



Co-operating to Disarm

**AN ASSESSMENT OF ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION AND FRAGILITY SITUATIONS**

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN





Co-operating to Disarm

VISION

“A safe and secure sub – region in a peaceful continent free from arms proliferation”

MISSION

To coordinate action against Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa

CORE VALUES

Flexibility
Gender Sensitivity
Integrity
Professionalism
Partnership
Team Work
Transparency

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACL	Authority Capacity and Legitimacy
AU-LOSS	Africa Union Liaison Office of Republic of South Sudan
BCSSAC	Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control
CAR	Central African Republic
CEPO	Community Empowerment for Progress Organization
CoH	Cessation of Hostilities
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil-society organizations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FGD	Focus group discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPMG	General-Purpose Machine Gun
GRSS	Government of the Republic of Republic of South Sudan
IDMC	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ONAD	Organization for Nonviolence and Development
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SMGs	Sub-Machine Guns
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in opposition
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SSP	South Sudanese Pounds
TGNU	Transition Government for National Unity
UIDO	Universal Intervention and Development Organization
UN	United Nation
UNAFPOs	UN funds programs and organizations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nation High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation Children Education Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNPoA	United Nation Program of Action

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has experienced various violent conflicts. This has resulted in instability and increased levels of poverty. According to the Funds for Peace, the Republic of South Sudan is the most fragile state in the world. Its levels of governance remain low and the propensity for the country to revert to conflicts remains high owing to the current political tensions. Illicit SALW proliferation is at the heart of this insecurity and the human development challenges it creates. Arms have facilitated protracted conflicts both within and outside the country, leading to the disruption of key economic activities and further impoverishment of the population.

The overall objective of this research was to investigate the relationship between proliferation of illicit SALW and fragile situations in South Sudan, and their impacts on development and livelihoods. Participants in the research included Civil Society Organizations, security agents, religious leaders, government officials, civil service members, academics and the general South Sudan populace. The research was conducted in different parts of South Sudan.

The findings of the study indicate that Fragility situations in South Sudan are manifested by proliferation of illicit SALW (85%), protracted armed conflict (76%), presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (68%), the presence of peacekeeping forces (65%) and the presence of humanitarian agencies (60%). On the other hand, the keys drivers of fragility in South Sudan are poor governance (76%), protracted conflict (74%), poverty (70%), proliferation of illicit SALW (64%), and ethnic and clan politics (60%).

The impact of fragility situations in South Sudan is profound. The study established that, the key affected sectors included security, tourism, foreign direct investment, health, education and the road infrastructure. A number of legal frameworks and interventions have been put in place by the government and the international community with the objective of addressing the fragility situations. However, the challenges of protracted conflict, continued proliferation of illicit SALW, weak governance institutions and ethnic and clan-based politics still persists.

In building resilience, the study recommends strengthening of governance institutions, addressing proliferation of illicit SALW, reforming the public and security sectors and post conflict reconstruction among others.


1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

South Sudan is the 55th and youngest nation on the continent of Africa, after gaining independence from Sudan in July 2011. This move was aided by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which saw the end of Africa’s longest-running civil war.

The Republic of South Sudan is located in Eastern Africa, covering 644,329 sq km with an estimated population of 11,562,695.¹ Culturally, there are over 60 ethnic groups in the Republic of South Sudan with traditional religions and Christianity as the major religions.² Key economic activities include farming, fishing and cattle rearing.

Figure 1: Political Map of the Republic of South Sudan



Source: Paan Luelwel³

The long history of instability in the Republic of South Sudan dates back to the Anglo-Egyptian era (1899-1955), when the land-locked Republic of South Sudan region experienced slavery from Egyptians and Arabians who were also searching for gold, ivory and tax revenue. Southern Sudan, (at the time called Southerners) was thus dominated by the Northerners, consisting of Turkish rulers of Egypt and the Mahdist government of Khartoum, who strongly sought to spread Islam among the black Southerners.⁴

The opposition to Islam by the South has continually shaped the country’s current realities. Opposing Sudan’s Islamicization policy in 1983, which would have instituted Islamic law among majority Christians, the South intensified its demand for autonomy from the North through its second liberation movement. The intermittent conflict ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

¹Infoplease, “World-Countries-South Sudan,” Available at: <http://www.infoplease.com/world/countries/south-sudan.html> (Accessed on 16/03/2016).
²British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “South Sudan Country Profile,” Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082> (Accessed 4/02/2016).


³Paan Luelwel, “South Sudan Map by County/State.” Available at: <https://paanluelwel2011.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/south-sudan-map-by-counties.png> (Accessed on 15/03/2016)

⁴Francis M. Deng, “Sudan - Civil War and Genocide Disappearing Christians of the Middle East.” Middle East Quarterly. Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 13-21.

The relative peace that ensued with the inauguration of President Kiir was disrupted in December 2013 by a civil war in the country following confrontation between the forces allied to the President and those allied to the Deputy President, Riek Machar. This eventually exploded into a war in early 2014. Riek Machar fled out of the country after sporadic conflicts emerged between the two big ethnic groups, the Nuer and Dinka. Within this period, many people were displaced and the population in need of assistance within and outside displacement camps increased.

The renewed frictions between the two leaders almost reversed the gains made after the 2005 CPA. In order to end the conflict, the two parties signed a peace agreement in August 2015 referred to as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Plus Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, despite the peace agreement political tensions continue to simmer. The country has remained fragile since its independence in 2011 as demonstrated by the figure below.

Figure 2: Fragility Situations Trend in the Republic of South Sudan (2012-2015)



Source: Fund for Peace 2015

The figure above shows the Republic of South Sudan’s exponential trend of fragility situations, year-to-year. Upward movements represent worsening trends, of which the country has consistently experienced since independence. The figure only covers from 2012 following independence of the country in 2011. Prior to this, the state of the Republic of South Sudan as presently constituted did not exist. The Republic of South Sudan is ranked 1 out of 178 countries as per 2015 fragility state index.⁵

⁵The Fund for Peace, 2015. “Fragile State Index 2015.” Available at: www.fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015 (Accessed on 15/03/2016)

⁶Finn Stepputat and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2008. “Fragile States: Definitions, Measurements and Processes.” Available at: http://www.dcism.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/R2008_11_Fragile_States_%20Definitions_Measurements_Processes.pdf (Accessed on 2/02/2016).

1.2 Conceptualizing Fragility situations and SALW proliferation in the Republic of South Sudan

Due to the diverse experiences of countries in fragile situations, scholars have noted that there is no generally accepted definition of fragility because of the political motives associated with the concept. “The African Development Bank defines fragility as the “low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development.”⁷ It reflects incapacity of the state to provide for its populations as well as the non-acceptance of the governing institutions by the majority of its citizens.

⁷African Development Bank, 2014. Africa Development Bank Group strategy for addressing Fragility and building resilience in Africa. Abidjan: Africa Development Bank.

Within the African Development Bank's conceptualization of fragility situations, this study conceives fragility as the low institutional capacity and poor performance that the Republic of South Sudan has shown with regard to the provision of human security and sustainable development. In this regard, fragility situations are measured using the authority, capacity and legitimacy (ACL) framework, hereafter, the ACL model. Authority is the capability of the state to protect its citizens from any form of violence and criminality including provision of security for their lives and property. Within the hierarchy of public goods delivered by states, the most important public good that modern states are required to provide to the citizenry is security, and most importantly human security, which holistically addresses the basic requirement of citizens. It also involves having in place judicial systems that dispense justice fairly while prosecuting against breaking of the law.

Authority is also taken to mean the ability of the state to enact binding legislations over its population and to provide the latter with a stable and safe environment. In relation to the Republic of South Sudan (RSS), authority was measured by considering the extent to which leaders in the RSS have worked to ensure human security to the South Sudanese. Authority also included assessing the functionality and effectiveness of security forces in protecting the citizens against internal and external aggression. Security providers in the RSS are largely tribalised and informal. In the absence of a strong functioning state, clans and diverse ethnic groups in the RSS have organized themselves around armed groups, which protect the community against their enemies. The authority function within the RSS government is thus weak and this has contributed to instability in the country.

Legitimacy denotes the ability of the state to command public loyalty to the governing regime and to generate domestic support for government legislation being passed and policies being implemented. In the RSS, legitimacy was established by considering the extent to which legal institutions dispense justice freely and fairly. Fragile situations tend to weaken state institutions, often leading to lawlessness, which further diminishes state legitimacy. The RSS, a conflict-ridden state has been more susceptible to fragility situations. It has been dogged by deep-rooted conflicts and violent transitions that have postponed peace.

The inability of the government to control high levels of corruption and the propensity to revert to conflicts and political instability after periods of peace has also been high. Conflicts in the country have not only become endemic, but also brutal. Due to the limited acceptance of the state in most parts of the country, populations continue to live under the control of armed groups and some have resorted to either joining or aiding the groups to access illicit SALW. For such a citizenry dependence on the armed groups provides more protection and comfort than continuing to wait for non-responsive government security agencies. Many citizens have also opted to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.

Capacity refers to the ability of a state to effectively provide basic services such as health, education, food, water, and sanitation as well as basic communication and transport. In the same vein, the state needs to guarantee the basic needs of its citizens through provision of infrastructural support, partnership with public and private sectors and encouragement of community initiatives. The RSS has struggled to realize these basic needs to their citizens and in some cases, this space has been filled by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international development agencies. In some instances, non-state armed groups have often taken it upon themselves to provide security and other needs such as electricity and water to citizens albeit in an illegal manner.

Fragile states can thus be defined as those that are caught up in any or all of the following traps: conflict, natural resource competition, poor governance, weak institution, violence and poverty. The World Bank notes that such states fall behind other states in meeting all the sustainable development goals including mortality, literacy, poverty and malnutrition levels, which remain higher than in other low-income countries.⁸ This is the case with the RSS where, despite its resources, its development levels are still low.

Countries with high poverty levels tend to develop fragile situations. Moreover, the propensity of populations in such states to resort to criminality is also high, as most of the youth remain unemployed or underemployed.

⁸World Bank, "Fragility Violence and Conflict," Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview#1> (Accessed on 2/03/2016).

Scholars have also noted that fragile situations in one country often have destabilizing, spill over effects on its neighbours.⁹ For instance, some assert that fragile states play a critical role in the proliferation of illicit SALW.¹⁰ The easy availability of weapons in turn tends to weaken state capacity, further fuelling wars and fostering crime and impunity in the neighbouring states. According to Funds for Peace, the RSS is the most fragile state of 178 sampled states in 2015. Majority of its population is armed and state legitimacy, authority, and capacity to prevent and deal with resource, ethnic and political violence has consistently been limited. This study, therefore, sought to establish the extent to which the proliferation of illicit SALW has contributed to fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall goal of this study was to establish the nexus between illicit SALW proliferation and fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan and how the two have impacted on livelihoods and development. The study was guided by the following objectives:

- i. To document manifestations of fragility situations and illicit SALW proliferation in the Republic of South Sudan;
- ii. To identify drivers of fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan;
- iii. To explain the impact of fragility situations and illicit SALW proliferation on development and livelihoods in the Republic of South Sudan; and
- iv. To identify existing national, regional and international intervention mechanisms addressing fragility situations and illicit SALW proliferation in the Republic of South Sudan

2.0 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Research design and sampling

The study adopted an exploratory research design using both qualitative and quantitative techniques of data analysis. Qualitative information was collected by invoking the perceptions of the respondents on the current fragile situation, its drivers and existing intervention mechanisms. The respondents also provided quantitative data on the extent of small


⁹Siân, Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan, and Marielle Debos. 2013. "State Fragility in the Central African Republic: What Prompted the 2013 Coup." Available at: http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/car_gsdr2013.pdf (Accessed on 23/3/2016).

¹⁰Patrick, Stewart, "Weak states and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" *Washington Quarterly*. Vol.29, No. 2 (2006), pp.27-53.

arms proliferation, cost of small arms and the impact of the fragile situations on human development.

Purposive sampling was used to ensure that specific key informants were reached for the relevant information. The key informants were identified based on their roles in the society on matters touching on fragility situations and SALW, their level of knowledge, and organizational representation. They came from academic institutions (teachers, lecturers, and university students), government officials (government bureaucrats, security personnel, and civil servants), general public (religious leaders and ordinary citizens), and civil society organizations (CSOs) (both national and international). The pie chart below gives the percentage of the respondents:

Figure 3: Category of respondents



2.2 Data collection and management

Before the study commenced, the researchers informed the government through the various Ministries of the nature of the study and respondents' consent was sought in the case of primary data. Secondary data consisted of online journals, online reports from various organizations, government publications/reports and policy papers to corroborate the primary data. Primary data was gathered through key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions were carried out with officials from government, security agencies, Civil Society and NGOs and South Sudanese nationals. Most of the interviews were done face to face, but some were done either through phone calls or through email exchange. The researchers sought representatives from diverse categories of respondents.

The researchers used the objectives of the project to analyse the data collected. They used the Authority, Capacity and Legitimacy (ACL) model to come up with the variables to be used for context, content and critical analysis of data. The data analysed was aimed at establishing the nexus between illicit SALW proliferation and fragility situations and their impact on development and livelihoods.

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was employed for quantitative analysis. Separate data filing was adopted for each of the groups interviewed with corresponding answered questionnaires for ease of reference. Confidentiality and anonymity was maintained by the removal of names where they had been indicated. Descriptive statistics such as proportions were used to summarize categorical variables analysis. The data is presented using frequency tables, graphs, bar and pie charts. Qualitative data was filtered, coded and thematized in order to arrive at the most frequently mentioned response. Findings were then presented in tables, narratives and verbatim and triangulated with the quantitative data.

2.3 Limitations and delimitations

The topic of illicit SALW and fragility situations is generally sensitive due to its associations to security and governance issues respectively. Initially, respondents were unwilling to cooperate due to fear and suspicion as to why the study was being carried especially at a time when political tensions were high. The respondents were, however, assured of their anonymity and the intention of the research explained. Travelling to out of Juba for data collection exercises was also a challenge due to the ongoing conflict. The researchers, however, were able to get as much information as possible through phone exchange and emails from respondents outside of Juba. Though we had anticipated having an interview with security officials, it became challenging due to their involvement in restoring order in the country. This, did not, however, jeopardise the results as researchers were able to consult security officers on phone.

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

The Republic of South Sudan has had a long history of protracted conflict, which has impacted on the country's stability. The fragility situation in the Republic of South Sudan manifested itself through

weak and poor governance, which has resulted to protracted conflict, which has been sustained by proliferation of illicit SALW into civilian hands. This notwithstanding scanty literature exists on the topic.

3.1 Manifestations of Fragility situations and illicit SALW proliferation in the Republic of South Sudan

a) Protracted conflicts

The history of political instability in the Republic of South Sudan dates back to Anyanya 1, the first liberation civil war in 1955-1972, when the Republic of South Sudan was demanding representation and more regional autonomy from the North. The 17 years of war led to the death of half a million South Sudanese.¹¹ The second liberation movement in the south started in 1983 due to Sudan's Islamicization policy and ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and SPLM/A in Nairobi.¹² The years leading to the secession of the south saw the eruption of violence as the referendum drew closer. The Republic of South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011. The recent crisis that erupted in December 2013 cut-short the peace and stability in the Republic of South Sudan thus exacerbating fragility situations.

b) Struggle to attain state legitimacy

The South Sudanese state has struggled gaining recognition from majority of its populations. Different ethnic groups have formed their political groups and loyalty to the central government has thus been reduced. In addition, most of the former militia groups that had been poorly integrated into the SPLA after the 2005 CPA defected in support of the rebellion by Riek Machar, prompting the ethnic tinge to the current conflict.¹³ In particular, the disproportionate representation of Dinka in the SPLA (The Nuer comprise of 70% of SPLA¹⁴) has provoked ethnic-based killings in the recent crisis.

c) Humanitarian crisis

Protracted civil war in South Sudan has exacerbated fragility situations in this young nation, leading to the displacement of approximately 2.3 million people and the death of thousands.

¹¹The Sudd Institute, "Republic of South Sudan's Crisis: It's Drivers, Key Players, and Post-conflict Prospects," Available at: https://www.suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/572b7eb3cea73_SouthSudansCrisisItsDriversKeyPlayers_Full.pdf (Accessed on 8/12/15).

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

According to United Nation High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 2016 statistics, there are 645,052 refugees in South Sudan, bringing the total number of refugees and asylum seekers to 768,725.¹⁵ Simona Foltyn's report on the Republic of South Sudan reports approximately 3.9 million people at risk of going hungry while 4.6 million, which is more than a third of the population, is in need of

humanitarian assistance.¹⁶ The UNHCR planning figures for 2015 demonstrate the serious humanitarian crisis in country as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: UNHCR 2015 planning figures for the Republic of South Sudan

UNHCR 2015 planning figures for the Republic of South Sudan*					
Type of population	Origin	January 2015		December 2015	
		Total in country	Of whom assisted by UNHCR	Total in country	Of whom assisted by UNHCR
Total		1,400,150	590,150	1,568,650	508,650
Refugees	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	15,600	15,600	17,600	17,600
	Ethiopia	6,500	6,500	7,000	7,000
	Sudan	245,500	245,500	266,300	266,300
	Various	2,200	2,200	2,700	2,700
Asylum-seekers	Various	50	50	50	50
Returnee arrivals during year (ex-refugees)	South Sudan	300	300	25,000	25,000
Internally displaced	South Sudan	1,000,000	300,000	1,000,000	110,000
People in IDP-like situations	South Sudan	110,000	10,000	110,000	10,000
Returnee arrivals during year (ex-IDPs)	South Sudan	20,000	10,000	140,000	70,000

Source: UNHCR country operations profile, 2015.¹⁷

3.2 Drivers of fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan

a) Proliferation of illicit SALWs

The protracted violence in the Republic of South Sudan has aided the widespread diffusion of illicit SALW in the country. A 2014 report by Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC) noted that there are approximately between 1.9–3.2 million illicit arms in circulation in the Republic of South Sudan.¹⁸ The proliferation of illicit SALW is associated with three major periods of the country's violent history. To begin with, the 1800s witnessed the entry of illicit SALW from the Ottoman Empire, which invaded Sudan. Secondly, the secessionist movement and mutiny in 1955 of the southern Sudanese saw the tremendous increase of illicit arms. Globally, there was a general increase

in illicit SALW during the Cold War period as civilians acquired arms from foreign powers.¹⁹ Factors outside the country have also been blamed for arms proliferation in the country. For instance, the LRA of Uganda, Libya's militias, Chadian rebel groups as well as Eritrea and Ethiopia's armed groups have often been accused of providing illicit arms to South Sudanese rebel factions.²⁰ Largely, the insecurity in the Republic of South Sudan has provided a conducive environment for arms exchange and diffusion with devastating effects on the civilian populations.

¹⁵United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Republic of South Sudan Situation," Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=251> (Accessed on 14/1/16).

¹⁶Simona, Foltyn. "South Sudan: Coffee in a time of War?" Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/01/south-sudan-coffee-time-war-160105132312753.html> (Accessed 20/01/2016).

¹⁷United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), "UNHCR country operations profile -Republic of South Sudan," Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html> (Accessed on 4/02/2016).

¹⁸Saferworld, 2012. "Civilian Disarmament in Republic of South Sudan: A legacy of struggle," Available at: <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/637-civilian-disarmament-in-south-sudan>. (Accessed 8/1/16).

b) Poor and weak governance

Consecutive governments' in the Republic of South Sudan have been accused of corruption, favouritism and impunity. Some regions in the country have been isolated and government capacity to provide basic services is wanting in states such as Jonglei. Before the outbreak of the conflict, around 83% of the population in the Republic of South Sudan resided in rural areas,²¹ which have been largely marginalized in service delivery. According to a report²² by the Sudd Institute, before independence Juba took over 80% of the national budget, leaving the 79 counties and 10 states to share the remaining less than 20% of the budget. This exclusion prompts people to seek alternative means of providing security and food. Illicit SALW become such a quick option.

c) Porous Borders

The Republic of South Sudan has largely been blamed for the proliferation of illicit SALW into its neighbouring countries. However, it has also received a fair share of arms from its neighbours such as Kenya, Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Ethiopia and Sudan.²³ The flow of arms is largely facilitated by porous borders.

3.3 Impacts of fragility situations and illicit SALW proliferation on development in the Republic of South Sudan

The increased illicit SALW and consequent instability have had devastating effects on the economy, politics and the social fabric of the Republic of South Sudan as discussed below.

a) Economic development: The recent, 2-year conflict cost up to 15% of the 2014 Gross Domestic Product (GDP).²⁴ A recent report from Al Jazeera highlights that traders in the Republic of South Sudan can only access black market hard currency

¹⁹Dominykas, Broga, 2016. "International Meddling." Available at: <http://weareiguacu.com/the-proliferation-of-arms-in-south-sudan/> (Accessed on 9/4/2016).

²⁰Ibid.

²¹The World Bank (WB), "Republic of South Sudan Economic Overview," Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> (Accessed on 22/12/15).

²²The Sudd Institute, 2014. "Republic of South Sudan's Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-conflict Prospects," Available at: <http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/south-sudan-s-crisis-its-drivers-key-players-and-post-conflict-prospects/> (Accessed on 8/12/15).

²³Leff, Jonah, and Emile LeBrun. "Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan." Geneva: Small Arms Survey (2014). See also Berman, Eric G., and Mihaela Racovita. Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14. No. 37. HSBA Working Paper, 2015.

at five times the official rate, contributing to inflation in the country and hindering imports.²⁵ The country's subsistence economy is characterized by vast untapped natural resources and a few oil enclaves. Unfortunately, 15% of the Republic of South Sudan's GDP is from the low productivity, unpaid agriculture and pastoralist work with 85% of the labour force in the country engaged in non-wage work, mainly in this agricultural sector.²⁶

Oil is the dominant export product in the Republic of South Sudan and it accounts for around 60% of the country's GDP. ²⁷ Production of oil in the Republic of South Sudan has fallen by approximately 20% due to the recent conflict and is expected to remain at 165,000 barrel per day up to the end of financial year 2015/16.²⁸ This poses a challenge for Government of the Republic of South Sudan as oil revenue accounts for 95% of government revenue.²⁹

b) Provision of Social amenities: In the Republic of South Sudan, approximately 38% of the population has to walk close to 30 minutes to access drinking water, while only 55% have access to improved sources of drinking water. In addition, 80% of the population does not have access to toilet facilities.³⁰ The World Bank economic overview of the Republic of South Sudan also found that only 27% of the population was literate, as illustrated in Figure 4 below.

²⁴The World Bank (WB), "Republic of South Sudan Economic Overview," Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> (Accessed 22/12/15).

²⁵Simona Foltyn, 2016. "South Sudan: Coffee in a time of War?" Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/01/south-sudan-coffee-time-war-160105132312753.html> (Accessed 8/1/16).

²⁶The World Bank (WB), "Republic of South Sudan Economic Overview," Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> (Accessed 22/12/15).


²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid

Figure 4: Population literacy rate in the Republic of South Sudan (Source: World Bank)




Source: World Bank³¹

c) **Poverty:** Protracted conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan have led to increased rates of poverty. The Republic of South Sudan’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is 0.551.³²

As shown in Figure 5 below, it measures levels of deprivation over ten indicators, namely: years of schooling, school attendance, child mortality, nutrition, electricity, sanitation, water, floor, cooking fuel and assets.

Figure 5: Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI): Censored Deprivation




³¹Ibid.

³²Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 2015. "Central African Republic Country Briefing." Oxford: Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank, OPHI, University of Oxford. Available at: www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/mpo-country-briefings/ (Accessed on 12/02/2016).

Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 2015

A person is said to be multi-dimensionally poor (or MPI poor) if he/she is deprived up to one third of the 10 indicators above. Thus, poverty is measured not just on income but on comprehensive aspects of living conditions of an individual as well. In the Republic of South Sudan, 89.3% of the population are said to be multi-dimensionally poor.³³ The average MPI is measured from 0-1, with 0 being perfect situation with no poverty and 1 being the highest situation of poverty.

Figure 6: Percentage of Responses on Manifestations of Fragility in South Sudan



Source: Research Findings

Protracted conflicts: The Republic of South Sudan has been ravaged with instability since 1955. According to 76% of the responses, fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan is manifested by the intermittent conflicts. In order to understand fragility situations in South Sudan, one has to consider its history that is deeply entrenched in struggles for liberation as observed by a political officer at the Africa Union Liaison Office in the Republic of South Sudan (AU-LOSS).

³³United Nations Development Programme (NDP), “Human Development Report-South Sudan,” Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/SSD.pdf (Accessed on 12/3/2016).

³⁴The World Bank (WB), “Republic of South Sudan Economic Overview,” Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> (Accessed 22/12/15).

The provision of basic needs such as housing, food, and water has also been hampered by the recent crisis. Poverty in the Republic of South Sudan has increased to 57.2% in 2015 from 44.7% in 2011.³⁴

4.0 KEY FINDINGS

4.1 Manifestations Of Fragility Situations And Proliferation Of Illicit Salw

The fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan is manifested in various ways as shown in the figure below:

He added that the long history of instability dates back to the Anglo-Egyptian era (1899-1955) long before the birth of the Republic. This was an era of plundering, which was followed by liberation that continued in different phases with years of peace. The Republic of South Sudan has been in conflict for most of its life span.

The December 2013 crisis for example, was caused by infighting in Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and disunity among the government leaders. An official from Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) held the view that there is currently a generational clash within SPLM, which forestalls the development of the Party.

Since the signing of the 2005 peace pact, political power has been concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite and the masses have been left at the mercy of politicians whose main goal is self-aggrandizement at any cost.

Clan and ethnic politics have also exposed fault lines within the government, deepening the fragility situation of the country. However, respondents from Civil Society were quick to point out that the conflict was not ethnically motivated, but rather politically instigated. An officer from the Organization for Nonviolence and Development (ONAD) reiterated, “the recent conflict was ethnicized by top political actors who sought support from their communities after disagreements at the party level.” Hence, what started as a political tangle ended up as an ethnic-based conflict with numerous revenge attacks, mostly between the Nuer and Dinka communities.

Proliferation of illicit SALW: The long history of conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan has left the population heavily militarised and armed. A majority of responses at 85% identified the presence of illicit SALW as a lead indicator of fragility situations in the country. According a United High Commission for Refugees officer, the swift mobilisation of armed groups after the December 2013 crisis, demonstrates the widespread availability of illicit SALW among the populations. This has been a major sustaining factor of the continuing crisis. The responses were emphatic that SALW have diffused from neighbouring nations and used in many of the conflicts.

Table 2: Humanitarian Workers and Troops in the Republic of South Sudan

Category	Number
Uniformed personnel	12, 523
Troops	11 782
Military liaison officers	185
Police (including Formed Police Units)	1105
International civilian personnel	787
Local civilian staff	1215
UN volunteers	435

³⁵IDMC, “South Sudan.” available at: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/south-sudan/> (Accessed on 20/04/2016)

³⁶UNHCR, South Sudan situations.” Available at: www.data.unhcr.org/south-sudan/regional.php (Accessed on 20/04/2016)

The presence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): The fragile situations that exist in the Republic of South Sudan are manifested through the various Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps located across the country. The findings revealed that 68% of the respondents considered the increasing numbers of IDPs in rural and urban areas as a manifestation of fragility situations in the country. A respondent from an international NGO noted that by December 2015, there were an estimated 1,000,000 IDPs. This corresponds with the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), which put the figures at approximately 1.7 million as at the end of 2015³⁵ and the number of South Sudanese who have fled the country at 947, 384.³⁶

The presence of peacekeepers: the fragility situations in the country are further manifested by the presence of peacekeepers in the country. This was expressed by 65% of the responses. According to a respondent from United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Republic of South Sudan, there are over 50,000 UN peacekeepers, humanitarian agencies, UN agencies including United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), UN funds, programs and organizations (UNAFPOs) and international NGOs. Respondents from the UNHCR in the Republic of South Sudan estimated that UN troops are over 15,000 spread throughout the country and that what is sustaining the Republic of South Sudan economy are international agencies. Table 2 below shows the number of humanitarian workers and troops in the Republic of South Sudan.


Source: UN, United Nations Mission in the Republic of the Republic of South Sudan. 2016, ³⁷

4.2 Drivers Of Fragility Situations

The following were mentioned as key factors sustaining fragility situations.

Poor governance (76%), protracted conflict (74%), poverty (70%), proliferation of illicit SALW (64%), and ethnic and clan politics (60%) as shown in the figure below:

Figure 7: Percentage of responses on drivers of fragility situations in South Sudan



Source: Research Findings

4.2.1 Poor governance


Poor governance came out as the leading driver of fragility situations in South Sudan, scoring 76% of the responses. Poor governance in the Republic of South Sudan was attributed to a disunited government and by extension the army. NGO participants pointed out that the SPLM government has continued to exhibit neo-patrimonialism and clientelism, which are characterized by corruption and impunity. These factors have undermined the government’s capacity, authority and legitimacy to safeguard the wellbeing of its people. In an FGD with NGO officials, it was emphasized that ideological differences among the top political SPLM leadership instigated the recent crisis. The rigid military power structure in the SPLM has also contributed to the constant wrangles and lack of consensus within the Party. This has hampered governance in the Republic of South Sudan with most government officials keen to control the Party for their selfish and tribal interests.

International Humanitarian workers added that informal patronage networks within the civil administration and the army have also hampered good governance. Some respondents (47%) also noted that proceeds from oil revenue have been used to garner support from rebel groups. In return, these armed groups are allowed to purchase illicit SALW from neighbouring conflict-ridden zones.

Generally, the lack of transparency in governance has aided patronage networks that benefit only a few. NGO respondents (78%) were emphatic that lack of transparency and accountability has aided corruption and impunity, and weakened the government’s capacity to provide for its people. However, the newly signed IGAD peace deal has enabled the formation of the Transitional Government for National Unity (TGNU), which is charged with uniting the nation and reducing party tensions through power sharing. Whether this is going to work or not is still debatable. On further probing on the performance of the government in various sectors, respondents’ feedback varied as demonstrated in figure 8 below;

³⁷United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMSS), “UNMISS Facts and Figures,” Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/facts.shtml> (Accessed 02/01/2016).

Figure 8: Perceptions on the governance performance of the country



Source: Research Findings

The research was conducted in October 2015 when negotiations between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar were ongoing. This may explain why 81% of the respondents indicated that the levels of political crisis were very high as indicated in the above figure.

On corruption, 73% of the respondents held that there were high rates of corruption, while 71% affirmed that impunity was rampant amongst the military and armed civilians. This was an indication that the law and justice structures in the country were dysfunctional. On the other hand, 63% of the population held that the government had failed to ensure the security of the population. This is particularly due to increased civilian armament and the manner in which the government armed forces carried disarmament violated the rights of civilian populations.

Most of the respondents (68%) also noted that lack of adherence to the rule of law has caused insecurity and instability in the country. It has led to impunity for crimes and to diffusion of arms, amplifying the culture of illicit SALW among civilians. The government has failed to ensure community and individual security, motivating civilians to arm themselves for protection.

4.2.2 Protracted conflicts /violence

Protracted conflict, according to 74% of the responses emerged as the second most significant driver of fragility situations in South Sudan. The South Sudanese have experienced more war than peace. This has led to the proliferation of militia groups and illicit SALW in the country consequently exacerbating levels of instability. According to 78% of respondents, the current situation is in part due to the legacy of conflict during the liberation struggles that aided the militarization of communities. The government has continuously failed to disarm the population.

4.2.3 Poverty

Responses (70%) indicated that poverty was the third driver of fragility situations in the country. The many years of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan have left the population destitute, with few viable economic activities due to insecurity. According to a professor of economics from the University of Juba, impoverishment has undermined human resources and become a source of instability (See Table 3 below).

Table 3: Multidimensional Poverty across Sub-national Regions in the Republic of South Sudan

Region	MPI (H* A)H	H (Incidence) $\geq 33.3\%$	A (Intensity)	percentage of population			Population
				Vulnerable to poverty $k=20.0\%-33.3\%$	In severe poverty $k\geq 50\%$	Destitute	
South Sudan	0.557	91.10%	61.20%	6.90%	71.10%	71.40%	100%
Urban	0.459	82.50%	55.70%	11.30%	53.20%		25.30%
Rural	0.591	94.00%	62.80%	5.40%	77.20%		74.70%
Central Equitoria	0.391	75.60%	51.70%	17.40%	39.20%	39.70%	13.60%
Western Equitoria	0.456	85.20%	53.50%	11.50%	53.20%	50.00%	8.30%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	0.491	84.90%	57.90%	11.20%	62.10%	57.00%	4.10%
Upper Nile	0.503	86.30%	58.30%	10.00%	61.20%	62.50%	12.40%
Eastern Equitoria	0.561	92.50%	60.70%	7.00%	71.50%	75.30%	11.40%
Lake	0.605	96.90%	62.50%	2.50%	81.60%	80.90%	7.40%
Jonglei and Unity	0.627	97.50%	64.40%	2.20%	84.90%	86.10%	20.40%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	0.652	97.40%	66.90%	2.50%	86.90%	87.70%	10.10%
Warrap	0.661	98.70%	67.00%	1.30%	89.30%	88.40%	12.30%

Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2015).

Table 3 above highlights the levels of poverty for various regions of the country, the vulnerability of the population and the percentage of the population in a situation of severe poverty. The desperate situation that has caused many to turn to violence is exhibited by the accounts of increased criminality in Juba. It has also made South Sudanese people vulnerable to political manipulation into violence

violence and recruitment into armed militias. Economic power in the Republic of South Sudan is concentrated in the hands of a few as pointed out by 62% of the respondents. The lack of sufficient funds for development in the country is evident in the outskirts of Juba. One of the respondents from the University of Juba pointed out that development funds do not reach 5 km beyond Juba, Wao, or Malakal. This has led to a vicious cycle of poverty where the poor have remained marginalized and disillusioned.

In addition, a religious leader was of the view that despite having a vibrant private sector, the Republic of South Sudan's economy largely depends on its underdeveloped public sector, which has seen political manipulation of especially vulnerable youth. These youth are illiterate, unskilled and idle. Hence, 59% of the respondents were concerned that school enrolment had been highly affected by the fragility situations in the country.

Majority respondents (61%) noted that many children either do not go to school or have simply dropped out due to increased cases of insecurity in different localities. This has led to increased engagement of the youth in criminal activities to earn a living, as reiterated by a religious leader from the Universal Intervention and Development Organization (UIDO). The presence of illicit SALW has aggravated fragility situations, as guns are continuously seen as a source of wealth.

Figure 9: Estimation of the number of arms in the country



Source: Research Findings

Figure 9 above indicates the estimation of the number of arms in the Republic of South Sudan. This notwithstanding, a total of 64% of the respondents held that there were 201,000-400,000 illicit SALW in the country, whereas 21% were of the view that the figures could be as high as 401,000-500,000 illicit SALW.

Coupled with this is the disempowerment of women in the Republic of South Sudan due to the patriarchal culture of the various communities. Respondents from NGOs (52%) explained that with exclusion from mainstream decision-making in the economic, political and social spheres empowerment opportunities are limited. This accounts for the gender disparities observed in the public sector and government circles as women continue to struggle to engage in politics in the new nation.

4.2.4 Proliferation of illicit SALW

Proliferation of illicit SALW was mentioned by 64% as the fourth driver of fragility situations in South Sudan. Given the protracted and long period of armed conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan, it was difficult to establish the exact number of illicit SALW in the country. The respondents, however, gave variant numbers of illicit SALW in the country as shown in Figure 9 below;

On the flows and sources of illicit SALW, a government official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that diffusion of arms in the hands of civilians is largely as a result of the civil war that led to independence of the country. He however added that the current supply is from non-state actors engaged in the conflict; spills from government stockpiles; local and regional cross-border illicit SALW trafficking given to the country's porous borders.

Ukraine was mentioned as the major exporter of arms to the Republic of South Sudan with the help of Kenya through the Port of Mombasa. Respondents (52%) also cited Uganda as a shipment area with planes carrying arms from Entebbe landing in Juba. Russia has also been in the forefront of arms trade relationship with the Republic of South Sudan.

Local community elders also noted that illicit SALW enter the nation through raids by nomadic communities who travel throughout the borders of the neighbouring nations. For instance, Kidepo valley that straddles the Republic of South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya was constantly mentioned by the respondents interviewed. For many years, valley residents, the Turkana of Kenya, the Dodoth of Uganda and the Toposa of the Republic of South Sudan have traded SALW across the three countries' borders.

Security agencies have also been implicated in lending and/or selling their arms to civilians, due to weak legislation on SALW control in the country. The failure to disarm the civilian population has also created a vicious cycle of illicit arms circulation for self-protection. This has contributed to the rise in criminality, with most youth turning to illegal activities such as theft and highway robberies as a means of income. An official at the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) said small arms are being used for lethal robbery.

In a focus group discussion (FGD) with security officers, it was cited that there are various types of illicit SALW in circulation throughout the country. AK47, G3, pistols, grenades, Mark 4, sub-machine guns (SMGs) and the general-purpose machine gun (GPMG) were associated with rebel groups and government security officers. Homemade guns are also common with the Toposas. The weapon of choice by most of the locals is the AK47. Security agents pointed out that the AK 47 is light and easy to operate. It is also easily available from neighbouring Somalia and Sudan.

4.2.5 *Ethnic and clan politics*

According to 60% of the responses, ethnic and clan politics was ranked as the fifth driver of fragility situations in the country. The competition for political control and supremacy among the various ethnic groups and clans during the many years of war has polarized their relationships. The recent

crisis in South Sudan has further affected the relationship between the over 60 ethnic groups. In a FGD with university lecturers and students, respondents emphasised that the politicization of ethnic relations can be attributed to socio-cultural differences in the Republic of South Sudan. Ethnic polarization dates back to the struggle for liberation, especially the divide-and-rule approach of the Khartoum government. Ethnic-driven killings were on the increase during this period, heightening divisions among communities. Militarization of communities led to diffusion of illicit SALW among civilians, facilitating ethnic-based killings and conflicts. A university Professor added that the recent conflict further polarized the new state as leaders turned to their ethnic cocoons for support. The South Sudanese communities have been turned against each other and used to commit atrocities on each other, causing hatred, mistrust, and conflict along ethnic lines.

4.3 *Impact Of Fragility Situations And Illicit Salw Proliferation On Human Development And Livelihood*

The impact of the recent conflict on the Republic of South Sudanese, coupled with the breakdown in provision of services, has worsened prospects for human development in a country that was already among the poorest in the world. The following are the most affected areas.

4.3.1 *Political impacts*

The biggest threat to human development in relation to fragility has been the proliferation of illicit SALW in the Republic of South Sudan. A NGO respondent pointed out that there are approximately 3 million small arms and light weapons in the country. A retired senior military officer emphasized that illicit SALW are at the heart of the security challenge that continues to deter development as the government is unable to provide security.


Respondents (58%) pointed out that anticipated disarmament processes have been undercut by the ongoing feeling of insecurity among the people. This is coupled with lack of a legal framework regulating arms control, absence of alternative livelihoods, poor stockpile management and conditions, and loss of faith in the disarmament process. The study noted that disarmament should be systematic and holistic, addressing economic issues, education, and legislation on small arms. It was pointed out that

disarmament has failed by 60% of the respondents, since individuals always re-arm to protect themselves and their property. In this case, most are reluctant to give up their arms because their security has not been safeguarded. Respondents also asserted that in cases where disarmament has started, it has been inconsistent and biased, with one community being disarmed and the neighbouring community left armed.

4.3.2 Development/ economic impact

Fragility situations have also affected development in the various sectors such as transport, agriculture, energy, security, provision of services and industrialization among others indicated in Figure 10 below:

Figure 10: Perceptions on how various sectors of development have been affected by political instability in percentage



Source: Research Findings.

a) Security

Figure 10 above reveals that 79% of the respondents held the view that security has been greatly affected by the existing fragility situations. This is linked to the presence of many armed rebel groups, which are fighting government forces and are in control of some of the regions of their operations. Security is a key component for development in a society. Therefore, absence of security translates to low development. A total of 64% of the respondents were of the opinion that transportation and road networks have been negatively affected by the fragility situations. There are armed gangs along the way targeting traders or civilians. In most cases, they would loot from the civilians. Similarly, 55% of the respondents indicated that pastoralism had equally been affected and following the 2013 crisis, there was increased number of cattle raids.

According to a UNHCR official, criminal gangs were allowed by political leaders to attack different ethnic groups and robbed them of their cattle. As a result, communities that hitherto never possessed illicit SALW armed themselves to repulse attacks.

b) Foreign investment

Figure 10 above indicates that 59% of the respondents were of the view that political instability has greatly impacted on foreign investment. Political instability raises the cost of doing business due to insecurity and poor social-economic infrastructure. Therefore, investors are not willing to incur extra cost in providing security and in doing so they are still not sure of the safety of their businesses. Two FGD with Juba University students highlighted that the recent conflict worsened the economy by deterring investment and trade, and halting key economic activities.

c) **Agriculture**

Fragility situations have adversely affected the agricultural sector as noted by 48% of the respondents in Figure 10 above. An officer at Saferworld stated that South Sudan is predominantly agro-pastoralist. The conflict has, however, led to the disruption of these key economic activities in the country, with farmers displaced from their farms and pastoralists now even more insecure due to the creation of a conducive environment for cattle rustling. The respondents pointed out that the crisis has crippled agricultural production, risking the starvation of millions of the South Sudanese. The conflict drove people away from their sources of livelihood thus hampering development. A respondent from Saferworld explained that the predominant livelihood activities in the Republic of South Sudan are farming, fishing and cattle keeping, which were all disrupted by the conflict.

d) **Mining**

Most Civil Society respondents (64%) pointed out that dependence on oil has worsened the current economic crisis, due to reduced government oil revenue. Majority of the respondents (60%) observed that the conflict led to a reduction of production, which in turn affected the government's already limited capacity to run institutions, deliver basic services, and invest in infrastructural development. Oil has become a scarce commodity in the Republic of South Sudan, as one observes motorists queuing for hours at filling stations for gas. Loss of oil revenue has negative implications for macro-budgetary indicators in South Sudan.

e) **Poverty**

A total of 59% of respondents pointed out that while there has been relative economic growth occasioned by the signing of the 2005 CPA, the current political impasse has retarded this development and poverty levels have been on the rise. An official at the Universal Intervention and Development Organization (UIDO) stated that the conflict has led to high living costs, displacements where locals have left their farms unattended, fear, and withdrawal by investors who had populated such towns as Juba. This has generally had an impact on micro-economic indicators, with the majority of the South Sudanese complaining of increased prices for basic commodities such as food and shelter.


f) **Unemployment**

Owing to increased levels of unemployment, both the government and Civil Society respondents agreed that proliferation of illicit SALW is a major contributor to unemployment. Fragility situations have seen many youth acquire illicit SALW leading to a culture of violence and increased criminality on the streets of Juba and beyond. For instance, in October 2015, in the course of this research, around 27 young men were arrested in possession of illicit arms in Juba. They stated that they had acquired the guns from military personnel at a daily charge of 250 Sudanese pounds. These youth were using the weapons to commit crimes, increasingly an avenue of income for youth in Juba with its high youth unemployment. Illicit SALW proliferation creates the widespread feeling of insecurity. A respondent from the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms asserted that there have been cases of cold-blooded homicides, highway robberies, cattle raiding, inter-communal violence, interpersonal violence and brutality by unemployed youth in major towns of Jonglei, Juba, Malakal and Bentiu.

4.3.3 *Social impacts*

The fragility situations in the Republic of South Sudan, occasioned by the proliferation of illicit SALW have adversely affected the country. Figure 11 below shows the impact of fragility situations on different aspects of livelihoods.

Figure 11: Impact of Fragility Situations and illicit SALW proliferation on livelihoods



Source: Research Findings

i. Health

Figure 11 above shows that 71% of the respondents were of the view that child mortality rates had been highly affected by the current fragility situations. The mortality rate in 2015 stood at 60 per 1000 live births.³⁸ The situation is further deteriorated by the bad condition of the health facilities. Hence, 64% of the respondents indicated that access to health facilities had been highly affected by the fragile situations. As a result, majority of the population lacked access to health facilities, hence poor living standards. In the rural areas and the outskirts of Juba, health facilities are dilapidated and health providers are lacking. Years of conflict have seen health providers flee the country leading to shortage of health practitioners. The lack of sufficient funding for the public sector has led to deterioration in provision of basic social services, especially in rural areas, for which the government receives blame.

ii. Education

A total of 59% of the respondents held that fragility situations have greatly impacted on school enrolment, as shown in Figure 11 above. The adult literacy is at 27% with 70% of children between the ages of 6-17 having never gone to school.³⁹ NGO

participants in this study reported that enrolment, retention and dropout rates have also been consistent and the levels of literacy remain low. A university professor of economics at Juba University pointed out that the protracted conflict in the Republic of South Sudan has seen government funds diverted to military spending at the expense of health and education. Respondents from United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) explained that up to 75% of the youth are illiterate. Illiteracy among the youth was cited as a cause and consequence of proliferation of illicit SALW. This is because uneducated youth are usually idle and mobilizing and arming them has become a norm further exacerbating insecurity situations in the Republic of South Sudan.

In conclusion, instability in the Republic of South Sudan has led to the disruption of livelihoods, further impoverishing communities in the Republic of South Sudan. Social amenities and much-needed infrastructure have been destroyed by the conflict, derailing service delivery, especially in rural areas.

³⁸The World Bank (WB), “Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births),” Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN> (Accessed on 04/03/2016).

³⁹The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), “Basic Education and Gender Equality,” Available at: <http://www.unicef.org/southsudan/education.html> (Accessed 12/03/2016).

4.4 Existing interventions

As discussed above, fragility situations and the proliferation of illicit SALW have adversely affected economic, social and political development of the Republic of South Sudan at both micro and macro levels. Acknowledging these effects, the government, regional and international actors have, thus, put in place measures to build resilience and stabilize the country. The existing intervention measures are herein discussed.

4.4.1 National approach

i) Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement of January 2014

Respondents (54%) were aware of the 2014 Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement signed by President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. The government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and SPLM/A-in opposition signed the cessation of hostilities agreement in Addis Ababa during the IGAD-mediated peace talks. The agreement required that the current conflict would be addressed through dialogue and not by military means. It also called on community representatives to monitor compliance alongside other national, regional, and international actors. Respondents from the Civil Society sector and other security personnel interviewed said that the cessation of hostilities did not, however, materialize due to a blame game between the two factions.

ii) Disarmament

The interviewees acknowledged that the government has also attempted several disarmament exercises in the recent past. They pointed out that in 2008 there was disarmament in Jonglei and Warrap states. Respondents mentioned that in 2011 a locally driven disarmament exercise was carried out in the former Lakes State, which resulted in the collection of 3,000 arms. Local community members, however, lamented that disarmament in the country has in the past taken a forceful approach with individuals being coerced to give up arms. Some noted that communities that have long lived in conflict situations and been sidelined in development processes do not understand the need to disarm. They suggested that disarmament should be voluntary and that raising awareness on the need to disarm at the community level should precede disarmament efforts.

iii) Federalism through creation of 28 new states

President Salva Kiir's creation of 28 new states was seen as improving governance. These new states are, Imatong, Namurnyong, Maridi, Amadi, Gbudwe/Bodudwe, Juba, Terekeka, Yei River, Wau, Aweil, Lol, Aweil East, Twic East, Gokrial East, Tonj, Eastern Lake, Western Lake, Gok, Northern Lich, Southern Lich, Ruweng, Eastern Nile, Jonglei, Western Nile, Western Bieh, Eastern Bieh, Latjor, and Boma. This is aimed at bringing the services closer to the people. An officer at the Sudd Institute stated that this would also ensure efficiency in service delivery. Others pointed out that it would help solve border issues between communities by recognizing them and giving them their own territory.

iv) Conflict-Sensitive Development Program by BCSSAC

South Sudan has designed a collective incentive program operating under the Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC). An officer at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) described this program as a conflict-sensitive development project. Officers working under this program rely on information gathered from the community through community assessment meetings to determine the needed intervention in a particular area. The communities identify insecurity drivers in their region and projects are designed and implemented to address them. Respondents noted that before the conflict these programs had been implemented in 6 out of the 10 states. The projects provided police posts, juvenile detention centres, bore holes, tractors under food projects, communication equipment such as radios, aid vehicles to county commissioners, and motorcycles among other things. Communities were also brought together to interact and live peacefully. These projects brought about relative peace until violent conflicts erupted in December 2013.

Besides these initiatives the BCSSAC has been engaged in record keeping and marking of arms for the army, police, national security, civilians and private security companies. They have done this with the technical support of the Regional Centre of Small Arms (RECSA).

4.4.2 Regional approach

i) IGAD-Plus Compromise Peace Agreement of August 2015

Most of the respondents identified the IGAD-Plus compromise peace agreement as the key intervention strategy that has, albeit partly, helped address political instability and proliferation of illicit SALW in the Republic of South Sudan. A policy analyst at the Sudd Institute noted that on August 17th and 26th 2015 the GRSS and SPLM/A-IO were pressured into signing the IGAD-Plus agreement for the resolution of the crisis in the Republic of South Sudan. This fragile peace agreement is currently governing the transition to peace, with a focus on reforms in key state institutions that are tasked with peace and stability. However, 57% of informants were sceptical about the success of this agreement.

The respondents highlighted the limited capacity of the government to implement it, and a weakened economy as the chief concerns. In addition, the agreement touched on the removal of forces from the capital Juba but the respondents pointed to the vacuum of insecurity that would be left, especially by the departure of Ugandan forces. The transitional government established by the agreement still faces disagreements among top political leaders. Civil Society participants pointed out that despite the signing of the ceasefire by the transitional government, as stipulated in the IGAD-Plus peace agreement, there has been continued exchange of fire between warring parties. This is threatening the implementation of what has been described as the Republic of South Sudan's path to development and prosperity.

ii) RECSA

Although the Republic of South Sudan has signed, but not ratified the Nairobi Protocol, RECSA has assisted the country by facilitating software training for the BCSSAC security personnel on electronic record that would allow easy traceability and retrieval of records of arms in the hands of security personnel from the military, police, prisons, wildlife and national security forces. This has assisted in the regulation of arms and controlled the misuse of arms by security officers adversely mentioned in the proliferation of illicit SALW. Additionally, RECSA has been at the forefront in supplying equipment and training people to initiate marking programmes of weapons. In addition to this, RECSA has played a key role in training people on basic equipment maintenance.

4.4.3 International approaches

i) The United Nation Program of Action (UNPoA) Commitment

On 21 July 2001, the Republic of South Sudan committed to a consensus decision of the United Nations to adopt, support and implement the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. However, according to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, South Sudan has not yet declared its small arms exports in one or more annual National Reports on Arms Exports.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

Even though the above interventions have been undertaken, they have not been effective enough in addressing the fragility situations in South Sudan. This study established that there is a strong nexus between proliferation of illicit SALW and fragility in South Sudan. The historical fragility situations in South Sudan are largely attributed to weak governance institutions and protracted conflicts. These conflicts are mainly fuelled by proliferation of illicit SALW from within and outside the country, which have subsequently weakened the government's authority, capacity and legitimacy. This is demonstrated by the existence of clan and ethnic politics, increased IDP camps, presence of peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies. This has offered a fertile ground for existence and breeding of armed groups and continued fragility situations, further weakening the government's nascent institutions.

5.2 Recommendations

The study recommends strengthening of governance institutions, addressing proliferation of illicit SALW, reforming of the public and security sectors and post conflict reconstruction in building resilience. Specific details of this are as follows:

a) **Strengthening of governance institution:** to effectively address fragility situations in South Sudan it is important to strengthen, existing governance institutions through public sector reforms for effective and efficient public service delivery.

The GRSS should be assisted in building public sector's institutional capacity. Effective institutions will also contribute to the diversification of livelihoods and other key economic sectors in the society. There is also need for efficient coordination and information sharing between the various government departments and agencies that have a role to play in building resilience is often a significant barrier in tackling fragility situations. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the capacity of various governance institutions for them to implement their mandates.

b) Address proliferation of illicit SALW: the widespread use of SALW in the country calls for interventions in the following areas - capacity building and strengthening the Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control (BCSSAC), undertaking comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise, sensitization and civilian disarmament, enhance safe storage and management of government stocks including arms marking, electronic record keeping and destruction of obsolete and surplus stocks. The fragility in South Sudan is of regional and international concern and therefore cannot be addressed in isolation. This calls for a concerted effort and political will among the regional and international actors for a lasting solution in South Sudan. In implementing above interventions, regional or international cooperation will be paramount.

c) Security sector reforms: the long history of instability in South Sudan coupled with inadequate security sector capacity calls for comprehensive security sector reforms. This should involve establishment of appropriate security sector management policies, and laws, rationalization of security and law enforcement personnel, training and kitting. The role of development partners is critical in providing the needed resources and integration of international and regional standards.

d) The Post conflict reconstruction: the many years of conflict has left the socio-economic sector of South Sudan shuttered. Majority of the people are poor, illiterate and cannot access the basic social services. The higher levels of unemployment coupled with proliferation of SALW has led to the increase of armed violence as a means of bargaining for social gains. It is therefore necessary to heavily investment in the socio-economic sectors of the country such as health, education and infrastructure.

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