and eastern Uganda; and (c) settlement of IDPs. An agreement on comprehensive solutions was signed between Government of Uganda and the LRA on 2 May 2007. The PRDP contains a crucial policy framework upon which to consider some of the issues of re-integration of ex-combatants and the general commu-

67 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

nity of northern Uganda. A clause in the PRDP states that 'reintegration will focus on provision of resettlement packages to ex-combatants, facilitating reunification with their families and the community'

The closest the Government of Uganda ever came to putting in place a comprehensive DDR programme for practical disarmament was the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), launched on 18 April 2008. The KIDDP is a medium-term development framework that harmonises the various Karamoja-specific development interventions by government (through the medium-term sector budget framework processes), bi-lateral and multi-lateral development partners and international and national non-governmental organisations. Other similar programmes have since been launched for other war-affected areas such as the Luwero Triangle and West Nile.

In Kenya, attempts have been made under '*Dumisha Amani II*' to integrate development, peace building and security provision to disarmament interventions. There are however challenges related to long-term engagement, adequate budgetary provision, sustainability of development and security mitigation projects. Another challenge is the perception of disarmament as an exclusive security undertaking as opposed to one that is closely linked to other developmental and social security interventions. Lack of political goodwill especially from local politicians has also hampered disarmament initiatives.

3.2 CHALLENGES RELATED TO THE DESIGN OF THE DDR PROGRAMMES

3.2.1 Inability to Recognise the Complexity of Local Security and Political Situation

In some of the studied Member States, there were inherent contradictions between the realities of the political and security situations and the objectives of the DDR programmes. For example, one of the major design flaws of the Sudan DDR programme was the failure to recognise the complexity of the local security situation. At the time of the signing of the CPA, there were multiple armed conflicts in Sudan. The CPA was signed between the two main belligerents, and yet other conflicts continued in other parts of the country. While in South Sudan there were challenges of bringing on board other smaller contending parties when the implementation of the CPA commenced; in the North, the government in Khartoum had to contend with other armed rebellions.

In both the North and South Sudan, multiple conflicts continued at the time when the implementation of the DDR programme commenced. This meant that while the DDR programme entailed a call for reduction in force size, it was un-

tenable for Sudan Armed Forces to disarm and demobilize. Instead, the six years between the signing of the January 2005 CPA and the referendum on the self-determination of southern Sudan in January 2011 provided an opportunity for both CPA parties to consolidate their positions and seek security and political gains during the interim period.

There were also other forms of contradiction wrought on the DDR interventions. Under the CPA, there were efforts directed at making national unity achievable, although there was never any reported open discussion between the North and the South on the future national defence force, the borders between the North and South, the issues of citizenship as well as the sharing of national resources especially oil and gas wealth that sit astride the common borders between the two. As a result, there was mutual suspicion in the way the DDR was perceived both in the North and South and hence no sufficient good will from both parties.⁶⁸

In some of the studied Member States, there was no agreement between the principles in the armed conflicts over the main objectives to be achieved. In Uganda, the Juba Peace talks, which articulated the nature of the DDR programme that the LRA would be subjected to, failed to attract a final signature because of, among other reasons, disagreement on the fate of the LRA leadership. In Sudan, there was no agreement between SPLA and SAF on objectives of implementing the DDR programme. Both the GNU led by the NCP in Khartoum and the GoSS led by the SPLM were, for all intents and purposes, not openly committed to meaningful disarmament and demobilization as well as the consequent verification of their armies; yet the UN agencies were oblivious to these political realities in their implementation of the DDR programme.

The context within which DDR programmes were implemented in some of the Member States was not after armed conflicts had come to an end, for example, in Sudan where the DDR processes were themselves considered as opportunities for achieving peaceful resolution of conflict. Under such conditions, the diversity and complexity in the prevailing local context in Sudan should have been properly understood. However, the design of the Sudan DDR programme failed to reflect the various dynamics of the respective armed conflict situations in both North and South Sudan. Despite the large amount of resources that were expended, its impact remained largely limited. A considerably small number of

68 See Small Arms Survey (SAS), “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan”, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Sudan Issue Brief, Number 17, May 2011. Available at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. See also the following: (i) Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report; (ii) Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

active armed forces that directly benefitted from the DDR programme showed that it was highly inefficient in terms of resource disposition.

In South Sudan, the implementation of the DDR programme not only suffered from widespread mismanagement and inefficiency, its main beneficiary, the SPLA, remained significantly disengaged from the programme, primarily because it regarded DDR benefits as insufficient compensation for its ex-combatants and has never felt ownership of the civilian-led process.⁶⁹

Kenya undertook disarmament interventions without clear strategies for provision of alternative livelihoods to those subjected to disarmament. This was partly because the disarmament programme in Kenya targeted mainly armed civilians and armed organised criminal groups/gangs, which did not require the classical support for demobilisation as provided for in DDR processes. Support for provision of alternative livelihoods would have been most beneficial to those whose main source of livelihood was criminality.

3.2.2 Inability to address the Underlying Community Security Challenges

In most States, community-level causes and drivers of insecurity still loom large. In Kenya, there are concerns about inadequate security for communities affected by armed conflicts, as well as poor urban neighbourhoods. Most urban areas in Kenya are faced with a challenge of having to find ways to deal with misuse of firearms. The same applies for some rural areas especially in the pastoral areas. In Sudan, the prevalence of small arms in communities continues to fuel inter-communal violence whose escalating levels arguably pose the greatest current threat to human security in most of the country (Small Arms Survey, 2009: 54).

In Uganda, the protection of those who were disarmed from foes (internal and external) remained a very big challenge for the success of disarmament in Karamoja. As it were, they became vulnerable to attacks and raids from those who had not been disarmed or had re-armed. Most lost their livestock after they disarmed. In former conflicts areas of Northern Uganda, a comprehensive firearms collection system was absent, and a substantial number of firearms remained in the hands of former combatants posing a threat to transitional stability. Some returnees retained their firearms due to fear and uncertainty about the situation they would encounter upon return. Many mentioned the possibility of

69 See Small Arms Survey (SAS), “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan”, Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Sudan Issue Brief, Number 17, May 2011. Available at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. See also: Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

hidden guns being used for restocking and rearming the LRA, remobilisation of combatants, or even launching new rebellions.

In both the North and South Sudan the DDR program did not address the underlying causes of community insecurity. In the South, the program did not focus on civilians who were in possession of small arms without being associated with either SPLA or other armed groups. These comprised several self-defence militias that had been created by either the SAF or SPLA among communities. There were also very many combatants who voluntarily disarmed before or after the CPA, who were never considered for registration on the SPLA master lists for disarmament and demobilization. There were armed groups and militias that did not align themselves with the SPLA in the South, whose members melted away into civilian life in their communities. Many such groups still harbour their grievances, which have not been addressed through the DDR program. These have continued to pose a security threat in the communities, because they still have access to weaponry.

In the North, government was unable to guarantee security in significant parts of Transitional Areas, particularly on the frontier with Darfur and in Abyei. Most of the areas in the North and South outside of the major cities have minimal social services as well as economic and physical infrastructure. This implies that in such areas, economic opportunities for ex-combatants as well as for community members are limited, hence making these areas extremely prone to armed conflicts.⁷⁰

In South Sudan, the state is still grappling with restoring of community security. In some communities, such as the Mundari in Central Equatorial State (CES) and the Dinka of Lakes State, disarmament by the SPLA without ensuring their security made them extremely vulnerable to attacks from those who had not yet been disarmed. Communities neighbouring Eastern DRC in West Equatorial State (WES) and the Central African Republic (CAR) in Western Bar-el-Ghazal State (WBGs) are affected by insecurity caused by the continued incursions from the renegade Uganda rebels, the LRA, while communities neighbouring North Sudan from North Bar-el-Ghazal State (NBGS) to Upper Nile are affected by insecurity caused by the incursion of armed militias from the North. They are a cause of insecurity and population displacement. In many communities across

70 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report. See also Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

southern Sudan, tangible peace dividends have not yet been realized despite the signing of the CPA.⁷¹

Due to its overriding concern with reduction in the sizes of armed forces in the North and South, the implementation of the DDR program in North Sudan, like in the South, not only failed to address the underlying community security challenges (especially the conflicts within and between communities on one hand, and between communities and governments on the other hand), but also, it did not succeed in providing for the achievement of long-term peace development. The CPA period of political transition was also characterised by inherent internal instabilities in both the North and South Sudan.⁷² These community insecurity incidences undermined the achievement of human security objectives. In addition, the Sudan DDR programme failed to enhance the achievement of the objectives of social stabilization that had been envisaged during the design of the DDR programme.⁷³

The DDR programme did not have discernible impact on security in South Sudan. Although it publicly agreed to downsize the army through DDR, the SPLA leadership did not intend to undertake the necessary steps prior to 2011. The SPLA's target DDR caseload of 90,000 ex-combatants was determined through a bargaining process that bore little relation to the genuine capacity or needs of the SPLA. As a result of an early focus on female combatants, women SPLA members have enjoyed significant livelihood training benefits from the DDR programme. Despite concerns that many global DDR 'best practices' may be inapplicable to the Sudanese context, the programme continues to prioritize lessons from other DDR programmes rather than the specific context of South Sudan. Plans under discussion for reconfiguring DDR in Sudan will only succeed if the partners have a shared understanding of its purpose.⁷⁴

The continuation of community insecurity in most Member States is also partly caused by entrenched cultures of armed violence in many communities. Major-

71 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

72 See Small Arms Survey (SAS), "Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan", Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Sudan Issue Brief, Number 17, May 2011. Available at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. See also the following: (i) Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report; (ii) Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

73 See Small Arms Survey (SAS), "Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan", Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Sudan Issue Brief, Number 17, May 2011. Available at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. See also: Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

74 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

ity of the States in the Karamoja and Somali clusters have a large population of cattle keeping communities that continue to revere livestock raiding as an important aspect of their culture, which has led to the entrenchment of the gun culture as a key part of the traditional values in these communities (Karamojong of Uganda; Turkana and Pokot of Kenya; Dasannach and Merile of Ethiopia; Nuer and Toposa of Sudan, among others).

The DDR programmes in the studied member States where they have been implemented have had different degrees of success in addressing deep social-political and religious differences and distrust among conflicting parties, resulting from decades of war.

In most cases therefore, the DDR programmes implemented were unable to engineer the necessary political goodwill and faith in the implementation of requisite peace building initiatives.

3.2.3 The Resourcing of Disarmament Programmes

All DDR programmes in the studied States were supported in different ways by donor resources, both bilateral and multi-lateral, although the scope, form and nature of the support varied from one country to the other. In Uganda, the support to DDR programmes was provided under the Multi-donor Trust Funds, while in Ethiopia, the funding was mainly multi-lateral. In both Uganda and Ethiopia, DDR programmes were undertaken as part of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) intended among other things to reduce military spending so that national resources could become available for socio-economic development. Most States that benefitted from support to DDR programmes that were linked to SSR encountered challenges with the conditionalities that were associated with accessing the funding for support to DDR programmes. In Uganda, as in Ethiopia, availability of funds for supporting DDR programmes targeting ex-combatants of defeated fighting forces was made conditional to the 'down-sizing' of the national armies (defence forces). While in Uganda, the conditionalities were accepted and resources made available, the government later justified new recruitments on account of emerging security threats thereby circumventing the conditionalities.

In Ethiopia, the Transitional Government did not accept the World Bank conditions for accessing funds for supporting DDR programmes. The World Bank and other donors didn't approve the government's proposal to, inter alia, establish (and sustain) discharge centres; the necessities for the reorientation of ex-soldiers, including undertaking longer comprehensive training programs; the consideration of ex-combatants as a normal welfare case of citizens in development, and the launching of revolving credit schemes for the ex-combatants.

Even when they pledged to support the DDR programme, some donors were tied down by cumbersome bureaucracies and narrow interests. When help was eventually made available, despite the delays, it was not sufficient. When donors agreed to support the DDR programme, they were still uncomfortable with procurement and financial management systems, leading to further delays in disbursement of funds.⁷⁵ Ethiopia ended up using mainly its own resources to undertake the DDR programme.

In Ethiopia, while the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans known as the *Tahadiso* (reintegration) Commission, established in 1991 targeted already disarmed and demobilised former combatants (ranging from ex-*Derg* army, to other fighting groups and the former ENDF and EPRDF fighters), the actual disarmament and demobilization was handled by the Ministry of Defence through the national army (the ENDF). After being disarmed and demobilised, the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants in Ethiopia was taken over by the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. However it was not provided with sufficient resources to support the reinsertion and reintegration process. The *Tahadiso* Commission did not receive adequate funding to enable it to undertake the rehabilitation of members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans.

In Uganda, in addition to the Amnesty Commission, the UPDF also played a critical role in the disarmament and demobilisation of rebel armies, especially during combat. The disarmament program in Karamoja was exclusively managed by the UPDF. Both the UPDF and the Amnesty Commission played a very limited role in the reintegration of those it facilitated to disarm and demobilise. The Amnesty Commission was established under the Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294) to among others, undertake the functions of decommissioning arms, demobilising, resettling and reintegrating reporters (former rebel army fighters of armed groups ranging from HSM, WNBF, UNRFII, ADF to LRA). It was not adequately facilitated (financially and in terms of human resources) to enable it to perform as efficiently and effectively as needed.

The Amnesty Commission's Regional Demobilisation and Resettlement Teams were not properly resourced although they did a lot of work. Due to limitation with funding, the Amnesty Commission was unable to address the large backlog of reporters, as well as those who were not yet registered as reporters. The Amnesty Commission was never able to reach out to all combatants who needed to be reached. Many ex-combatants who were registered and entitled to packages did not receive them. The reinsertion packages were not adequate to enable

75 See Fenton, W., 1994. Demobilization in Ethiopia: lessons learned. Addis Ababa: USAID. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABT046.pdf (Accessed June 17, 2011)

ex-combatants start a new civilian life. Uganda's Amnesty Commission lacked adequate funds and logistics to implement its key activities including sensitisation, receiving and processing reporters, providing reinsertion packages, and facilitating longer-term reintegration. Its' one year renewable mandate inhibited its long-term planning.

3.2.4 Management of DDR Data

There were challenges facing the studied States with regards to the management of data on the beneficiaries of the DDR programmes. Most DDR interventions were affected by the poor management of data on DDR beneficiaries. Information, Counselling and Referral Services (ICRS) were not well-developed. After disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants, the authorities concerned lost track of the whereabouts of the ex-combatants. During the DDR processes, some of the former combatants benefitted from poor record-keeping by 'double-dipping'. Many of the rebel groups in Uganda inflated their ranks as a way of boosting their bargaining power for DDR packages. In Uganda, information on the actual number of guns that the Amnesty Commission collected between 2005 and 2007 was not available.

3.2.5 Sustainability of DDR Programmes and Interventions

The States that were undertaking disarmament encountered challenges in addressing the supply-side factors especially the proliferation of illicit SALW. The deployment of the security forces has remained a challenge to addressing the trafficking of illicit firearms. Despite the continuation of gun collection exercises, the proliferation and misuse of SALW continued in many States. Conditions for the voluntary surrender of illicit firearms were in most cases not yet in place. Many disarmament undertakings were ad-hoc, poorly planned and unsustainable to the extent that they were largely in response to availability of funds provided by donor agencies or reactive responses to escalating insecurity.

Uganda is one of the few states that have undertaken a consistent campaign to remove illicit firearms from civilians, especially pastoralists in Karamoja. In Kenya, the *Dumisha Amani II* was more consistent and well planned, although it still faced challenges of not being simultaneously undertaken in all pastoral communities. The disarmament in Kenya has largely remained selective both at the regional and local levels. In Kenya, the strategies that were used by the Police to undertake disarmament of criminals such as 'shooting', led to recovery of firearms, although the elimination of criminals also removed the leads that would have helped police get to the bottom of the criminal cartels. Disarmament was to say the least largely reactive (impulsive) and did not address the root causes of the armed criminality, which is associated with poverty and unemployment among the urban poor.

There were significant contradictions that undermined the sustainability of the DDR programmes. In Uganda and Sudan, the DDR programmes were affected by the slow processes of identification, screening and documentation of reporters, leading to accumulation of a back-log. In some States, there were inequalities and injustices in the implementation of DDR processes – some got higher packages than others (e.g. in Uganda and Sudan). Some of the packages that were provided for reinsertion were not adequate to support the ex-combatants who were subjected to DDR. The more the grievances harboured by DDR beneficiaries, the more unsustainable the initiatives turned out to be.

Some DDR interventions are unsustainable to the extent that they were unable to provide alternative sources of livelihood for those subjected to DDR, most of who turn to a life of crime. Many of the DDR interventions that have targeted ex-combatants in Uganda and armed civilians in Kenya have largely been ‘quick-fix’ programmes, in so far as support for alternative livelihoods have not been systematically provided for. These programmes usually do not fund activities associated with long-term sustainable reintegration. Though reintegration was recognised as essential from the point of view of long-term stability and rehabilitation in Uganda’s conflict-affected zones, it was secondary to the government’s wider political agenda, which was to hasten the end of the war in northern Uganda.

In all the studied countries that implemented DDR programmes, they planned that disarmament would be followed by development initiatives. In Ethiopia, it was planned to invest in road construction, health care centres, community policing and reinforcing joint local peace committees. Continued conflicts delayed the start of development programmes. In Kenya, there were plans to support employment creation for youth, as well as invest in education for social transformation. Many of these programmes however suffered from a limited focus on resettlement and reintegration. Support for Post Trauma Stress Disorder counselling was absent. In Karamoja, there have not been any consistent efforts towards a fully-fledged reintegration programme for disarmed Karamojong warriors.

3.2.6 Determination of DDR beneficiaries

In the Member States where internal civil strife was widespread, it was always not possible to determine the exact numbers of ex-combatants that would benefit from post-disarmament support (e.g. in Uganda Ethiopia, Sudan). In others, the numbers of ex-combatants that were expected to benefit from DDR were very high due to the large numbers of armed forces that were involved in armed conflicts (Ethiopia). There were challenges in both North and South Sudan with the selection of DDR beneficiaries. None of the armed forces in the North or

the South ever touched their core fighting forces. The process of verification of those who were subjected to DDR was not transparent. Both used the DDR to jettison excess, disloyal and/or dysfunctional caseload of OAG combatants. In other words, they let go only those whom they were comfortable letting go, who included the elderly, the disabled and the women, and not their core fighting forces. In the wake of Juba Declaration of 2006, the SPLA had to accommodate over 34,000 new combatants from the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) within its bloated standing list.⁷⁶ While there were efforts made, there was not much support for reintegration after combatants had been discharged from the military.

In South Sudan, there were some additional challenges, as large numbers of potential DDR participants often failed to meet the programme's eligibility criteria because they joined the SPLA too late (after 2005) or left the army before entering the programme. Many such ex-combatants were not considered for registration on the SPLA master lists for disarmament and demobilisation.

3.2.7 Addressing Civilian Disarmament in Conventional DDR programmes

Conventional DDR programmes are basically designed to deal with mainstream, armed rebel groups that target the capture of state power, and yet increasingly, many States have had to deal with armed conflicts associated with purveyors that have no interest in regime change. These range from armed criminal groups, militias and vigilantes whose agenda range from neighbourhood security to a wide range of criminality such as armed robbery, extortion and revenge, as well as armed groups such as the cattle keepers and individuals who are armed for self-protection. Conventional DDR programmes have not addressed the need to develop standards applicable to civilian armament, which has always made it difficult for programmes intended to deal with illicitly owned firearms. In pastoral areas of Uganda and Kenya where pastoralists have been subjected to disarmament, no possibility of transition has been taken into account for armed civilians, the way armed rebel groups are dealt with.

76 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

3.3 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DDR PROGRAMMES

3.3.1 The Absence of Political Goodwill for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

In Member States where there was inadequate political will or where disarmament was characterised by suspicions or political interference, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and other armed categories (such as criminal gangs and civilians) was not as successful as it should have been. The GoSS was suspicious and wary of a process that was planned, directed, and implemented from Khartoum.⁷⁷ Khartoum was on the other hand not wholly committed to a process that it did not wish to succeed.⁷⁸ As a result, nearly all timelines set for achieving the benchmarks and mile stones during the six-year CPA transition period, including achieving a national consensus on the future of a unified Sudan, holding national elections, force withdrawals and redeployment were never met.

In some States grappling with armed pastoralists, the response from the respective governments has ranged from unwillingness/inability/lack of interest in the total disarmament of all the armed pastoralists groups (e.g. in Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya), to instances where disarmament has become politicized by the national leaders from affected communities (Sudan, Kenya and Uganda in early stages of disarmament in Karamoja).

In some States where the need for disarmament was not internally appreciated, there were challenges with the implementing of disarmament and demobilisation; largely resulting from the implementation of disarmament while at the same time recruiting more forces due to complexity of internal security needs (e.g. in Uganda in the 1990's and Sudan in the post-CPA transition period). In Sudan, for example, there was mutual suspicion between North and South in the period preceding the January 2011 referendum that led to unwillingness to subject the core fighting forces in the North (SAF) and the South (SPLA) to DDR. The uncertainty surrounding the future relationship between North and South Sudan after the January 2011 referendum made outright armed conflicts a possibility.

For both the North and South Sudan, the optimal size of the armed forces was not addressed during the CPA transition period, as both SAF and SPLA contin-

77 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

78 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

ued to position themselves for a maximum advantage after the expected result of the referendum. Both SAF and SPLA not only remained armed and ready to fight, but were also recruiting and training new soldiers to bolster their numbers in the event of an outbreak of war after the referendum. Armed confrontations between SAF and SPLA units continued even after the signing of the CPA. While in the South the core SPLA was never touched by DDR, in the North there were reports of re-recruiting of former SAF soldiers who had been disarmed and demobilised. In addition, the future status, composition, size and mandate of the armed forces (SAF and/or SPLA) were never clarified. Despite the official abolishment of Other Armed Groups (OAGs), the existing armed individuals with affiliation to former militia, rebel groups, local defence forces and other non-affiliated combatants remained in place and their number largely indeterminate.⁷⁹

The January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) required the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces to implement DDR of their armed forces. The DDR programme in the South was expected to benefit 36,641 members of Special Needs Groups (SNGs), including WAAF in Phase I and about 53,400 active-duty members of the SPLA in Phase II. The donors thought GoSS would use the opportunity of the DDR program to reduce the size of its forces. Due to mutual suspicion with which the South and the North viewed each other, not only going into the January 2005 CPA but also in implementing it, exactly six years later by January 2011, less than 13 per cent of the SPLA's targeted adult caseload⁸⁰ and 44 per cent of SAF's expected adult caseload⁸¹ had been demobilised as was required under the terms of the CPA. By December 2010, less than 10,000 combatants and WAAF had been demobilized. Of these, there were none from the active-duty SPLA who had been demobilized. In some instances, some of those who had been demobilised were put back on the SPLA payroll. Considering the tensions that developed over Abyei going into 19 July 2011 declaration of independence, there was no hope that even half of the expected caseload would be demobilised both in North and South Sudan.⁸²

79 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report. See also Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

80 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

81 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010a. North Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

82 See Small Arms Survey (SAS), "Failures and opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan", Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Sudan Issue Brief, Number 17, May 2011. Available at: www.smallarmssurveysudan.org

In Uganda, government did not show commitment to a full demobilisation programme in the UPDF as recommended in the defence review, owing largely to the continued regional armed conflict challenges that the country faced starting in the late 1990's. The UPDF reluctantly demobilised the 'non-effectives' consisting of soldiers who were disabled, terminally sick or otherwise past the age that they can make an effective contribution. Donors were reluctant to support demobilisation of auxiliaries. The Uganda government and the LRA engaged in sporadic peace talks over an extended period of time. When Juba Peace Process started, assembly at designated point did not proceed as planned because the LRA did not assemble by specified dates, and neither did it withdraw beyond the effective range of their weapons. As a result, the LRA failed to break contact with the UPDF, which occasionally resulted into gunfights. During these talks, the Lord's Resistance Army never sufficiently demobilized its forces but instead often used the peace negotiations to re-arm and recruit more combatants.

3.3.2 Governance Challenges Encountered in Implementing DDR

In some of the studied States, DDR programmes failed to make significant headway in ending armed conflicts and laying the foundation for achieving sustainable development because of the overriding focus of the DDR program on mainly the hardware components of the DDR program (the collection of as many firearms as possible), while disregarding the improvement in political governance on one hand, and addressing issues of reconciliation within and between communities as well as the delivery of assistance to community members and the beneficiaries of the DDR programme, on the other. In many instances, the communities affected by the armed conflicts were never adequately enabled to build ownership of the DDR program through being enabled to make certain decisions regarding the way the DDR program was implemented. In some States, the political systems were not adequately opened up to enhance the participation of all political interests. There were governance challenges encountered in Ethiopia's Federal system of government, especially harmonizing disarmament objectives at the state level with the DDR program objectives at the federal government (national) level. The lack of transparency in governance remains one of the major causes of armed conflicts. Dealing with issues of governance in a positive and transparent manner is a major contribution in addressing the factors that lead to the proliferation of SALW, and therefore important for undertaking comprehensive disarmament.

3.3.3 Capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies

States continue to suffer inadequate capacity of law enforcement agencies (in terms of numbers of Police Officers available for deployment in areas affected by armed violence, as well as the resources required). Police per capita for most

Member States is still low, standing for example at 1:836 in Kenya⁸³ and 1:1,600 in Uganda⁸⁴. Deployment of law enforcement officers is still inadequate in most States, making it difficult to enforce law and order in post conflict communities. Many of the States are grappling with equipping the law enforcement agencies to enable them handle armed civilians and criminal gangs, who sometimes have more sophisticated equipment. In South Sudan, the capacity of the South Sudan Police Services (SSPS) to maintain law and order is still weak. Armed criminal gangs still reign supreme in the communities far away from the state capitals. In Uganda, the lack of capacity by the State to provide law and order and maintenance and administration of justice affected the progress of disarmament in Karamoja. There were difficulties in the recovery of raided livestock and sometimes livestock disappeared in the custody of law enforcement agencies.

In some States, there were challenges associated with the complicity of law enforcement agencies and security organs involved in disarmament. Security forces were unable to stop trafficking and trade in illegal firearms either due to complicity or incapacity or indiscipline (Kenya, Uganda). There were allegations of rogue elements in security agencies and law enforcement organs hiring out firearms to criminals (Kenya, Uganda).

3.3.4 Challenges to the Management of Collected Firearms and Arms Stockpiles

In all cases, there were reports about challenges related to the management of firearms collected during disarmament as well as weapon stockpiles.

In South Sudan, the best-functioning weapons collected during civilian disarmament exercises in Jonglei in mid-2006 and late-2008 were reportedly re-distributed to local police, and in some cases recycled into SPLA stocks themselves (Small Arms Survey, 2009: 36). A study on the border region of Kenya and Uganda indicated that there were supplies of ammunition to the pastoral communities by the law enforcement agencies, a clear sign of stockpile mismanagement.⁸⁵

There were challenges regarding the storage of collected weapons and management of post-disarmament stockpiles in not only Sudan but also Ethiopia. In Sudan, neither the CPA, nor the 2007 National DDR Strategic Plan provided a

83 See <http://www.ethiopianreview.com/articles/15781> (Accessed July 15, 2011)

84 See Uganda National Report for the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010 at <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrrls/ldc/MTR/Uganda.pdf> (Accessed May 17, 2011)

85 See Bevan James, *Blowback; Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District*. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper, Geneva, 2008

framework for verification of disarmament, discharge or following arms management and control, by an independent external body. UNMIS had no mandate to monitor the disarmament and discharge of individual soldiers, and neither of the commissions had been present at the time of discharge from the armed forces. None of the States had determined the full extent of the magnitude of the SALW proliferation, as the problem was much wider than was assumed to be. Even countries like Kenya, which did not have active internal civil strife, bordered an extremely volatile region, which led to high trafficking in SALW. Many countries have not yet been in a position to appreciate and/or acknowledge the full extent of the impact, leading to failure to prioritize and allocate adequate resources for disarmament and development interventions. None of the studied States had carried out an actual mapping to determine the numbers of illicit SALW. All based their interventions on estimates.

In Sudan, SAF and SPLA internal processes of discharge and disarmament did not include an arms reduction process. Weapons were collected and stored under control of each army. The CPA was designed for a situation in which two armed forces agreed to engage in a process of demilitarization, peace-building and mutual trust – the reverse was however true as both parties continued to move heavy weaponry and large consignments of small arms in the ceasefire zones. The momentum for disarmament that existed at the time of signing the CPA progressively waned and was replaced by mutual suspicion and hostility.

In Ethiopia, there have been challenges with the management of weapons stockpiles. Illicit firearms collected from civilians are supposed to be transferred to the national defence forces, and those that are non-functional disposed via burning. Sometimes however, these weapons have been stolen or misused which fans trafficking and trade in illicit weapons. The same problem was reported in Southern Sudan.

3.3.5 Management of Expectations of Ex-combatants in the Selected States

All States that implemented DDR programmes did not manage expectations surrounding the nature of benefits that would accrue to the different stakeholders affected or how they would benefit by the DDR programmes. In Sudan and Ethiopia, very high expectations were created among ex-combatants in terms of the financial packages they would receive after being disarmed and demobilised. The actual support they received in the name of reintegration support did not measure up to what ex-combatants usually expected to get. This lowered the integration process success rates as the beneficiaries were unsatisfied and thus did not add value to the token received as was intended.

3.3.6 Management of Groups Associated with Armed Forces

There were also gender and generational issues that were associated with the DDR programmes. War situations not only affect women and children, but sometimes these groups play an active role, and yet during disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration support, they are usually peripheralised. In Uganda, the Amnesty Commission Act of 2005 did not provide for children, including those who were active combatants, hence they did not get any packages that were given to the adults. In Sudan, largely by accident and not design, much of the DDR interventions that happened during the CPA Transition period benefited women who were associated with armed forces. The children who were associated with armed forces were also supported by development agencies.

3.3.7 The Adverse Consequences of Disarmament Interventions

In all the studied States, there were challenges in addressing the adverse livelihood consequences not only from armed conflicts, but also from the interventions undertaken to forcefully remove illicit weapons from civilians. Disarmament that is not voluntary has been associated with the use of excessive force, indiscriminate harassment as well as allegations of gross violations of human rights. There are many ways in which poorly planned disarmament has also been associated with adverse economic consequences on those subjected to disarmament. These include destruction of property during military action and combat to end armed conflicts and collect illicit firearms (e.g. killing of livestock in crossfire with recalcitrant armed Karamojong warriors). The Karamojong were on several occasions forced to sell livestock to redeem their freedom. In addition some of the disarmament strategies used led to loss of livestock (e.g. in protected kraals in Karamoja, either from disease, poor nutrition of animals due to lack of pastures and limited time available to graze, or lack of adequate security of livestock in protected kraals). Some of the communities while fleeing disarmament were exposed to diseases to both humans and livestock. Others were exposed to attacks from other criminals.

3.4 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN UNDERTAKING REINTEGRATION

3.4.1 Challenges Associated with Reinsertion Support Given to Ex-Combatants

Reinsertion is the transitional support provided to beneficiaries of DDR to enable them return to the area they choose to reintegrate, and to ensure that in the first few months following demobilization, they can meet their (and their family's) immediate needs in order to start the reintegration process. Reinte-

gration is when they receive support meant to help them transit to civilian life. Reinsertion packages varied from one country to another. In Uganda and Sudan, they comprised packages containing both cash and a diversity of in-kind items. There were challenges associated with reinsertion support. In Sudan and to an extent Northern Uganda, the distribution of packages to reporters contributed to community divisions and tensions. Communities perceived reporters as being rewarded for committing acts of violence. In Uganda and Sudan, beneficiary verification was a challenge as there were false claimants or beneficiaries who were not legitimate combatants who sought to take advantage of the programme to access reinsertion and resettlement packages. There were challenges with the information management systems and the processes by which combatants were registered and verified, which created opportunities for combatants to register several times for amnesty with different groups.

In South Sudan, the reinsertion packages that were provided did not contain incentives for combatants to voluntarily demobilize. The packages given were not as attractive to ex-combatants compared to the loss of regular monthly salaries they received while they were still SPLA soldiers. Many ex-combatants did not think the packages were 'worth-their-while', considering, first, their contributions to the liberation struggle, and secondly, the hassles right from the assembly area to the demobilization site to just access the packages. Some ex-combatants had large families. The food rations could not last their families the anticipated three months. In addition, the food items provided to the ex-combatants undermined local food production as the local farmers could not compete. The value of the in-kind support in the South was often less than in the North due to higher delivery costs.

3.4.2 Challenges Associated with Resettlement of Ex-Combatants

In States that were afflicted with civil wars, the resettlement of not only ex-combatants but also communities was affected by anti-personnel mines, Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). While mine action activities had been widespread in these countries, many areas were not free from these devices, and occasionally they inflicted harm on civilians. Many parts of the vast southern Sudan terrain and especially in the transitional areas are still heavily contaminated and infested with Landmines, Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs), as well as Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). This has affected return and resettlement of communities in these areas.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

In Uganda, different forms of stigmatisation affected resettlement of ex-combatants. Some communities felt that ex-combatants were being unduly “rewarded.” Material and financial aspects of the packages received a lot of attention at the expense of the psychosocial aspects of reintegration. Restorative justice had not been adequately considered as the amnesty did not automatically mean forgiveness and acceptance at community level. Anger and anguish over perpetrated crimes still persisted. Consequently, returnees were not fully accepted by communities.

In Uganda’s West Nile sub-region, the way the payment of resettlement packages for former rebels was handled led to widespread allegations of betrayal by leaders of former combatants demobilised following an agreement with government. UNRFII signed a peace agreement with the government in December 2002 to demobilise its 2,500 fighters and received Ushs. 2.5 billion as resettlement packages, in addition to scholarships for their fighters and their children, as well as a school in Yumbe district. The packages were not distributed equitably. Many of the fighters missed out on the resettlement packages. The schools which the government promised were not constructed.

In South Sudan, first, there was limited support provided to ex-combatants in the form of professional psychosocial support and counselling during and after demobilisation, largely because the capacity was absent. Secondly, community members did not receive any form of psychosocial support, and yet the majority of the people in the communities where ex-combatants were being reintegrated were not only also reintegrating themselves, either as a result of having been internally displaced inside Sudan or having been refugees in neighbouring countries, but were, like the ex-combatants, equally affected by the prolonged exposure to armed conflicts.⁸⁷

In Uganda, demobilisation was haphazard, with a significant number of returnees going home without reporting to the authorities. Many ex-combatants quietly returned and settled in their villages, without benefiting from Amnesty and the packages that go with it. Reception centres suffered from the failure to standardise counselling, go-home packages, length of stay and overall approach.

3.4.3 Challenges Associated with Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

In the States that have been grappling with internal civil strife, post-conflict peace building and sustainable development require that, as much as possible,

87 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

ex-combatants are enabled to find some form of employment to earn income to support themselves and their families after they leave the army, where all was provided for them. This is crucial for enhancing community security. Once reinserted and resettled, ex-combatants need to be supported to get back onto their two feet in civilian life through economic support mechanisms to restore their livelihoods. This process of rehabilitation requires the interventions of very many stakeholders at different levels at the same time. Viable sources of income, health, education, agriculture, roads, schools and personal security.

If ex-combatants are unable to find something to do to earn them an income and to support their families, they could become a security risk. Reintegration support is intended to prepare ex-combatants to return to civilian life and take advantage of the broader economic opportunities that are available in their local economies for income generation. The challenge has always been that economic opportunities for reintegration are usually limited after war has ended. Even what existed may have been decapitated by the prolonged exposure to armed conflicts. In the rural communities, extreme poverty conditions are widespread implying that broader recovery support is necessary to strengthen local economies and nurture holistic development in the States. To develop these opportunities usually requires a broader concerted effort to stimulate longer-term economic development.

In the different States, varied strategies were employed for diverse scenarios. In Uganda for example, some disarmed and demobilised LRA commanders received work and salaries from the government. Post conflict recovery and development programmes were put in place (PRDP, KIDDP and Luwero Triangle). In much of southern Sudan, support for the economic reintegration of each ex-combatant entailed not only job placement and skills training in agriculture, small businesses, adult functional literacy, and vocational skills areas (such as carpentry and joinery, tailoring and motor vehicle mechanics), but also provision of start-up tool kits and capital. The immediate economic opportunities for income generation were still limited. Reintegration support received did not match expectations from recipients. In South Sudan, the long duration ex-combatants take from the time they are demobilized, to not only the start of reintegration training, but also the receipt of reintegration kits after finishing training and graduating was unbearably long. There were challenges with the sequencing and scheduling of the various forms of reintegration assistance provided. The entire DDR program in Sudan had problems of handling huge backlogs.⁸⁸

88 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

In Sudan, under the provisions of the CPA, DDR interventions that were envisaged were supposed to ensure the smooth resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development of not only ex-combatants (to enable their transition to civilian life) but also those affected by the war (including returning refugees and IDPs, as well as communities that remained behind) and to redress the historical imbalances of development and resources allocation.⁸⁹

Poorly handled reintegration presented immense security challenges. In Ethiopia, some *ex-Derg* soldiers at times resorted to a life of crime. There were also dissenters from ENDF who were carefully watching what the government was doing to their former comrades, and sometimes, these turned to a life of crime as a way of rewarding themselves for their sacrifice in the revolution that brought the government to power. Even within the ENDF, there was potential for resistance from EPRDF fighters who, after sacrificing so much, opposed the idea of going back to civilian life without any adequate rewards or sufficient support.⁹⁰

Without provision of viable alternative sources of livelihood, the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants, local militia and auxiliaries poses enormous challenges as to what people who are highly trained and have skills not desired elsewhere will do for a source of livelihood when their services are no longer required in the event of return of peace. In Karamoja, for example, the programme to disarm Karamojong warriors did not entail any initiatives for reintegration of disarmed Karamojong warriors, such as skills training and credit schemes. Little has been done to reintegrate ex-warriors in Karamoja apart from their involvement in army activities and meetings.

In Uganda, among reporters who did receive packages, rarely did the packages in themselves contribute in the long-term to reducing their economic vulnerability. Many required follow-up support, though the project only had limited success in terms of facilitating reporters' access to services, where these were available. Although soldiers received their demobilisation and resettlement packages, the demobilisation and reintegration programme did not provide adequate assistance in the reintegration phase. For many of the demobilised, therefore, effective reintegration did not take place, especially in Northern Uganda. The lack of reintegration support, the fear of rebel reprisals and an absence of profitable employment opportunities in the Acholi sub-region combined to deter many veterans from returning home. Of those who attempted a

89 See Sthlm Policy Group. 2010b. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. Unpublished report.

90 See Mulugeta, G. B., "Ethiopia Case Study: The Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration, 1991-1997", in Nathan, Laurie (ed.) 2007. No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, pp.68-73.

return, many could only find work using their military skills in private security firms, while others re-joined the army as the government tried to improve security in the north. Consequently, many soldiers were only temporarily taken out of military service, bringing into question the effectiveness of the demobilisation and reintegration programme in making a significant, long-term reduction in Uganda's burdensome military budget.

In South Sudan, the prolonged exposure to armed conflicts in most States meant there were very limited private sector opportunities available for linking ex-combatants to apprenticeship training and employment opportunities. The support that was provided by UNDP South Sudan and its DDR program implementing partners in form of paying a fee to private sector companies to employ and train ex-combatants was unsustainable in the long run.

One of the most important lessons from the studied States that have grappled with armed conflicts is that the end of active conflict does not necessarily translate into peace unless imminent as well as covert forms of conflicts are addressed through reconciliation. In communities where ex-combatants are resettled for reintegration, it is always important to seek ways to undertake reconciliation of former combatants with the communities over crimes that may have been committed during armed conflicts. In post-conflict communities, reconciliation is usually important to address locally identified causes of local level forms of insecurity. If the process is community-led, it has potential not only to enhance community security, but also promote a culture of peaceful coexistence and tolerance and harmonious living.

The studied States indicate that the capacity of justice, law and order institutions and structures has been inadequate, and yet long exposure to armed conflicts may have undermined traditional systems of justice and reconciliation. The need for strengthening the police and courts of law is therefore key to post-conflict reconciliation. In Sudan, the UN-led DDR programme did not integrate reconciliation and social healing in the activities, which were undertaken to promote the reintegration of ex-combatants who were disarmed and demobilised.

3.5 CROSS-BORDER CHALLENGES TO DISARMAMENT INTERVENTIONS

3.5.1 Cross-Border Collaboration and Co-operation

States that have been grappling with armed conflicts associated with livestock raiding have long and remote borders that are difficult to police and patrol, making it very difficult to curtail trafficking of illicit firearms (Uganda-Kenya; Kenya-Ethiopia; Kenya-Somalia; Kenya-Sudan). In many of these areas, there is minimal security presence in gun-trafficking corridors as well as remote com-

munities and poorly manned border areas in frontier districts. There has been minimal collaboration and co-operation among partners involved in national disarmament. There were challenges with civilian disarmament in communities which share close affinities with other pastoral groups in neighbouring countries such as the Gambela region on the border between South Sudan and Ethiopia; and Pokot between Kenya and Uganda, among others.

3.5.2 Armed Conflicts and Insecurity in Neighbouring Countries

The armed conflicts and insecurity in Southern Sudan, Eastern and North-Eastern DRC, and Somalia have continued to affect States that border these countries because of continued proliferation of illicit firearms. SALWs continue to flow into Uganda from DRC, Sudan and pastoral areas of Kenya. Trafficking in SALW continues in West Nile from Sudan and DRC. Trafficking of SALW into Acholi from Sudan and into Karamoja from Sudan and Kenya are still ongoing while continued rebel activities of the ADF in DRC and the LRA in the jungles between eastern DRC, Darfur and CAR are another source.

3.6 PHYSICAL FACTORS THAT AFFECTED DISARMAMENT INTERVENTIONS

3.6.1 Physical Infrastructures

Many States encountered challenges undertaking disarmament in conflict afflicted communities partly because the years of exposure to armed conflicts destroyed the economic and physical infrastructure in these places, making service delivery extremely difficult. In South Sudan, most of the roads become impassable during the rainy season. In pastoral areas of Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia where armed livestock raiding takes place, many places are inaccessible for much of the year. In most of these areas, there are no telecommunication facilities, making it difficult to share information with security agencies when attacked, implying that response to such attacks becomes difficult.

3.6.2 Adversity in Climate Change and Intensification of Resource Competition

Armed conflicts in most of the States make the afflicted communities and groups prone to the adverse consequences of external shocks (such as drought and famine), leading not only to deaths during peak drought periods but also high levels of poverty. The continued mismanagement and/or over-exploitation of natural resources diminish their capacity to cope with higher demands, creating a competitive environment, which precipitates conflicts. The lack of appropriate policies for guiding livestock development exposes pastoralists to unfair vagaries of the open market systems that do not favour their traditional livestock husband-

ry and management systems. This compares badly with other agricultural and economic avenues such as coffee and tea that have established marketing and control institutions to protect the economic venture and the farmers. Livestock farming/rearing should receive similar attention and focus.

CHAPTER 4

4. LESSONS LEARNT FROM PAST DISARMAMENT AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT

The different States experienced different armed conflict scenarios. The disarmament interventions that were undertaken also varied, largely in response to local political and security dynamics. This notwithstanding, there were several lessons that could be inferred from the various disarmament experiences in the four selected Member States where the case studies were conducted. Lessons were derived not only from the challenges that were encountered but also from the interventions that were considered to have worked well in the context in which they were implemented. The following were considered to have been extremely critical lessons. The lessons constitute good practices for practical disarmament.

Taking into Account the Varied Armed Conflict Contexts:

- For disarmament interventions to succeed, they have to take into consideration the specific context in which they are implemented. Armed conflict situations varied from State to State; and ranged from the usual internal civil strife scenarios in some States, to include situations where States have had to grapple with different categories of armed civilians, such as armed criminal gangs/groups, militias, vigilantes, armed pastoralists as well as armed individuals.
- Disarmament interventions are largely informed by the peculiarities of local contexts. It had become all too evident that the problem of illicit possession and use of firearms was not only a major security risk, but also a key challenge to enforcement of rule of law and maintenance of law and order. Therefore, understanding the context of the conflict made possible the flexibility and adaptability of interventions to respond to contexts, which was essential to make it possible to realise the goals of sustainable peace and development.
- In States where there has not been any internal civil strife, armed conflicts have largely been the result of a combination of factors ranging from widespread proliferation of SALW to weakened institutions of the State responsible for maintenance of not only security but also law and order. It was evident from the four disarmament case studies that there were extensive and complex channels of small arms proliferation in the RECSA region, which led to civilian armament. It became clear that small arms are not only confined to conflict situations involving internal civil strife, but are present

even in countries or parts of the countries where there is no internal armed civil strife, such as Kenya.

- Disarmament undertaking also had to take into account the varied dimensions of criminality resulting from armed civilians. The experience of the four selected States indicated that there was a new phenomenon in the region, which had become even more critical in arms reduction efforts – the increase in numbers, sophistication and magnitude of illicit firearms arms in the possession of non-state actors, who need to be disarmed through civilian disarmament programmes.

The Importance of Political Goodwill:

- Disarmament programmes are invariably politically driven processes that require significant levels of political good will to succeed. In States where the armed conflict situation entailed civil conflicts between the State and belligerent armed groups, ending the conflicts, as well as enabling the peaceful transition to post-conflict development necessitated the existence of political good will among all the principals in the conflict, to ensure that armed conflicts did not recur, and that the resulting peace was sustainable. If anyone of the principals in the conflict that led to the initiation of the DDR programme stalls on any one of the requisite commitments, the progress of a DDR programmes will be negatively affected.
- In most States, DDR programmes were successful where the government was politically committed to the success of the programme. With political good will from the government, it becomes possible to cultivate community support as well as leverage funds and other forms of support from international development partners, as well as the different categories of national and international civil society.
- In all the member states, smooth disarmament took place where there was a conviction that it had to be undertaken for the sake of sustainable peace and long-term development of conflict-afflicted countries. The manner in which the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) handled the former *Derg* soldiers is a practise worth emulating. The TGE sensitised communities not to vent their anger on former *Derg* soldiers in revenge for their atrocities, which made it easy for the former *Derg* soldiers to surrender their weapons and register for DDR.

DDR and Security Sector Reforms:

- In States where armed conflicts resulted in regime changes, subsequent DDR programmes necessarily targeted the former national armies. Where

there was no regime change, but armed conflicts ended with defeat of beligerent armed groups or in peace agreements/plebiscites that ended the conflicts, former combatants from the armed groups were also subjected to DDR interventions. After the end of the armed conflicts, it was also essential to subject government forces to 'right-sizing' through undertaking comprehensive Security Sector Reforms (SSR), not only to cost-cut, but also to improve planning for, and enhance the efficiency of the national defence forces.

Voluntary Disarmament in General:

- The experience from the four disarmament case studies showed that voluntary disarmament was the most preferred strategy for undertaking disarmament under all the different armed conflict scenarios. Disarmament is usually more successful where armed combatants and civilians (including criminal gangs) understand and appreciate the importance of voluntarily surrendering their weapons, based on widespread awareness of the adverse consequences of not only possessing illegal firearms and weapons in the society; but also failure to heed government's call for the firearms to be voluntarily surrendered.
- The cost of disarmament (especially the levels of collateral damage) is usually lower when it is done voluntarily. The different States used different strategies to promote the voluntary surrender of illicit weapons. For some States, unilateral unconditional amnesties were declared for those who surrendered SALW in their possession, in return for immunity from prosecution within a specified time frame. In those States where this was possible, collection centres and modalities of surrender were clearly stipulated. States also put in place measures to not only address any prevailing insecurity fears but also to bring on board strong community based structures where they still exist. The States also invested in the improvement of security in communities to enhance voluntary disarmament.
- In undertaking disarmament, force is used only when it becomes unavoidable, and is usually the last resort. Usually forceful disarmament is used where the voluntary surrender of firearms is estimated to have fallen short of expectations, based on the initial estimates of illegally-held arms as well as continued manifestation of armed conflicts which is suggestive of continued retention of illicit firearms.
- When force has to be used, clear guidelines are put in place, mainly to guard against violations of basic human rights of those subjected to forceful disarmament. Careful planning and coordination, backed by legal and adequate

policy provisions, awareness creation and sound accountability measures should be in place to ensure successful forceful disarmament operations. Strategic planning to include localised, national and regional coordination should be considered for an effective process.

Civilian Disarmament:

- Civilian disarmament was most successful in communities under the following circumstances:
 - i. where significant effort was made in undertaking education, sensitisation and awareness that led to changes in the attitudes of the people in the affected communities regarding firearm ownership and use.
 - ii. where community security was secured, especially through enhanced enforcement of law and order, communities found it easy to voluntarily disarm. This was mainly evidenced in communities that armed themselves in their self-defence.
 - iii. in States where the proliferation of SALW in communities was occasioned by the need to address deprivation and marginalisation, disarmament was most successful where it was clear to armed individuals that they would be supported to secure alternative forms of livelihoods.
 - iv. the structural challenges that face communities afflicted by armed insecurities perpetuated by non-state actors are addressed in Government plans and policies. All stakeholders should acknowledge the insecurity associated with armed civilians and challenges they pose to sustainable security and development.

Demobilization of Combatants from Disbanded/Defunct Armed Groups:

- In undertaking the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants of disbanded/defunct armed groups (including rebel forces, and auxiliaries, militias or vigilantes), the case studies showed that it was a best practice to undertake DDR programmes in ways that ensure those who benefit from DDR interventions do not seek illicit arms for criminal activities. This is achieved in programmes which make an effort to support former combatants to find sustainable ways to reintegrate into civilian life.
- Fears and expectations of the beneficiaries of the DDR programmes as well as the local communities should be managed through civic education programmes that start before former combatants are disarmed and demobilised, and continue even after they have been resettled and efforts for their reintegration commenced. Through civic education, the minds of former combatants are 'disarmed' to change their attitudes with respect

to ownership and use of illicit firearms, especially the consequences of the proliferation of illicit firearms in the communities. The details of how the above were executed in the various countries where they emerged as best practices varied from State to State.

Undertaking Reintegration of Ex-combatants:

- In implementing DDR interventions, there was more appreciation of DDR as a process (and hence less conflicts) in communities where support for resettlement and reintegration targeted (and benefited) both ex-combatants and the recipient communities, in form of not only individual packages for members of recipient communities, but also significant support to community-wide public good infrastructures, as well as psychological support to ex-combatants and community members. Interventions for supporting sustainable livelihoods, especially strengthening capacities of individuals through all-inclusive skills training, credit schemes and start-up capital in the local communities are essential.
- Former combatants need to be offered psychosocial support to help them to overcome stigmas, but also prepare them to adjust to civilian life. Reconciliation between former combatants and the communities where they are to be resettled sets the foundation for successful reintegration. Former combatants found limited challenges reintegrating in communities where there was security. Community security needs to be restored in resettlement communities through enhancing the enforcement of law and order

Maintenance of Law and Order:

- The experience from the four disarmament case studies showed that in order for disarmament/DDR to succeed, requisite institutions of the State for the maintenance of law and order and administration of justice have to be put in place where they are absent, and strengthened where they are existent but weak.
- Appropriate structures such as courts of law for administration of justice, as well as institutions for the management of stockpiles of weapons collected during disarmament need to be put in place as part of the broader objective of enhancing the rule of law in the respective States. These institutions and structures also need to be supported with adequate human (manpower) and financial resources for successful disarmament undertakings.

The Need for Appropriate Policy and Legal Frameworks:

- The case studies showed that collecting guns without an appropriate policy and legal framework undermines the sustainability of the outcomes of DDR interventions. All the States had challenges with their policy/legal frameworks for not only control of firearms, but also undertaking Disarmament and Demobilization (D&D) as well as Reinsertion, Resettlement and Reintegration (RRR). None of the four States had clearly stipulated policies and legislations on all the relevant aspects of DDR, including among others, the strategies permissible while undertaking DDR; who to bring on board, and how, and the categories to be subjected to DDR. Without relevant policy frameworks as well as enabling legislations, it was difficult for most States to leverage public resources for undertaking disarmament.
- Sustainable peace requires undertaking legal reforms to regulate ownership and use of firearms by non-state actors, including civilians. There should be clear policies and legislation related to the technical and other interventions undertaken to collect, manage and destroy retrieved or surplus weapons. The policy and legal frameworks should stipulate how State agencies responsible for undertaking disarmament and demobilisation, as well as those engaged in RRR, are held accountable.
- The policy and legal frameworks should not only cover disarmament, but also other aspects, for example disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in order to guide and harmonize not only the various post-conflict interventions being undertaken to enhance sustainable peace, but also deal with emerging conflict scenarios involving non-state actors in possession of illegal firearms.
- The legal/policy framework should clarify the strategies for resource mobilisation and allocation; inclusion and participation of all affected stakeholders in design and implementation of intervention strategies; socio-economic transformation; national reconciliation and integration. The details of the policies and legislations should reflect the peculiarities of the respective countries.

The Need for Holistic Long-term Planning:

- When appropriate policy and legal frameworks are in place, it is possible to undertake holistic long term planning for undertaking disarmament. The experience from the four case studies showed that all the DDR programmes that were undertaken were short-term engagements that entailed largely ad-hoc measures.
- The success of DDR interventions largely depends on how comprehensive

the programmes for post-conflict recovery and development are. DDR interventions are too complex to implement in a rush, within a short-term perspective or without a policy and legal framework that seeks solutions to underlying causes of the armed conflicts. Long-term perspectives are required in planning for DDR support intended to enable DDR beneficiaries derive viable means of livelihoods in a sustainable manner.

The Need for Comprehensive Solutions:

- DDR is as much a peace-building initiative, as it is a post-conflict recovery and development engagement. The experience from the four case studies showed that disarmament and demobilisation, and more so reintegration activities for different categories of beneficiaries, were more successful where they were implemented in the context of not only peace-building but also the broader and over-arching recovery and development frameworks.
- The case studies showed that sustainable disarmament does not stop with the collection, management of stocks of firearms collected, and their destruction, but also involves strengthening the rule of law and promoting public safety and community security in the communities affected by the armed conflicts, and especially those where the former combatants are to be settled (including addressing the issues of UXO, ERWs, and de-mining activities).
- For disarmament/DDR programmes to be successful, they have to engender comprehensive (holistic) solutions going beyond the mere collection of guns, to involve the building of trust and confidence in the ability of the state to protect former combatants and all other categories of armed individuals, including those whose guns are taken away under disarmament. Reintegration support should also not stop at only the ex-combatants but also other groups associated with the armed forces such as women and children. Various other interventions also need to be undertaken to prevent the onset and spread of armed violence through a combination of approaches, such as ensuring the reduction of the demand for and supply of illicit firearms, as well as putting in place a multitude of measures targeting the total elimination of those firearms already in circulation.
- The removal of illicit guns from non-state actors is the foundation of sustainable peace building. This should however, be accompanied by other socio-economic and political aspects such as good governance, improved public security and reforms to promote development, political development, social tolerance and cohesion necessary for restoration of complete justice and peace. When individuals, groups or communities find no use for

firearms, they will not need to be coerced to surrender them. Those who have them will hand them over peacefully. Others who would have wished to also acquire firearms will not do so.

- In order for DDR to succeed, efforts need to be made to improve the delivery of basic social services geared towards the improvement of livelihoods especially through income generation initiatives. For example, support needs to be provided in form of vocational-training programmes and continuing education not only for former combatants but also members of communities affected by armed conflicts.
- When DDR programmes are poorly implemented, some disarmed former combatants easily fall back to old networks of crimes, especially when life gets hard, hence becoming a source of insecurity in the communities. In Uganda, some former rebel commanders who had been disarmed and demobilised were arrested and charged with involvement in armed robbery. Many self-settled ex-combatants who retained some or all their weapons sometimes use them to commit crime, especially settling personal scores (or settling scores for others).

Structures and Institutions for Undertaking DDR interventions:

- The need for structures and institutions for undertaking DDR are an important requisite. The case studies showed that where DDR interventions were mainstreamed within existing line ministries, they experienced immense resource and other challenges. The following structures contributed positively towards disarmament in the case-study countries:
 - In Ethiopia, the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans known as the *Tahadiso* (reintegration) Commission was established in 1991.
 - In Sudan, North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) were set up to oversee the implementation of the DDR programme.
 - In Uganda, an Act of Parliament established the Amnesty Commission. UVAB was also put in place. The Disarmament in Karamoja was handled under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) that oversees the implementation of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development (KIDDP) programme.

Community Education, Awareness and Sensitisation:

- It was also apparent from the disarmament studies in the selected States that effective strategies for community education, awareness and sensitisation need to be adopted to achieve an attitude change. Messages about disarmament and the advantages of doing so need to be designed in such a way that they can be delivered to all those affected. This becomes the starting point for promoting a culture that abhors violence and respects human rights.
- Disarmament can never succeed if it is not accompanied by concerted efforts towards national reconciliation complemented by appropriate policies as well as legal frameworks for achieving peaceful conflict resolution.

Involvement of local Communities and their Leaders:

- It was all too evident from the four case studies that disarmament is usually very expensive to execute if the local communities affected by the armed conflicts and their local leaders are operating at cross-purposes. Efforts need to be directed to ensure there is a common understanding of the purpose of the disarmament, and an agreement of how it will be executed, as well as an appreciation of the support that will be provided by government to ensure its success.
- In DDR programmes which entail the resettlement of ex-combatants, it is essential to ensure that the local community are brought on board to support the programme in order for it to succeed. Gender and generational issues also need to be taken into consideration in implementing DDR.

Cross-border Collaboration and Co-operation:

- Cross-border collaboration and co-operation as well as simultaneous and joint disarmament need to be undertaken by countries that are affected by armed conflicts that are the result of communities or armed groups that share common borders.
- If the disarmament programmes target pastoral communities, such as those who live in borderland areas, the governments in the neighbouring countries needs to be brought on board to ensure there is close collaboration so as to undertake simultaneous disarmament of the respective communities.
- If adopted, an international/regional approach to disarmament ensures re-armament using smuggling routes and unsecured border controls does not take place. In regards to harmonising disarmament targeting pastoral communities that live and share resources across the international com-

mon border, the governments of Kenya and Uganda undertook the following measures that can be regarded as good practices:

- The governments have committed themselves to implementing a Joint Disarmament Action Plan (designed in 2005);
- on several occasions, both governments have undertaken both joint (cross-border) and simultaneous (in-country) disarmament operations;
- both governments deployed armed forces in trouble spots along their common borders to stem international arms trafficking as well as cross-border livestock raiding;
- regular high level strategic meetings between the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) in Uganda and his counterpart in Kenya are held;
- both governments have exchanged military liaison officers on disarmament;
- protocols have been developed to allow resource sharing between pastoral groups in the two countries.

Such established systems and structures ensure permanent coordination of interventions that contributes significantly in promoting sustainable peace in the affected border areas.

Monitoring and Evaluation of Disarmament Programmes:

- The experience from the four disarmament case studies showed that it is always essential to design a system of Monitoring and Evaluation of not only the progress being made in the implementation of disarmament interventions, but also their impact. This makes it possible to identify challenges as well as learn lessons for improving the implementation of the programme. None of the States where the disarmament case studies were conducted had put in place such a system. Monitoring and evaluation functions were therefore being undertaken through ad-hoc measures, if at all.
- From the foregoing, it is clear that there is need for ensuring that measures taken to address disarmament must take into account the various components and aspects of illegal armament. Practical Disarmament is one such measure; especially so because, among others, it gives pre-eminence to aspects of demand reduction, supply control and surplus re-conversion which are important in addressing the proliferation of illegal SALW.

CHAPTER 5

5. GAPS AND NEW AREAS OF RESEARCH

The above lessons and best practices justify the need for undertaking Practical Disarmament. This calls for the need to undertake thorough baseline assessment studies to understand how practical disarmament can be implemented.

Critical Gaps for Research:

The following were considered as critical gaps and new areas for research for successful practical disarmament:

- There is a need to study and prepare concrete action about the supply side of SALW proliferation. Though it is hard to exhaustively and unequivocally list the suppliers of SALW, it is important that they are identified if disarmament efforts are to be effective. This can only be done if there is capacity and political willingness in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa countries.
- Physical disarmament cannot work for pastoralist communities because their security needs require to be maintained in accordance with their way of life. If the state is not economically in a position to provide mobile socio-political facilities, disarming them unilaterally poses a great danger. There is a need therefore to study the security needs of pastoralist communities and alternative feasible solutions prior to disarmament.
- There is inadequate historical documentation of disarmaments (current and past) in most countries where disarmament programmes have been implemented. It is important that studies are carried out in these countries to document their experiences for purposes of drawing future lessons for practical disarmament.
- In most countries, national scientific household surveys on public safety and security dynamics have not been undertaken. Consideration needs to be made for such studies in the future.

New Areas of Research

- The emerging dynamics of armed criminal groups and gangs as well as militias and vigilantes in countries other than those that have been afflicted by internal civil strife need to be undertaken to draw appropriate lessons.

- Civilian armament has mainly focussed on urban areas and pastoralist communities. There is need to understand the dynamics in other areas outside the urban areas as well as non-pastoralist areas to capture the entire breadth of this problem.
- There is need for new research to demonstrate the importance of traditional systems and mechanisms of conflict resolution to the current efforts geared at disarmament, and what significance these have for different conflict scenarios.

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